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This doctoral thesis investigates the process and problems of central (top-down) 
budgeting system of Iran and aims at exploring how it can be replaced with a decentralized 
(Bottom –up) model that may be more in line with the interests and expectations of regions 
of the country. In chapter 1, the trend of socio-economic planning in last decades 
(particularly after the Islamic revolution) is studied and the reason why access to the 
endowment of fossilized energy resources could not accelerate and pass current developing 
situation is reviewed. 
Then in chapters 2 and 3 a historical pathology of planning and budgeting system 
considering various conceptual understandings of planning and budgeting and their 
underlying effects on development indicators is discussed. 
To highlight the importance of participatory role of people in process of planning and 
budgeting, the concepts and characteristics of good governance and its possibility to 
implement in Iran is critically reviewed in chapter 4. 
Differences in the conceptual understanding of decentralization has urged the author to 
resort to questionnaires and face to face interviews with most experienced experts and 
scholars in the field of planning and budgeting in Iran, which are explained in detail in 
chapter five.  
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Based on the compilation and classification of viewpoints of the respondents and 
concentration on the concept of good governance, chapter 6 of the thesis entails reformative 
guidelines which are presented in line with necessary changes in the basic rules and 
regulations governing the budgeting system of the country and has provided practical steps 
towards its realization. 
This thesis contributes to an initiative document for the adoption of executive policies in 
Iran's planning and budgeting system which eventually results in the improvement of living 
conditions and the development indices of the country. 
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This doctoral thesis has tried to investigate the current planning and budgeting processes 
in Iran which have led to an unequal socio- economic development. The purpose of this 
thesis which focuses on budget allocation based on an appropriate central- regional 
government relationship was to improve coordination and collaboration across central and 
regional government agencies for planning and budgeting. This would in turn lead to 
further improvement of the ability of the government as a whole to achieve its desired 
development outcomes through devolution of central authority to regional responsible 
people with the aim of uplifting transparency in budgeting performance and accountability 
of regional authorities. 
The thesis principally aims at elaborating on a top- down process of budgeting (to use 
unique roles and regulations defined by central authorities) and down – top process 
(identifying significant and emerging issues, projects and priorities by regional and local 
authorities) basis. 
At the center of this thesis lies a critical discussion of the trend of socio-economic 
planning and budgeting history in Iran in relation to regional development. The thesis 
considers various evidences of all economic development plans, and their practical 
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implementations which resulted in a significant inequality in distribution of budget among 
provinces, with wider political and social ramifications. The thesis is divided into six 
chapters which are briefly explained in this introductory part. 
 
Chapter One: 
The first chapter is largely engaged with expanding the problem statement, main 
questions of the research, conceptual framework, methodology and some important data 
which shows the importance of attending to this subject as a doctoral thesis. The chapter, 
based on figures and existing reports on different development indices, tries to show that 
implementation of different economic development plans over recent decades in Iran and 
current planning and budget allocation and existing investment flow in the country have not 
succeeded in the alleviation of inequality and poverty, the achievement of which would 
help the process of regional development. This fact has resulted in inefficient economic 
performance of budget allocation and caused disparity and regional imbalance between 
provinces. 
The model and means of distribution of constructive financial facilities and investment 
have not been able to change or improve development indicators in all provinces at the 
same level. It could be said that the current concentrated budgeting system with high 
authority for overruling provincial budget and using an ineffective model of distribution of 
global constructive budget, is not efficient and needs to be revised and reorganized. 
Furthermore, because of the particular polices of government centralization with its lack 
of political and wider public accountability - which manifests itself in terms of inadequate 
regional governance as well as the involvement of private sector innovators - regional 
governance and development have been distorted, which in turn prevent proper sustainable 
development. 
This resulted in a wide gap between urban and rural areas on the one hand, and among 
different regions and provinces, on the other. Comprehensive development and a national- 
regional coordination development would not have occurred without enough attention to 
closely set conjunction of rural and urban society and their mutual effect on each other. 
As such, in the first chapter of the thesis, it has been tried through figures and tables to 
find out why some of our people in the less- developed provinces suffer from poverty and 
malnutrition and why generally deprived and border provinces always remain undeveloped 
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class and further why injection of financial resource and governmental investment, have 
had very less effect on development indices in these provinces? 
As an important part of the thesis I almost tried to conclude the conceptual framework of 
the research based on a decentralized planning and budgeting system influenced by the 
aims and objectives of good governance policies in an Islamic country. The core of this 
conceptual frame work is the current centralized approach to preparation of the annual plan 
and budget document. The budget of a country is the most important tool in the hand of 
government for implementing the socio-economic, cultural and political policies. 
Administrative structure of the government has a tight relation with budget preparation 
process. This relationship depends on comprehensive changes in structure of 
administration, implementation, planning, decentralization, privatization, economic 
liberalization and active participation of public sector in economic management of the 
country.  
Theoretically, according to Rondinelli, (1981) to achieve all these, it requires, along with 
financial resources, the belief in decentralization as an ideological principle which seeks 
goals of democratic decision-making, public participation, and accountability of 
government authorities and self dependency of regions. At the same time, decentralization 
transfers the responsibility from central government to local and regional authorities, and 
emphasizes on their accountability, therefore this process has not only become a strong 
incentive for local authorities to consider the priorities of the regional people but also, it 
will result in public participation in the decision making, financial and technical efficiency 
and more political stability. 
 
Chapter Two 
To illustrate a critical comparison of main theoretical framework in the field of planning 
and development in countries like Iran, chapter two of the thesis is concerned with the 
literature review on theory, occurrence and the evolution of planning. A historical review 
on emergence of economic planning in Iran followed by its critical assessment has been 
presented in the last part of the second chapter. 
The chapter tries to conclude given definitions of planning. A Simple definition of 
economic planning agreed by most of economists and planners refers to a type of 
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scheduling the future activities and holds three main characteristics: a) Plan is related to 
future, b) Plan includes time table for specific activities in national economy and c) 
responsible organization should implement the plan. Economic development can also be 
described in terms of objectives. These are most commonly described as the creation of 
jobs and wealth, and the improvement of quality of life or a process that influences growth 
and restructuring of an economy to enhance the economic well-being of a community. 
Economic development policies could also be classified in 3 separate periods. The first 
period initiates from windup of the Second World War and continues up to the last decade 
of 1970, with the idea that government can equip necessary financial and non-financial 
resources through public and government companies. The second period( 1980-1990) the 
follower of market economy (Neo-liberals or Chicago School) seeks to transfer part of the 
control of the economy from public to private sector to ostensibly, bring a more efficient 
government and to improve economic indicators of the nation. According to this school any 
kind of government interference to change what the market generates, is anti-productive. So 
the look towards government as a factor of development changed to an obstacle towards 
development. In the third period in which a new wave of theories and approaches started, 
the subject of size of state (large or small) was pointed out and the quantity of state has 
changed to quality of interference of state. If we assume the slogans of the first period 
"state as engine of development" and second period "small state", the slogan for the third 
period is "good governance" which can be defined as execution of social, economic, and 
administrative power according to law, efficiency and accountability. 
For many of developing and new independent countries, economic planning was 
regarded as an appropriate model for rapid socio-economic growth and a way of 
renouncement from the group of less developed countries. For industrialized developed 
countries like Japan, planning was considered as a tool of coordinating economic growth, 
without any change in social structure of the country. More important, was the accentuation 
of international competition between industrialized countries in both east and west block 
which increasingly exposed the need for planning. 
In Iran, the planning experience has the benefit of continuity which is found in many 
other developed countries, where the national plan was adopted as a central instrument of 
decision-making and when comprehensive medium-term plans (mainly 5-7 years plans) 
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were prepared in regular and uninterrupted sequence. However, Islamic revolution and 
imposed war of Iraq against Iran were exceptions in the duration of this continuity. 
During the recent years, the approach of planning underwent further modification which 
was adequately flexible to take into account the constantly changing macro-economic 
situation, and organized development around heavy industrial and large infrastructural 
projects. This flexibility enables the government to adjust the annual and mid-term plans to 
the changes as and when they occurred. 
These changes to the approach of planning illustrate the way in which the government 
experimented with different combinations of roles for planning, ranging from an advisory 
role distanced from the decision-making process to one centered in the policy-making 
process. The planning system in Iran benefited from three "macro, sectoral, and regional" 
subclass structures, a) Macro planning is the most efficient part of this system and in the 
economic point of view it has a very important and institutionalized position, b) Sectoral 
planning also due to its historical credit holds a traditional place in planning system of this 
country which affords the combination of activities during the period of plan according to 
global budget allocation, c) The third dimension(regional planning) despite many years, 
still has not been well established in planning system of Iran's development plans. During 
the period of sixty years of experience in planning in Iran, five Mid-run Constructive 
Development Plans before revolution and another five Development Plans after the 
revolution have been formulated and implemented. These development plans have been 
critically discussed in chapter two of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Three 
Due to the important role of budgeting in successful implementation of plans and 
activities, the third chapter of the thesis underscores history and process of budgeting in 
Iran. This part of the research has been critically analyzed based on 27 years of experience 
on planning and budgeting of the author of the thesis in Iran. 
Traditionally, budgeting is considered to be one of the most important management tools to 
run the organization, evaluate its performance and motivate its people, (De Waal, 2005). 
Briefly, budgeting means deciding or estimating in advance, the course of action to achieve 
a particular target or objective in a given period of time along with numerical expression of 
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the inputs required and outputs expected. Today, budgeting has become the major issue of 
national politics and the lifeblood of government. 
Budgeting in Iran, like most other countries, is the nerve center of the government. 
It is a decision-making system for allocating funds and tapping resources in order to 
achieve governmental priorities and objectives efficiently and effectively. 
Iran has traditionally been a highly centralized country with most of the national 
resources owned and operated by the national government. Despite much emphasis made in 
the Constitution of Iran on the need for local councils and the active participation of people 
in handling community-based affairs, little has been done to transform the highly 
centralized administrative system of the country. 
The comprehensive control of government over natural resources, particularly oil and 
gas, major industry, rail road's and other major means of transportation, as well as fiscal 
institutions (banks and insurance companies) also means that the bulk of government 
budget is derived from these nationalized resources rather than taxes or local community 
rates. State interference in the economy covers a whole spectrum: wages, prices, exchange 
rates, trade and business, interest rates, and state-bank lending quotas in addition to direct 
industrial, agricultural and commercial control (Farjadi, 2001). 
In the economic arena, oil revenues in fact constitute the main source of government 
budget and the latter tends to suffer as a result of periodic fluctuations in oil production or 
prices. Despite general consensus regarding the long term consequences of heavy 
dependence of government budget and the national economy on a single product, almost all 
efforts to build an oil-free economy have so far met little success. Although not the largest 
sector, oil accounts for more than 80 percent of annual foreign-exchange earnings and 
nearly 70 percent of annual state finances. 
 While reduction and eventual elimination of this dependence have been mandated in 
each and every of the past development plans, the reliance on oil has, if anything, actually 
intensified. The government’s need for oil receipts has increased from $16 billion in 2001 
to $41 billion in 2009. Recent oil-price volatility in the face of Iran’s increasing heavy 
dependence on imports of essential capital and consumer goods now presents an even more 
ominous threat. According to a recent IMF estimate, a protracted oil price below $75 per 
barrel may play havoc with Iran’s economy. The Perspective’s ultimate material success 
may, in fact, depend largely on the fate of Iran’s gas and oil industries. 
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The national fiscal program of the government, usually corresponding with the Iranian 
calendar year (starting on the 21 March), is known as the Government's Total Budget for 
that year. It contains the government's public budget including the budgets of banks, 
government corporations and affiliated enterprises. Government Public Budget is the 
portion of the total government budget which provides for financial resources needed by 
the government to carry out its annual programs and determine current and development 
credits for executive bodies. 
Government public budget covers two broad functions: payments and receipts. Payments 
of the government public budget comprise all expenditures, both development 
(constructional) and current, paid by the government from general and exclusive revenues 
during a financial year. Receipts of the government public budget contain all sums known 
as general and exclusive revenues as well as miscellaneous sources of revenues, and funds 
that should legally be accumulated in the Treasury General's accounts. General revenues 
consist of revenues gained from oil and gas, taxes, and other sources of income in the 
public budget. Exclusive revenues are those legally allotted to special expenditures in the 
government public budget. 
All funds allocated in the annual budget approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(Majlis or the Parliament) fall into two broad categories: Development or constructional 
budgets and current expenditure budgets. Development budgets refer to funds provided to 
implement development projects and expand current expenditures of the government's 
socioeconomic plans. Current expenditure refers to budgets provided to meet government's 
current expenditures as well as expenditures of maintaining the level of government's 
socioeconomic activities. 
Lack of transparency in government budget is the gravest economic threat. The annual 
budget document, approved by the Parliament usually after weeks of deliberation, is hardly 
ever faithfully adhered to. Formally in balance at the time of approval, the budget 
invariably ends up in deficit usually due to a paltry and inflexible tax base, recurrent losses 
of state-owned enterprises, poor tax collection and unaffordable public-welfare 
expenditures. 
A shortage of funds in the current expenditures is routinely made up by transfers from 
the constructional portion. In recent years, one-fourth of the annual constructional 
(development) budget has been diverted to regular expenditures, resulting in thousands of 
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development projects unfinished. Budget deficits are normally financed by the Central 
Bank, operating as the government’s cash cow. 
A share of 30% of the total budget is stipulated in concentrated sections (without any list 
of projects), which causes many problems in optimizing the allocation of the resources. In 
recent years, number of secondary lines corresponding to executive organizations in the 
budget has increased and each executive department has specified a specific budgetary line 
for itself. What has been briefly addressed as problems and challenges of the budgeting 
system in Iran has been critically and thoroughly reviewed in this chapter. Practical 
recommendations are also offered in the chapter. 
 
Chapter Four 
It is important to note that lack of due attention to the concept and paradigm of good 
governance has turned into a fundamental concern in running public affairs in many parts 
of the world. Given Iran's traditional bureaucracy, chapter four of the thesis deals with this 
concept and evaluates its applicability in Iran. This is done both theoretically and 
empirically with specific attention to multicultural society, constitution and political system 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
My purpose of the word "governance" in this research gives sense to the concept of 
governance as it is used in public policy and public administration. Governance is the 
capacity of government to make and implement policy and to steer society (Pierre and 
peters 2000), which is an old top-down definition of governance. This chapter comprises a 
theoretical framework and literature review for the discussion on the concept and role of 
‘good governance’ in development management and public administration, which 
emphasizes the responsibility of governments as service providers and architects of 
development as a whole and regional development and poverty alleviation, specifically in 
Iran through a mix model of Transcendental Value Management (TVM) and Public Value 
Management (PVM) which have been proposed with regard to the goals of Iran Vision 
2025. 
The concept of governance, in fact is simple. It is seen as a set of values, as well as 
social processes at different levels, on the basis of interaction among governments, civil 
society and the private sector including participation, rule of law, transparency, 
responsiveness, equality, inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. 
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According to the model of good governance, governments should establish a type of 
governance to pave the way for their own national development. Otherwise, their weak 
governance will emerge as a development inhibitor. The evidence largely verifies the fact 
that building this model based on values explained by neoliberal presupposition will 
undermine its desirability to the followers of other common ideologies in the world. 
In fact, this model depicts the desired governance in industrial countries, and its 
generalization to all countries, with different conditions and in different stages of growth 
and development, is not acceptable by the scientific method of research. Although Good 
governance was proposed by the World Bank to lay grounds for the development and 
growth of developing countries; the successful experience of East Asia raises the question 
whether good governance is really a prerequisite to development or not (MetteKjaer 2004). 
Chapter four has tried to raise this question whether the characteristics mentioned for 
"good governance" are also justifiable with the adjective “good” in an Iranian society? In 
other words, isn’t the idea of good governance in a country like Iran, which seeks to 
implement Islamic governance, a kind of clash? Maybe the best answer to such a question 
is a model of democracy which, given the culture of Iran and with regard to Islamic 
principles and values, has taken the form of Islamic democracy (religious democracy). A 
prominent feature of the present political system in Iran is the Islamic dimension of its 
government. As a result, to use the paradigm of good governance in the Islamic-Iranian 
pattern, we need to design a local model which would encompass all the characteristics of 
good governance under the umbrella of Islamic values. Therefore, to customize good 
governance in Iran, the “Islamic” feature should also be taken into account as one of the 
other characteristics of good governance. 
Thus, one may ask whether in a political system based on Islamic values, accountability 
can be considered as a characteristic of good governance. Any prejudgment regarding this 
question is misleading and wrong simply because accountability in its highest perceived 
situation is a basic tenet of Islamic political discourse. As Hood (1995) states, there is no 
unique model for “good governance”, rather a range of models for good governance 
consistent with the existing climate in countries (political and cultural factors) could be 
imagined. In Iran, such a model should be devised and applied with a focus on the 
“Islamic” feature of governance on the one side, and the long-term development plan of the 
country (20-Year Vision) and indigenous traits of Iranian society on the other. 
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Thus, the possibility should not be disregarded that the paradigm of good governance 
could be a solution to Iran’s public administration dilemma by blending the relevant 
mechanisms of empowerment and the improvement of living conditions. 
 
Chapter Five 
Due to the centralized system of planning and budget allocation and poor role of 
provincial authorities in financial and administrative affairs of provinces in Iran, the main 
hypothesis of the research was framed within a theoretical conception of decentralization. 
In this chapter of the thesis, the author, notwithstanding his experience in planning and 
budgeting system of Iran, has tried to prove this controversial hypothesis and bring forward 
the best understanding of the issues rising from academic studies and from government 
official's experiences relevant to policy formation through wide spread interviews and 
completion of professional questionnaire focusing on decentralization. 
Since data collection via questionnaires does not necessarily imply the use of a particular 
technique, face to face interview, observation and content analysis were also applied. This 
part of the research is the result of integrated comments made by participants who 
contributed to the completion of questionnaires and interviews. 
To this end the experiences and attitudes of Iranian experts who have been actively 
involved with development budgeting at both central (national) and regional (provincial) 
levels were investigated and the population of experts with development planning and 
budgeting experience at national and provincial levels were identified and 95 individual and 
highly respected experts and managers in a random order were eventually selected. 
The sample consisted of two major subgroups. The first consisted of senior experts in 
national planning and budgeting who, as members of the central office of the Plan and 
Budget Organization, had been actively involved in the preparation of the national 
development plans and budgets enacted in Iran over the past two decades. The second 
group consisted of similarly senior experts who have been affiliated to the Governor 
Generals' Office or the provincial bureaus of the Plan and Budget Organization and have 
been actively engaged in the development of provincial development plans and budgets 
required for implementation. 
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The total of 60 questionnaires for provinces (total of 30 provinces) and 35 questionnaires 
for the national level (30 sectors) were collected. There are altogether 95 completed 
questionnaires each of which contains 6 hypotheses and 51 questions. 
To summarize, the results of this part of the research which will be the basis for the 
recommended amendments in chapter 6, illustrate the fact that only 85.3% of the 
respondents among provincial authorities believed in the tendency toward the policy of 
implementing decentralized budgeting process. 
Around 94.7% of respondents believed in the necessity of reforming the basic laws and 
conducting a comprehensive study of decentralization. Some 93.7 percent of the 
respondents believed in reforming the basic laws of the country to better implement 
decentralization policies. 
More than 87.4 percent of the respondents believed that decentralization has been able to 
further extent the regional financial authority. As such, respondents have expressed their 
opinion in a way that decentralization has a very positive impact on structural reform and 
better administration in regions. About 93.7 percent voted the options that decentralization 
can draw service providers and receivers closer. 
Another outcome shows that 68.1 percent of the respondents believed that if the 
authority of the central government were limited to advisory and oversight roles it would 
highly or very highly contribute to better management of the organization. 
Nearly 90.3 percent who selected the high and very high options believed that extra 
delegation of authority to lower levels increases participation in the implementation of 
decentralization at a high and very high rate. 
All in all, it can be concluded that in words of expert groups, there is a tendency towards 
implementation of decentralization policy, and that the basic laws of the country should be 
reformed in favor of decentralization. Moreover, it is necessary to extend decentralization 
in various phases of budgeting, and to compensate the low degree of coordination in 
various phases of budgeting. Finally, due to the direct correlation between decentralization 
and efficiency, it should be realized that the effects of decentralization on structural reform 
for better administration and organizational management are significant. Local government 
would fulfill the needs and willingness of their people much better than the central 
government and they would allocate financial resources more efficiently( Teibout, 1959). 
 
 
12    
Chapter Six 
Chapter six attempts to use findings of the preceding chapters in order to propose 
recommendations for the transformation of the current centralized budgeting system into a 
decentralized one equipped with a better allocation of national financial resources in three 
dimensions. 
First, the results gained by summing up the opinions of the senior experts and scholars in 
the planning and budgeting system of Iran, who have completed the questionnaires of this 
research, second, the finding of historical pathology of the current planning and budgeting 
system and third concept of good governance, the requirement and features of its 
accessibility in Iran are utilized. Accordingly, experts regarded decentralization approach in 
budgeting system, devolution of financial power, enhancement of the power of making 
decisions and reforming rules and regulation as desired option to promote public's 
participation in process of decision-marking. This will result in a transparent implication of 
plans and projects, an increase in economic efficiency and leads to better accountability of 
regional authorities regarding the decisions taken and improves the development indices in 
the different regions of country. 
Findings of the second dimension- historical pathology- show that due to centralized 
planning and budgeting system as well as centralized budget allocation for constructive 
projects and activities, the development level of different provinces and counties has been 
imbalanced and the distribution of national budgets has been unfair.       The solutions were, 
transforming the centralized system of budgeting and budget allocation into a decentralized 
process, devolution of financial power to local and regional authorities, granting revenue 
license to different regions, and devolution of power to provincial treasuries. 
The third dimension involves the concept of good Governance, and the requirement and 
features of its accessibility. According to both World Bank's definition and a religious 
ideological system, Good Governance stresses on further participation of the people, 
development of legal and institutional frameworks, establishment of a clear information 
system, enhancement of accountability level, promptness in decision-making, devolution of 
power to lower levels, privatization, enhancement of financial motivation in different 
regions, and transparency. 
The findings of the research in these three dimensions (the system of planning and 
budgeting, completion of questionnaires and Good Governance) can be summarized in 4 
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eminent features, which are all the products of a decentralized administrative and financial 
system. The features are as follows: 
1- Increasing the technological and financial efficiency. 
2- Decreasing the administrative corruption. 
3- Increasing the political stability. 
4- Preventing the expansion of government size. 
To achieve these goals, the author has recommended necessary amendments in the basic 
rules and regulations governing the planning and budgeting system of the country relying 
on his own knowledge and experiments. 
The prerequisite to these reforms is the government's determination to devolve the 
responsibilities to local and regional authorities and to change the planning and budgeting 
system within a decentralized and a bottom – up approach. 
Accordingly, the projects required for every region are identified, prioritized, and 
proposed by local and regional authorities: Then, the required budgets based on estimations 
made in the region will be allocated and the required licenses for generating revenue in the 
regions will be granted to regional authorities for planning, implementation, control and 
assessment of the projects. 
Obviously, taking these measures lays grounds necessary for the establishment of civil 
institutions and NGOs which in turn will boost transparency in the implementation of 
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In the first chapter, I aim to present a clear-cut picture of Socio-economic realities in 
Iran including regional inequities which has mainly been the brainchild of inappropriate 
economic development planning models experienced in the past sixty years. I strongly 
believe this would largely contribute to the definition of the problem statement as well as 
the research questions upon which this doctoral thesis has been developed. The chapter 
later concentrates on conceptual framework, methodology and data that would underpin the 
core of this thesis.  
 
Intuition  
Resource allocation and the effective use of resources have been two major concerns of 
citizens, countries and governments, Premchand, (1993), Key.V. O, (1940) raised the issue 
of budgeting more than 60 years ago, “On what basis shall it be decided to allocate X 
dollars to activity A instead of activity B? Musgrave.R, (1969) the clearest exponent of 
welfare economics, has produced an abstract model that simplifies the interpretation of a 
budget preparation process. His model is based on the notion that budget preparation 
involves three branches, each of which is governed by one of the basic goals of economic 
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policy. These branches are: a: stabilization and growth, involving prevention of 
unemployment and inflation, and provision for raising standards of living, b: distribution, 
entails transferring resources to modify income distribution and correction of perceived 
injustices in the distribution of wealth in society, c: allocation, consists of defining what 
public needs and collective goods are to be met and to what extent they are to be met.  
Research at the center of this thesis seeks to demonstrate, based on the critical review of 
existing reports and analysis of empirical data, that implementation of economic 
development plans over recent decades in Iran, and current planning and budget allocations 
and investment flows, have demonstrably failed to eliminate disparities, inequality and 
poverty. Achievement of this lofty goal could have helped the process of regional 
development in this resource-rich country.  
As shall be demonstrated in the study, this major setback has led to inefficient economic 
performance of budget allocations. Furthermore, because of centralization policies, with its 
lack of political and public accountability, good governance and real development have 
been distorted, which by extension has undermined much-needed sustainable development.  
By taking into account Key’s (1940) reference to the three government economic 
functions and his historical question, it can and should be asked whether a key concern for 
effective socio-economic development in Iran, as in most developing countries, is the 
function of budget allocation.  
Presently the government in Iran is involved not only in financing public goods and 
services in all regions, but also in wide-ranging economic activities with little or no regard 
to their comparative advantage. Most, if not all, of these activities can and should be the 
function of private enterprise. It is largely due to these government policies that optimum 
allocation of resources and determining regional priorities have become all the more 
difficult. 
A key point here is that in analyzing the budget allocation process in Iran, it is important 
to consider the political context within which budget allocations indeed occur, and to also 
contemplate its wider social impact on governance and development in the regions and 
provinces. To illustrate the conceptual understanding of inefficient performance of budget 
allocation in Iran, the socio-economic and geopolitical situation is reviewed in the 
following section.  
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Socioeconomic Contexts  
Trends in socioeconomic planning in Iran in recent decades (particularly before the 1979 
Islamic Revolution) have resulted in regional imbalances in growth and development, 
(MPO 2004)1. This has further accelerated and expanded urbanism in a manner that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the rural society and border areas despite their 
important role in the socio-economic structure of the country. The visible result is the 
widening gulf between urban and rural areas on the one hand, and across different regions 
and provinces on the other. As such, comprehensive development and a harmonious 
national-regional development balance remains a tall order with little regard to the need to 
closely knit the rural and urban society and recognize their mutual effect on each other 
(ibid).As enshrined in the Iranian Constitution, Iran is defined as a society in which the 
liberty and greatness of human being and conditions of growth and evolution are 
emphasized. The main characteristics of the society as per the Constitution are as follows, 
(Articles 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 19, 20 and 43 of the Constitution): 
 
 
Table 1-1: Requirements of political, socioeconomic and cultural independency 
Ref. in the 
Constitution Theme 
Items 8,10,12 of 
Article 3 
Political stability and legal/institutional discipline focused on development of a 
fair economy based on public participation. 
Item9 Article43 Drawing on domestic potentials for augmenting productive capabilities. 
Article 43 
Achieving the economic independence of the society, uprooting poverty and 
deprivation, and fulfilling human needs in the process of development while 
preserving human liberty. 
Item 7 
Article 43 
Utilization of science and technology, and the training of skilled personnel in 
accordance with the developmental needs of the country's economy 
Preamble to the 
Constitution 
Providing a suitable field for the emergence of human creative power in various 
forms of economic activities. 
Item 1 Article 43 Provision of basic necessities for all citizens. 
Item 11 
Article 3 
All round strengthening of the foundations of national defense for the 
sake of safeguarding the independence of the country. 
 
                                                 
1-Management and Planning Organization of Iran 
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Table 1-2: Requirements of freedom as a means to attain independence 
and nurture national talent 
Ref. in the 
Constitution Theme 
Item 7 
Article 3 Ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of the law. 
Item 8 
Article 3 
The participation of the entire people in determining their political, 
economic, social, and cultural destiny. 
Articles 22 & 23 
Prohibiting inquisition of belief and intrusion into the personal lives of the 
people. 
Article 26 Freedom for political parties, political associations, syndicates, and religious 
minorities 
Article 28 Every person is entitled to choose the employment he wishes, so long as it is 
not contrary to Islam or the public interest or the rights of others. 
 
 
Table 1-3: Features of promoting social equality and alleviating poverty and deprivation 




Ensuring conditions and opportunities of employment for everyone, with a view 
to attaining full employment. 
Item 1 
Article 43 
The prevision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, 
hygiene, medical treatment, education. 
Item 2 
Articles 43 
Reducing the gap between the wealth and income of different strata to he 
minimum possible and compatible with sustainable socioeconomic development. 
Article 48 
There must be no discrimination among the various provinces with regard to the 
exploitation of natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution 
of economic activities among the various provinces and regions of the country. 
 
Therefore, in light of these points (as outlined in the constitution), this research is geared 
to, and focuses on, the direction to accomplish one of the key articles of the Constitution: 
socioeconomic development and the relative balance among regions and provinces.  
Iran as a developing country with huge energy resources has had the opportunity for 
effective management of its natural resources to graduate from a developing to a developed 
nation. Moreover, beside producing and exporting industrialized goods and finding proper 
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markets for exports through regional and inter-regional cooperation and trade agreements, 
the country has also had the means to employ knowledge and technical skills in almost all 
areas of production and services to join the club of developed countries. However, the 
development indices show that not only has the country not been able to achieve this aim, 
but six decades after experimenting with development planning (30 years before the 
revolution and 30 years after) has hardly produced the desired results regarding 
comprehensive and balanced development. 
 
Demographic Feathers 
The pace of demographic transition in Iran has been unusually rapid due to recurring 
shifts in the government’s population policies. By the mid-1980s, Iran's population was 
amongst the fastest growing in the world. Therefore, the population grew by almost %50 
between 1976 to 1986 census. In other words, in the space of barely 10 years, about 16 
million people were added to the population of 1976 and reached close to 50 million in 
1986 (World Development Indicator, 2006). It is worth-noting to emphasize the fact that 
this population grew to 70 million in 2006 which is indicative of a slow-pace growth rate of 
population in recent years (Iran Statistical Center, 2007).  
The gradual reversal in the pro-birth policy in the late 1980s was so remarkable that by 
the early 1990s Iran had not only curbed its high birth rates but was moving faster in that 
direction compared to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Consequently, Iran is at a crucial stage of its demographic transition. Between 1960 and 
2005 the age distribution in Iran remained exceptionally stable, with about 30% children, 
35% young adults, slightly over 25% mature adults, less than 5% middle-aged adults, and 
less than 5% elderly (Statistical Center of Iran, 2006). This stability prevailed despite a 
steady drop in mortality, which increased life expectancy at birth from around 48 in 1960 to 
71 in 2005. Demographic changes in Iran have been accompanied by a rapid increase in the 
accumulation of human capital. This was followed by a major increase in women’s 
participation in the labor market (from 22% in 1990 to 39% in 2004 for the 15-64 age 
group), which again reinforced the drop in fertility through postponement of childbearing 
by working women (World Bank, 2006).  
Despite the promise that it holds, the demographic transition appears to be posing new 
structural challenges to the economy, not the least because the growing numbers of young 
  
18    
adults are finding it increasingly difficult to get jobs. The unemployment rates remain 
stubbornly in double-digits, exceeding 20% for the youth, especially for young women. The 
high rate of joblessness among young women in part reflects the recent rapid increase in 
their labor-force participation (Hakimaian, 2006).  
As a result of inefficient economic planning, out of the 51.54 million net increases in 
population over 50 years, 38.65 million, or almost 75 percent now live in urban areas. In 
fact a non-stop flood of immigration from rural and backward regions to the political-
administrative centers in the provinces, especially to Tehran and its direct agglomeration 
areas, has taken place, (ibid).With the intensification of population growth and high rate of 
mobility and internal immigration, the pattern of settlement gradually becomes most 
concentrated and comparative density of population increased from 11.5 in 1961 to 42.7 in 
2006, (ibid). As a result of migrant spillover and high natural rate of population growth 
during these decades, the number of urban centers (easily recognized as big villages) rose 
from 199 to 1,015. It must be noted that a large number of these new urban centers lack the 
basic infrastructure for urbanization (ibid).  
 
Economic Feathers 
Based on the statistics provided by the Central Bank of Iran, the level of real per capita 
income in the recent years is equal to the early 1980s. Based on the data provided by the 
World Bank, the per capita production based on the buying power index in 1985 was $6870 
in Singapore, $1940 in Malaysia, $2330 in South Korea, and $3380 in Iran. These figures 
in 2010 increased to $41984 in Singapore (three times as much), $8337 in Malaysia, 
$20540 in South Korea, and $4526 in Iran. Iran’s share in the international trade is little in 
given its population, expansion, resources, and geopolitical situation in the region or in the 
world. Iran’s share in the international exports increased from 0.35% in 1995 to 0.61% in 
2006 and its share in the international imports increased from 0.27% in 1995 to 0.41% in 
2006. Over the past 50 years (1956-2006) Iran’s population has grown 3.7 fold. While in 
contrast the population of France and England doubled after almost 120 years (ISC, 2006)2.  
Iran's GDP (at current prices) has risen from $ 170.6 billion to $ 331.0 billion in 2010 
(WDI, World Bank). It is clear that countries with high rates of population growth need to 
generate higher rates of growth in total income and output to keep the level of their per 
                                                 
2- Statistical Center of Iran   
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capita income constant. Compared to other countries selected from a list of developed, 
developing and least developed countries, and three oil exporting countries, Iran's GDP 
with a growth rate of 4.6 percent does not hold an appropriate place in world ranking 
(Table 1-4). The lower growth rates in recent years are indeed a far cry from trends in 
developing countries like Malaysia and South Korea. It must be noted that the target rate of 
growth in Iran in the Third 5 Year Development Plan (2000-2004) was 6.5% which, 
however, could not be achieved. The same target for the Fourth Development Plan (2005-
2009) had risen to 8%, and explains the exigency of fundamental shifts in development 
thought that could help achieve this high rate of growth.  
Average economic growth over the past decade has not been sufficient to generate 
employment on the scale needed. The current ratio of unemployed to employed remains 
very high, in particular in the 15-24 age group (World Bank, 2007). The rate of growth in 
Iran's per capita GDP thus can be compared with other countries in table (1-5).  
-Iran is the 28th largest economy in the world but ranks only 71st in per capita GDP (as 
expressed in purchasing power). It ranks with countries like Belarus or Panama (George 
Friedman, 2008).  
A glance at the total income in 2006 regional accounts indicates that Tehran Province 
(capital)  with $17,405 per capita income had the highest per capita income and  Sistan  and  
Baluchestan Province with $454 was at the lowest end of the ladder. This means that the 
ratio of highest per capita income (Tehran) to the lowest (Sistan and Baluchestan) was 
almost 3.8 times, (MPO 2008).  
In 2006 nine provinces out of 26 with 38% of the population (Tehran, Isfahan, Yazd, 
Hormozgan, Markazi, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Semnan and Bushehr) had per capita income 
above national average. In other words, 62% of the population living in 17 provinces had 
below average per capita income, a considerable gap indeed.  
Trends in total investment indicate that this variable fluctuated from 1961 to 2006 
(Table 1-6). Comparison of proportions of savings and gross investment to GDP in Iran 
with some selected countries (Tables1-6 and1-7) shows that these 1-two indices followed 
the same pattern in Malaysia and South Korea. But the point is that these two countries 
enjoy higher growth rates while Iran’s is much lower. This situation, however, could also 
be the function of higher rates of investment in the two countries. In Iran it is the result of 
adverse use of savings and investment (World Bank, 2007). During 1981-2006 income tax 
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accounted for 28.7% of total government budget while 71.3% was provided by other, non- 
tax revenues, specially the oil sector, (MPO, 2006).  
Income from oil exports, which is national wealth and must be invested in infrastructure 
development, is routinely disbursed for current expenditures (73% of government 
expenditure). Share of taxes from GDP is hardly 5.3 percent and remains one of the main 
pitfalls of the budgeting system, (ibid).  
Ratio of government expenditure to gross domestic production (G/GDP) has been 
fluctuating and the index of government size gradually decreased from 24.65 in 1986 to 
18.7 in the middle of the Third 5-Year Development Plan (ibid).  
During the years 1991-2005, three development plans were introduced. According to 
figures in Table 1-9, 1,726,580 billion Rails (national currency) were invested. Distribution 
of total investment shows that Tehran received more than 37.1% and provinces like 
Khuzestan, Khorassan and Isfahan 7.8, 5.6 and 5.2 percent respectively, as the highest 
provinces. The provinces of Kohkiloye, Qom and Ilam had the lowest share -- 0.7, 0.6, 0.6 
percent respectively (Table1-8).The provinces with the lowest amount of investment top 
the list of undeveloped provinces in Iran.  
The tables 1-9 and 1-10 also show that the model and means of distribution of 
developmental  financial  facilities and investment have not been able to change or improve  
development indices in the provinces to acceptable levels. It could be said that the current 
centralized budgeting system with the power to overrule provincial budgetary needs and 
use ineffective models of distribution of national development budget, is simply inefficient 
and needs to be rewritten and revised.  
 
Human Development Index 
In table (1-11), HDI was calculated for all provinces in 1999 and published by 
government. The actual index draws on estimates of life expectancy, literacy rate and 
school enrolment ratio. An adjusted income measure to calculate an HDI value for each 
province (Tables1-10 and1-11) shows a new ranking between provinces, the border and 
deprived provinces usually occupy the lowest ranks. In a study by the World Bank (2005), 
the effect of investment flows and developmental financial resources on the level of 
development in the provinces showed that the correlation coefficient between per capita 
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transferred money is negative and has not improved the undeveloped areas in the said 
provinces (Table 1-12).  
With respect to the above mentioned indices, now the key point is why are people in the 
less-developed provinces generally saddled with poverty and malnutrition? Are they really 
poor in the sense of not earning and producing enough? Or, is their condition a 
consequence of some personal failure? Or, are they poor and malnourished because others, 
in other provinces, are so much better? In other words, is poverty in the less-developed 
areas partly a consequence of the pull effect on resources and goods operating through the 
global market system, which shifts the balance of production toward those with higher 
incomes and high purchasing power at the expense of those with fewer resources and lower 
income? (Cypher,J.M. and Dietz, J.L 1997) . 
 
Geopolitical Feathers 
In geopolitical terms the Islamic Republic has a unique situation in the regional structure 
and also at the international level.  Iran is located in a geographical area that is a primary  
source of world energy and has a substantial share in world’s known oil and gas reserves. 
Iran is the only country in the region with direct access to both oil and gas reserves in the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. It has the world's second largest proven natural gas 
reserves after Russia (estimated at 940 trillion cubic feet) and is ranked fifth in the world's 
known oil reserves with an estimated 125 billion barrels, roughly 10% of the world total, 
(Friedman, G. 2008).  
To better understand Iran from a socioeconomic and political development perspective 
one needs to also consider its size. Iran is the 17th largest country in world with an area of 
1,684,000 (Km) 2. That means its territory is larger than France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal combined (ibid). Iran is the 16th most populous 
country in the world, with about 70 million plus people; its population is larger than the 
populations of either France or the United Kingdom, (ibid). More important are its 
topographical features. Iran is defined, above all, by its mountains that constitute its 
frontiers surround its cities and describe its historical heartland. Iran has about 800 miles of 
coastlines, roughly half along the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf and the rest along the 
Caspian Sea, (ibid).  
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Geographically Iran is at the crossroads between Europe and South and Southeast Asia 
that is home to more than one-third of the world population. So, from the geographical 
angle the country plays the role of a land bridge connecting Europe to Southeast Asia. 
Access of the newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus to the free waters 
is possible through Iran. Due to its easy access to the northern and southern coastal 
waterways, Iran has the possibility of allowing low-cost transport/transit of goods while 
control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf bestows a prized geopolitical 
and regional position to the country.  
Iran is a vast country rich in fauna and flora. More than 60% of the landmass is 
dominated by arid and semi-arid regions. However, it possesses a large variety of water, 
land and plants indicating a high level of biological diversity, (MPO, 2008).  
Climate diversity offers the means for highly diversified agricultural production. The 
country also enjoys many historical and tourist attractions along its vast expanse that are 
rare in this part of the world and have the potential to draw millions of tourists. To these 
capabilities and potentials we should add the element of unity and the high degree of 
resistance to foreign incursions and threats. The heroic defense and selfless sacrifices 
during the 1980-88 Iraqi invasion and occupation are indeed a manifestation of Iranian 
patriotism, resistance and resolve, (ibid).  
 
Feathers of Iran's 20-Years Vision  
With the start of the Fourth 5-YearsEconomic Development Plan in March 2005, the 
government released a document known as the "Iran's 20-YearsVision", outlining a 
roadmap for the country's economic, political, social and cultural development for two 
decades, (Expediency Council, 2005).  The preamble promised that by 2025, i.e. after the 
completion of four five-year development plans, Iran would be a fully advanced country, 
rising to the top rank in economic, scientific and technological progress among the 
neighboring and Southwest Asian states. By that time, Iran was to be a nation with an Islamic 
and revolutionary identity, offering guidance and direction to the Islamic world while 
getting involved in effective interaction with the comity of nations (Amouzgar 2005).  
The objectives as outlined in the document contain some reasonably promising potential. 
With only one percent of the world’s population, Iran ranks seventh in mineral wealth, 
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possessing10% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 16% of gas deposits. The document 
states that to secure first place in Southwest Asia the following goals should be achieved:  
1- Rapid economic growth  
2- Meaningful interaction with the world economy  
3- Compatible economy  
4- Knowledge-based development  
5- Environment protection  
6- Spatial management and regional balance  
7- Improvement in healthcare and the quality of life  
8- Improving social security and promoting justice  
9- Cultural development  
10- National security  
11- Judicial development  
12- Rehabilitating government structures, (Expediency Council, 2005).3 
Challenging these lofty goals, however, is a host of serious ideological, political, 
economic, managerial, technological, socio-cultural and external obstacles, (Amouzgar, 
2005). Although, it may seem difficult, if not impossible, to achieve all the goals of the 
Iran's 20-Year Vision, but the experience of countries that have been in similar dire straits 
in the past shows that targets set out in the Iran's 20 -Years Vision can be met and the 
capacity to assist the accomplishment of the goals exist. Despite the series of challenges 
and constrains visiting the Iran's 20- Years Vision there is potential for achieving a 
considerable part of its goals by drawing upon workable economic and socio-political 
levers.  
These levers, due to the comprehensiveness of the Iran's 20-Years Vision, have a close 
link to all aspects of socioeconomic and cultural conditions in the country. Detailed studies 
of all these aspects are beyond the scale and scope of this study. So, the focus here is on the 
socioeconomic lever through planning and budgeting. A rational and pragmatic utilization 
of these levers would contribute to achieving the goals of the Vision. 
Administrative structures of governments have close ties to the budget preparation 
process. This relationship, however, in different government structures differs significantly. 
                                                 
3- These goals are directly translated from Iran's 20- Years Vision.  
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It is evident that to move forward from the present conditions and achieve the main 
objective of the 20 Year Vision (top slot in economics, science and technology in 
Southwest Asia), depends on comprehensive reforms in the administration, 
implementation, planning, decentralization, privatization and economic liberalization 
spheres and active participation of the private sector in economic management (Nili et al, 
2004). Achieving these is necessary for building platforms for decent and sustainable 
growth based on technological renewal and charting a knowledge-based economy, (ibid). 
 In search of an elusive economic model for more than 30 years, the government has not 
been operating under a series of five-year development plans that have never been strictly 
adhered to, nor did they attain all their targets. Nevertheless, this exercise in futility has 
continued and was extended in the preparation of the Fifth Plan (2011- 2015). By the same 
token, in search of a culture-specific model, planners have switched from one flawed 
strategy to another. The irony is that such a specific, domestic-oriented paradigm, even if it 
could be charted, would not only lack scientific or rational underpinning, but also actually 
go against Iran’s own basic national interest.  
Macro developmental policies and plans in Iran are still suffering from the lack of 
consensus among elites and social capital at the national level. One of the obvious 
examples of such issue can be clearly seen in the evaluation of realization of the Iran's 20-
Years Vision goals in the fourth and fifth development plans. In this regard, the fourth and 
fifth plans are clearly focused on approaches and sometimes on conflicting actions, and are 
not evaluated in the continuity and complementing each other for achieving the goals of 
vision. To explain this inconsistency, some planners have challenged the vision goals and 
the theoretical foundations of the fourth development plan. In addition, regardless of the 
validity of these evaluations, one can infer that that there is no consensus among elites and 
social consensus about the development goals and objectives, and administrative plans 
resulted from them. Our most development plans have not been developed based on the 
country's –socio- cultural needs and identification of the country's identity and historical 
characters, but based on imported theoretical models which could not be perfectly 
compatible with internal capabilities. The present development model does not seem 
convenient and graceful in the society even with beauty and vitality they may have, because 
they are not consistent with values, norms, relationships, institutions and social networks, 
which are all elements of social capital and therefore, they will not be able to attract the 
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society participation, consensus and cooperation to achieve their goals, (Mirsepasi,M and 
Bagherzadeh,M.R. 2007).  
By the time of design, most development plans have been prepared at the level of 
political approach dominant in the government and limited to the political tastes of the 
authorities, regardless of the discourse interactions at level of elites, scientific-academic 
institutions, media and public field and therefore, they could not attract the involvement of 
other approaches as well as the public involvement, and did not succeed. In most 
development plans, the economic approach was dominant and social, cultural and political 
institutions were not considered so important. In this approach, it is assumed that the 
desired political and social changes can be also created through economic variables. This 
impression is based on the assumption that actors often behave rationally and 
arithmetically, and economic interests are the key driver to their actions. In this case, the 
role of social groups, ethnicities, minorities, subcultures as well as social and local 
networks is being neglected.  
One can argue that real development may not occur by imitating foreign economic 
models, but rather through genuine “national, home grown and Islamic” paradigms 
compatible with Iran’s history, geography, politics and culture. The ideal society as 
enshrined in the Iran's 20-Years Vision emphasizes social justice, poverty alleviation, 
regional equality, and socioeconomic and cultural balance between regions and provinces. 
In other words, the document upholds comprehensive and sustainable development across 
the country. This will obviously increase the responsibilities of planning and budgeting 
systems in today’s Iran. This thesis aims to contribute to this process by way of critical 
analysis and proposing a model for better central-regional planning and budget allocation.  
 
Socio- economic Challenges 
However, despite all the abilities and potential resources mentioned above, Iran has been 
unable to register a high status among Southwest Asian nations. Table 1-5, shows Iranian 
ranking in 4 categories, namely the SWA countries, neighboring states, oil producing 
countries, and rival powers (World Bank, 2007).  
Iran's socioeconomic conditions described here and comparison data in tables1-1 to 1-9 
show that it is facing big challenges that render highly difficult the task of clinching the top 
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position with regard to economic performance and development in Southwest Asia. The 
challenges may be categorized as follows:  
- Slow and insufficient economic growth rates and low levels of productive 
investment.4 
- Low employment levels and lack of skills and efficiency of the labor force.  
- High and increasing disparities and poverty rates.  
- Deep and serious dependency of the national economy on oil and raw material 
exports.  
- Irregular growth in urban areas and migration.  
- Significant regional imbalances.  
- Huge and overlapping administrative bodies that have not only failed in their 
responsibilities and in fine tuning the relationship between socio-economic sectors, 
but have, by and large, emerged as part of the problem.  
- Significant degradation of the environment and natural resources as a result of 
overpopulation, disorganized and rapid urbanization along with unsustainable 
development and consumption patterns.  
With this short description of goals and challenges to Iran's 20-Year Vision, which is 
regarded as the most important national document after the Constitution, the question that 
arises is: To what extent is it possible to achieve these goals?"  
Despite the natural and material wealth, resources and capacities, mineral reserves, 
young, educated and professional labor force, cherished geographical position and diverse 
climate "why has Iran in a relatively long period been unable to achieve economic and 
industrial transformation worthy of its status and missed the great opportunities available in 
the last decade of the twentieth century?” 
It is a universal fact that in the last two decades, in comparison to Iran countries like 
Malaysia, South Korea, China, and Turkey in Asia, and Brazil, Chili, Argentina and 
Mexico in the Americas, with a big population base were able to achieve higher economic 
growth rates by adopting prudent development strategies and are slowly, but steadily, 
joining the ranks of the industrialized world.  
                                                 
4-According to Fourth Economic Development Plan the average economic growth rate was set at 8% but 
barely 4.5% was achieved. 
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In response to the above questions, one should dwell on the following issues and 
realities in and about Iran over the past two decades. First, the monumental challenges in 
the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Second, the post-revolutionary political and 
managerial overhaul. Third, eight years of war imposed by Iraq. Fourth, fluctuations in oil 
export revenues as a determining factor in the national economy, and finally, the crippling 
western and international sanctions along with major obstacles to Iran's access to global 
markets and capital (MPO5 2007).  
Besides these five key impediments, as will be discussed in the following chapters, one 
also should take stock of the three basic factors in assessing the country's poor economic 
performance. First, the inefficient and centralized budgeting system, second, the unstable 
policymaking, inconsistent, uncertain and contradictory policy shifts and decisions and 
third, lack of a long-term strategy and absence of cohesive and coherent industrial and 
economic development policies.  
The absence of viable long-range strategic plans for economic and industrial 
development, and the continuation of independent political development and approaches 
derived from wider global economic development, particularly policies not built upon 
economic sense and scientific logic, have all led to diverging development trends in Iran. 
One of the most significant policies followed systematically was the pivotal role given to 
agriculture in economic development plans which resulted in negligence toward expansion 
of industrialization and stabilization of rural population without considering technological 
transformations.  
Acceptance of the ‘small is beautiful’ theory, coupled with the negative approach to 
large firms and trade-industry complexes without considering the organic connection 
between clusters, small and medium scale industries with large industrial units was another 
policy that has led to the persistent industrial dilemma.  
Considering government sovereignty and authority as equal to the size of government, 
belief in expanding government influence as necessary to address economic ills and 
provide basic needs, and negative approach to private sector development and industrial 
investment should be seen as other questionable policies of recent years, (Firouzfar, 2001).  
Expansion of government control and wholesale interference in almost all economic 
spheres like pricing, regulating the labor market, financial market, and control of banking 
                                                 
5- Management and Planning Organization of Iran 
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resources, sovereignty of internal-oriented approach based on a closed economy and self-
reliance, and prioritizing income distribution and social justice without proper attention to 
production cycles, growth, productivity and efficiency, should be factored as policies 
leading to divergences in the development process,(ibid).  
The outcome of such beliefs and policies, besides the sheer lack of attention to the role 
and importance of investment as a key factor in economic growth, has pushed the Iranian 
economy into a situation where it cannot undertake the reforms so crucial for development 
planning.  
Despite some positive impact of economic reforms in recent times, we could say that the 
60 years of baggage of development planning has demonstrated the inappropriateness of a 
single dimensional command-based model of development.  
Therefore, it is inevitable and necessary to reconsider concepts of dominant models of 
development planning and initiate moves toward sustainable and comprehensive planning. 
The new approach, like in other countries, should be founded on cultures and social values 
of the society while at the same time pay enough heed to international developments and 
experience and the economic characteristics of the country.  
The investigation of some performance indices and their comparative analysis with other 
countries that started the process of development simultaneously or even later than Iran 
could reveal the success of the implemented plan. It should be noted that in order to 
compare countries, figures and statistics in the CD provided by the World Bank, titled 
WDI, have been used, and (tables 1-4 to 1-14).  
The problem of regional disparity and non-development in some provinces in Iran will 
be more acute if we deliberate Iran's 20-Year Vision program as a superior document for 
preparing midterm development plans and annual budgets which are used as key 
instruments of revenue and expenditure of the government for at least one year.  
 
Hypothesis of Research  
As the previous section sought to demonstrate, the inefficient performance of budget 
allocation in Iran has led to inequitable development and disparities between regions and 
provinces. Within this context, the core hypothesis of this thesis, therefore, is that 
sustainable (economic, political and social) development has not been achieved due to the 
lack of an effective central-regional development relationship. In other words, the current 
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quality of relations is devoid of effective decentralization, regional participation and 
regional accountability based on functioning regional democratic institutions capable of 
monitoring and managing the implementation of budget outlays on a transparent central-
regional paradigm.  
 
Main Questions of the Research  
This research, with the aid of conceptual and empirical analysis, seeks to understand 
inequalities among Iran’s diverse regions and establish what an optimum model of budget 
distribution could be for the country. The following questions are at the center of the 
research endeavor:  
1. What are the characteristics and the current model of financial resource distribution, 
and what are the ensuing (economic, political, and social) problems and challenges of 
present budgeting system?  
2. How does the current budget allocation regime relate to the wider central- regional 
government relationship and the public/private sector in Iran?  
3. Can a decentralized budgeting system achieve all the goals of the government?  
4. In particular, how can we address and overcome the deficiencies of the current 
allocation system and adjust the central-regional government relationship to help 
reduce inequalities and underpin the emergence of homogeneous development in all 
regions even when the process of investment changes?  
5. What can be learnt, generally, from the Iranian experience in terms of the impact of 
the central-regional governance relationship on economic, political and social 
development and related policy-making?  
6. From a more normative-prescriptive view, what could be the ideal model of budgeting 
in the current circumstances in Iran?  
 
Aims and Objectives of the Research  
The budgeting system of countries particularly those with similar government structures 
to Iran, due to their predominant role in the economic arena and in addition to their role in 
determining the income and expenses of government are usually vested with the 
responsibility for coordination among diverse socio-economic sectors. As a result, the 
government budget has turned into a key element in the development plans. As for Iran, the 
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government stands the most important and primitive kingpin of the budgeting system 
dealing with 690 independent public organizations holding separate budget codes.  
Iran's National Annual Budget, a comprehensive document, is the representation of 
government structure in which the administrative and government decision-making systems 
are reflected. This maximum presence of government in economy has brought about many 
adverse consequences. On one hand, it results in lack of accountability in management 
system at different hierarchical levels and on the other, it makes opportunities for control 
evasion and lack of transparency which are the result of a centralized planning and 
budgeting system(top-down system).  
The aim of this study is to review the process and problems of centralized (top-down) 
budgeting system in Iran. It later attempts to explore how it can be replaced by a 
decentralized (bottom-up) decision-making and budget allocation mechanism that could be 
compatible with the interests and expectations of regional authorities in order to have more 
equitable allocation of national resources. 
In this regard, survey on the experiences and challenges of some selected countries and 
their model of planning and budgeting systems from a particular perspective of budget 
allocation processes in the central-regional government relationship would be considered. 
At the end, based on the conclusions and policies resulted from critical analysis of intensive 
centralization of planning and budgeting process in Iran (chapter two and three of the 
thesis), and considering concept of "good governance" and responsibility of government for 
fair, reasonable, efficient and accountable service delivery (chapter 4) and also results 
derived from field studies including interviews and questionnaires by a wide range of 
experts and eminent scholars of planning and budgeting system in Iran (chapter 5), I will 
illustrate a decentralized model of planning and budgeting which benefits from an 
integrated central-regional government relationship that in turn results from a set of 
guidelines aimed at modifying rules and regulation pertinent to the planning and budgeting 
system of Iran.  
 
Conceptual Framework  
Planning and budgeting constitute the process by which objectives and resources, and 
the interrelation among them, are taken into account to achieve a coherent and 
comprehensive program of action for the government, (Murphy, 2006). This research, like 
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any other development study, attempts to develop a framework in which this process may 
be carried out and followed by theories and approaches of modern planning and economic 
development at national and regional levels. A survey of the history of planning and 
budgetary system in Iran and a critical review of economic development planning at global 
level are all provided.  
As noted, most of the reasons behind regional imbalance in Iran have been explained by 
the economic development theories based on maximizing input and allocation of resources 
to different sectors for achieving higher economic growth. The economic growth models 
which will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, support regional development idea 
through national income spillover. If these models prevail, it would take ages to induce a 
decent standard of living for people in the least-developed regions of the country.  
Iran (as opposed to Faludi’s findings 1998) is a country with maximum share of socio-
economic activities including development plans implemented by governmental 
organizations using inflexible  centralized financial  and  administrative  structures  coupled 
with a semi-balance of de-concentration in the form of minor delegation of authority to 
provincial officials. So, instead of allowing the private sector to emerge as the locomotive 
of growth, the public sector still remains the main source of production and employment. 
This shows the dismal condition of Iran’s centralized economy (Mahmoodi, 2006).  
Due to the centralized planning and budgeting system and the ineffective role of 
regional authorities in the financial and administrative affairs of regions, the research is 
framed within a theoretical concept of decentralization which will be discussed in the 
coming paragraphs.  
In addition, secondary data related to the issues of concern are collated and synthesized. 
The research will follow Rondinelli's (1981) view regarding the summon and use of 
financial resources for development and belief in decentralization as an ideological 
principle which seeks goals of democratic decision-making, public participation, 
government accountability and self-reliance of regions. The research also pays due 
attention to Turner,M and David Hulme's (1997) category of devolution of authority from 
central to the lower levels of government which consist of a) devolution in formal political 
structures; b) internal transformation of authority in public and non-public administrative 
structures (from the central office of a ministry to the sectorial office in the same ministry); 
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and finally authority  transformation from a government institution to a non-government 
organization.  
If the assumption is that a plan is the outcome of public participation and government 
planning, or we assume that it is the result of consensus of public, private and civil 
organizations, and emphasize on institutionalization, it would not be possible to build a 
workable and rational plan, unless it is done in a purely decentralized circumstance and 
with the participation of all groups, communities and parties at different levels of planning, 
(Ejlali 2006).  
 
Theoretical Concepts of Decentralization: 
Decentralization is the transformation of authority and responsibility from the central 
government to local and regional authorities or private sector, so the theoretical and rational 
credit for this conceptual framework in the economic sense is the relation between 
decentralization and efficiency which was first propounded by Tiebout (1956).  
Tiebout argued that, local government would fulfill the needs and willingness of their 
people much better than the central government and they would allocate financial resources 
more efficiently. In the concept of public finance theory, the most important aim in 
financial decentralization is to improve efficiency which will lead to an increase in the 
welfare of consumers or tax payers. In the concept of General Choice Theory, 
decentralization also means the control of authority of central government (Martinez-
Vazquez, and R.M. McNab (2000). It is also said that, decentralization can prevent 
excessive supply of public goods and services and reduce inefficiency of the public sector 
(Brennan, G and J. Buchanan 1980).  
Since the appearance of Tiebout (1956), or Oates (1972) classic studies, a growing 
branch of literature on public economics has focused on emphasizing the benefits of 
political decentralization and the federal state, and the competition among regional or local 
governments that it makes possible, to the detriment of centralized systems in which 
resource allocation and spending decisions are made by central governments" (Cai and 
Treisman 2004).  Besley and Coate (2003) are of the opinion that this has already become a 
classic problem in public finance and economics, in which the questions on how authorities 
should allocate public goods and how the costs of provision should be shared demand 
appropriate answers.  
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From an economic perspective, it is argued that decentralized systems of a government 
have better abilities to match service provision to the preferences of the constituencies and, 
accordingly, can deliver public services more efficiently(Rodrguez-Pose and Bwire 2004). 
If we analyses the issue from a political point of view, it is argued that they are preferable 
because "they tend to be more accountable and transparent and increase political 
participation factors which, in turn, have an indirect positive effect on efficiency" (Ibid).  
Therefore, as suggested by Sewell (1996), the case for decentralization is fundamentally 
based on efficiency considerations, and two discourses would compete, namely, the 
proposition that central governments are more efficient in providing services (Prud’homme 
1995), and the devolutionist and “new regionalist” discourses (Keating 1998) according to 
which there is a positive link between efficiency and decentralization. The most compelling 
argument in favor of decentralization is that it can better match citizens’ preferences for 
public goods. On the other hand, opponents of decentralization, such as Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001) and Smith (1985), argue that power should remain in the hands of central 
governments, since local authorities' lack of human, financial and technical resources 
would prevent them from providing appropriate public services in a decentralized scenario 
(Faguet, 2004). Specifically, enhanced decentralization may lead to higher administrative 
costs, which arise due to the difficulties of exploiting economies of scale in local 
governments. 
Several case studies corroborated that typically decentralized countries are more 
responsive to citizen preferences in service delivery and strive harder to serve their people 
than centralized countries. Crook and Manor (1994) in India, and Blair (1996) in Philippine 
concluded that decentralized government had a positive impact on the quality of service 
provided for their people and created an index of governance equality by the creation of 
several quality of life indices like, political freedom, lack of corruptions, level of education 
and health, citizen participation, political stability, judicial and bureaucratic efficiency.  
According to studies done by Huther and Shan, (1998), there is a high correlation 
between governance quality and per capita income. OECD countries dominate the top 
governance category and none are in the two categories with the poor and poorest 
governance. In this survey, there are no African countries in the top governance category. 
But now the question would be that, whether a country like Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait with a 
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high per capita income, can claim that good governance or top governance runs in these 
countries? 
 
Feathers and Effects of Decentralization: 
In a centralized country, central government assumes the exclusive responsibility for 
fiscal policy. In decentralized countries, fiscal policy becomes a responsibility shared by all 
levels of government. The central government in these centuries uses its power to the purse 
(transfer) and moral suasion through joint meeting to induce a coordinated approach (Blair, 
1996). The statements "enable everyone to act and think like a leader, not merely follow the 
plan", (Yukl, 2008), or "enable everyone to act and think like a leader"(Hope and Fraser, 
2003) carries with it a certain amount of ambiguity. However, they clarify this somewhat 
by  saying  that  the  objective  is  to  create  a  more  participative society whereby decision 
making and responsiveness is devolved and everyone in each part of country carries 
personal responsibility for his or her part in it. This is called a devolved and adaptive 
approach to centralization and devolution and is in contrast to the present traditional budget 
based and centrally planned model.  
Therefore, real decentralization indeed functions as an efficient tool for increasing and 
augmenting the efficiency of the public sector and the national economy by transformation 
of authority to lower levels of government for decreasing the authority of the central 
government (Rondinelli 1981). Rondinelli has mentioned a lot of positive results in favor of 
decentralization.  
a. In some areas, decentralization has resulted in the increased cooperation of the people 
and the power of local administrative and political leaders to exert pressure on the 
central government's organizations.  
b. In many countries, the administrative and technical capacity of the regional and local 
organizations has been gradually increased.  
c. There has been an increased access to the central government's sources and institutions 
for the people who inhabit rural areas and local communities.  
d. A lot of new organizations have been established at local and regional levels aiming at 
development planning and management.  
Another positive effect of decentralization in terms of efficiency is that, in a centralized 
system, policymakers take decisions aimed at reflecting the interests of the entire country 
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(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2005).However, if interests differed across regions, this would be 
inefficient, as some regions would not benefit from national policies. If preferences vary 
from region to region, it would be more efficient to alter the public provision of services 
geographically. Under these circumstances the provision of services by the public sector 
would be more efficient in a decentralized structure of government.  
Since the responsibilities which are to be carried out via decentralization are assigned to 
local and regional levels at once, usually many administrative problems will occur. One of 
the identified problems is the difficulty of an accurate division of various tasks over 
different levels of government, and drawing a border between them is not an easy task 
(World Bank, 1992).  
In cases where the decentralization projects have failed, they have usually faced 
insufficient  political  and  administrative  support  of  the  central  government, or  in  other 
words, the tendency of the political and administrative leaders to preserve the centralized 
authority. If the bureaucracy of the top level of the central government opposes 
decentralization or does not fully understand it, decentralization task will not make any 
progress, because for many years, the capital settling bureaucrats have been accustomed to 
determine everything in the center and notify it to lower levels, (Ibid).  
Decentralization experience in various sectors of third world has shown that local 
development requires the cooperation of different institutions, a kind of cooperation that 
should be integrated and include supplementation among its various parts,(Yukl, 2008). 
The services and technologies supportive of local development should regularly boost each 
other, (ibid). Even in centralized systems of management and planning, coordination 
among institutions plays a significant role in the proper management. However, in 
decentralized systems, coordination is the magic word that leads the whole system to a 
systematic movement or causes distress and indiscipline, (World Bank, 1992). Another 
reason for the failure of decentralization projects is the failure in the transference of the 
financial sources to the level of government to whom the responsibility has been assigned, 
Ejlali, 2006). Transference of power without the transference of financial sources is one of 
the factors resulting in confusion and finally, failure of the projects. Central government, 
doubtful and disbeliever in the local governments' ability, usually adapts this approach, i.e. 
it transfers some of the power, but makes the delivery of credits conditional to the 
agreement of a central authority, (Ibid).  
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Decentralization must be a gradual process for capacity building and for the 
establishment of non-governmental and local organizations that can efficiently accept the 
new responsibilities and tasks. The notion that decentralization implies withdrawing the 
tasks from central agencies and transferring them to their regional and local counterparts 
does not match the reality, (Ibid). Most of the time, such agencies do not exist. The 
available branches of ministries or the existing weak and inactive units are, organizationally 
and attitudinally, not able to act as governmental local units and/or based on a self-standing 
criterion. The capacity building is all technical, organizational as well as cultural and 
social, (Ibid).  
Introversion, regionalism, and stinginess of small environments can prevent from 
making sound and sensible decisions for a long time. These inefficiencies continue as long 
as  they  remain  hidden  from  the  people  and  critics  behind  the generosity of the central 
government. That is why if the central government does not restrict the financial 
transferences, assignment of power to local authorities will result in the increased costs for 
the government, (Rahnavard, 2010)  
The cultural infrastructure of the society or human agent is also one of the most 
important factors that must receive due attention in every kind of decentralization plan. By 
cultural infrastructure of the society, we mean the social habits of the people concerning 
cooperation in the management of the society affairs which is what is referred to as the 
cooperation culture or political culture (Ejlali, 2006).  
Since the behavior of the people (both individual and collective) originates from the 
previous historical experiences, and every kind of organizational reform has to be carried 
out by human agents, the traditional political culture can act as an obstacle or, on the 
contrary, as a reinforcement for decentralization policy (Rodrguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). 
 However, in addition to a nation's past, its current conditions can also act for or against 
decentralization. For example, in the countries which have huge revenues in the form of 
rental income (like oil in oil-rich countries), the regional and local levels have accustomed 
to rely on the "endless credits" of the capital, and their usual method of planning is to make 
a list of their needs and refer to the capital to take the required money for their fulfillment. 
In these countries, decentralization is contrary to the established habits of all authorities and 
local people as well as the governmental bureaucrats and politicians.  
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In these conditions, decentralization may be accepted by all in words. But, immediately 
they will request more credits from the central government, and when they are told that 
decentralization means the continuous decrease in the aids from the central government 
until they reach a minimum, not the increase of such aids, they conclude that adoption of 
this approach is impossible. However, fortunately, the growth of population, instability of 
costs of the valuable raw materials in global markets, constant changes in prices, and 
tendency to futurism and planning, will gradually force the politicians of these countries to 
increasingly rely on the internal interests and for this purpose, accept to use 
decentralization as a toolkit (Rahnavard, 2010).  
 
Decentralization in Iran: 
Considering all these merits and demerits of decentralization, taking into account my 
understanding and lengthy experiments of the features of Iran, I will attempt to raise some 
ambiguities that might come to mind with regard to the issue of decentralization in, this 
ancient land. We should first distinguish between centralization/decentralization in 
governance and other applications of this term. This study deals with decentralization of 
governance (government or country’s administration).  
Based on this definition, decentralization of administration is an integrated and 
undividable phenomenon and cannot be categorized into different administrative, financial, 
and political types. This is due to the fact that none of these hypothetical types could be 
realized in isolation from other types. With this regard, the main opinion among regional 
planners is the view that Rondinelli, the famous regional planner, and his colleague 
Cheema proposed in the articles they first wrote for the World Bank in 1981 and then in 
1983. It is still agreed that decentralization in governance is not of different types, but of 
three dimensions: political, administrative, and financial. The difference between the 
different types and different dimensions is that different types of decentralization of 
governance could mean that the political structure of the country is totally decentralized 
(authority to make decisions in that country has been to a great extent bestowed upon lower 
national levels) while administrative structure has remained centralized (i.e. administrative 
regulations and solutions require the order to be issued from a center in order to be 
legitimate). 
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Despite the existence of a decentralized administrative and political structure, there is 
not a regional or district authority or financial resource; in other words, financial structure 
is totally centralized. It is obvious that transfer of authority to make decisions will not result 
in decentralization without having financial and budget resources and regulations for 
carrying out the duties at lower levels than national. The opposite is also true, i.e. having 
regulations or financial resources without having the authority to make decisions will not 
result in decentralization. In other words, it is possible to decentralize governance only 
when it is done at three dimensions of politics, finance, and administration. 
 As a result, decentralization at only one of these dimensions is in fact practically 
meaningless. In addition, until the above process has not been translated into law and until 
it is not implemented at the national level and all across the country and for all sectors 
based on a pre-designed and agreed plan, its effects will not be tangible.  
Another important principle with regard to decentralization is the distinction between 
legal decentralization and practical decentralization. From the point of view of political 
law, the system of governance in Iran is a centralized one that lacks agglomeration. A 
central governance, or in legal terms, an integrated governance means that in these 
countries,  from  the  perspective  of  law,  only  one  governance  has  the authority to 
make  decisions.  
However, governance in Iran is agglomerated too; meaning that based on ordinary rules 
and regulations, some authorities of the central government is bestowed upon governmental 
bodies that are lower than the national level. The major rules and regulations are the laws 
pertaining to divisions of the country and councils’ rules in which some parts of the 
government authority is bestowed upon intermediary government institutions such as 
provincial governments, general offices or local institutions such as administrative sector, 
municipalities, village administration offices, and councils in cities, towns, and villages. 
These institutions are placed at a lower level than national and are somewhat considered the 
followers or representatives of the central government (and not independent government 
bodies) and whose authority is limited to certain scopes.  
In its general sense, decentralization is a necessary process and is one of the signs of 
good governance. It could pave the way for participation of the private sector, civil 
institutions and the people. In order to become decentralized, government’s responsibilities 
need to be categorized and each category (and category of authority) is bestowed upon a 
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certain level of government institution. In fact, the legal federal system provides excellent 
conditions for decentralization and makes it legal. However, it is by no means necessary to 
have a federal government; in order to become decentralized. This process is absolutely 
possible through delegation of authority and using ordinary laws. In many countries all 
over the world, among them Iran, this trend has been common after constitution period and 
thus it is possible to continue with this approach.  
A group of experts in Iran have repeatedly emphasized that the establishment of 
government institutions, which are lower than the national level, as representatives of the 
central government is a sort of de-agglomeration and is limited to reducing the work load of 
the central government and thus is not related to decentralization, (Ejlali 2006). Although 
this is true in theory and in legal terms, it is to some extent passive thinking. The fact is that 
there is not a firm boundary between decentralization and de-agglomeration. Different 
experiences all around the world have also confirmed this claim. Most of the countries that 
started establishment of these institutions in the 1970s (including Iran where 
decentralization started with the establishment of provincial Offices for Plan and Budget 
and specific district projects as well as councils in cities and provinces) obtained 
considerable success in reducing the gap between center of the country and its regional 
areas (PBO, 1987). Local  institutions  are  usually  formed  gradually with the expansion of 
the authorities of this institutions and this provides the grounds for turning de-
agglomeration into decentralization. This is an event that has occurred in many countries. 
However, one could here distinguish a significant boundary between pure de-agglomeration 
and a sort of dense decentralization and that would be the establishment and activities of 
the election-based institutions at levels lower than the national level (Ibid).  
The existence of an election-based institution construes people’s participation and 
supervision and it legitimizes non-central decisions. Establishment of such institutions is 
usually possible under usual laws (in Japan, England, French and many developing 
countries). In Iran, such institutions have been envisaged by the constitution (councils of 
provinces, cities, towns, and villages).  
Therefore, Rondinelli and Cheema in their classic article in the 1980s regarded 
decentralization and de-agglomeration as two points on a continuum that goes from 
absolute centralization to absolute decentralization.  
  
40    
Local election-based institutions would only contribute to decentralization if they were 
really decision-making institutions (within the scope of their responsibilities and influence, 
no matter how limited it is). If such institutions are only formal entities and play merely an 
advisory role for the authorities in the province or the city, or even worse, and if they play 
the role of mass media by going from one office to another just trying to bring about 
people’s problems, beg to solve people’s issues, while themselves are deprived of any 
authority but to collect people’s money (an assumption that some hold with regard to 
councils), they will leave no effect on decentralization. The goal of these election-based 
institutions is supervision from below and making decisions on the issues that could be 
decided at a level lower than the national level. This means doing something that the 
central government cannot perform (Ejlali 2006).  
In other words, responsibilities of these councils as representatives of people include 
supervision of local authorities. Among other tasks, one could name ratification of regional 
and local development plans. In contrast, it might be argued that intervention of these 
institutions limits local and regional authorities and will lead to disagreement. With the 
supervision of central government on the performance of local authorities and the existence 
of monitory institutions at the national level, one could ask what the logic behind having a 
bottom-up sort of supervision is.  
In response, it should be said that top-down supervision is always different from bottom-
up supervision and each is tied with certain responsibilities that could be diverse. Top-
down supervision is mainly viewed from the financial and legal perspective and is usually 
done after spending the budget, while bottom-up supervision deals with the performance of 
institutions and the quality of their services. It is through this sort of supervision and 
election that people participate in regional and local development plans and affairs and 
careful attention is paid to the performance of local authorities who enjoy good authority 
and financial facilities in decentralized conditions and want to be accountable. 
 Local media and civil society and the local private sector are other elements of this 
system that change the process of regional and local administration from a bureaucratic act 
to a political one, thus leading to a lively atmosphere for discussion. In such a condition, 
corruption will decrease significantly. However, top-down supervision has only been 
allocated to proper implementation of rules and regulations and current expenses. This is 
because the central government has no more the supervisory ability.  
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Administration of countries is a historical phenomenon and no two countries have 
similar historical experiences. Therefore, any sort of change in the administration of 
countries needs to take into account the history and should be done gradually. For instance, 
in Iran’s past history, centralized governance has always resulted in safer roads and boost 
of commerce and agriculture. However, decentralized governance, insecurity and war have 
resulted in stalemate of commerce and thus increase of poverty. Therefore, people have 
naturally preferred centralization and oppression that is accompanied with security over 
insecurity. The result of this historical experience is that Iranians, in their historical 
unconscious, attribute security and progress to centralization and confusion to 
decentralization. It is impossible to change this historical memory without proper 
education.  
Decentralization of administration is an approach that is used to enhance the quality of 
management in the country and is not a goal in itself, thus it should not be imitated, 
(Rodrguez-Pose and Bwire 2004). The best practice is not to make any changes in the 
combinations that lead to proper conduct of responsibilities and it is better to limit 
decentralization to the affairs in which tasks are not progressed desirably. It should  be 
noted that decentralization needs to increase efficiency, people’s participation, and 
democracy and should result in saving. In order to realize these goals, time plays a crucial 
role,  i.eas  experience has demonstrated that  costs might  increase in  the initial  years  and  
even tasks might slow down. However, we should not lose hope and we should keep in 
mind that decentralization is a gradual process (ibid). 
 
Requirements of Decentralization:  
We should also keep in mind that these three factors, i.e. higher efficiency, democracy 
and saving, are the criteria for allocating responsibilities to different level of governance. 
When allocating responsibilities to different levels, in addition to global norms, one needs 
to take into account the particular situation in Iran. Since it takes some time for the lower-
level institutions to obtain the necessary efficiency to perform tasks, and they need to be 
provided enough opportunity before making judgments on their capability.  
For a successful decentralization first central government must be seriously willing to 
start and in the local and intermediary levels, there must be enough willingness and 
potential for accepting new responsibilities, (Loehr, W. and Manasan, R. 1999). At the 
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local and regional level, not always is there motivation to accept new responsibilities, 
(Rahnavard). In many cases, provincial authorities or even those located in cities might 
prefer for the decisions to be adopted by the center (ibid). This is due to the fact that 
decision-making is a difficult and hard task and not everyone is willing to do that. In 
addition to motivation, potential is also a serious issue. The important point that could be 
raised here is how decentralization would be possible in the absence of hardware and 
software facilities (necessary potential) for doing current and civil activities at levels lower 
than the national level. The answer is: through all existing potentials in the region, in the 
private and government sectors, in the civil society and the media as they all play important 
roles. Advisor engineers, contractors, universities, human force, and investors are the other 
players in the scene of decentralized management and planning without whom it would be 
impossible to direct the show of “decentralization”. Therefore, organizational capacities 
and social and human assets are other requirements of a successful decentralization.  
The last important issue with regard to Iran is inter-coordination between different 
sectors. It is basically difficult to have inter-sector coordination in a centralized system, 
which is based on vertical hierarchies. However, the central government is rich and has 
access over an immense revenue (such as oil revenue), thus increasing the existing 
problems. Since government resources are based on oil revenue, the assumption that 
government resources are unlimited, either consciously or unconsciously, will lead 
everyone towards proposing and implementing projects. Therefore, each ministry claims 
that the sector under its supervision has a bigger role in the development of the country and 
thus asks for bigger budget. Thus, ministries are expanded and they establish all the 
different kinds of institutes from research to entertainment, administrative, manufacturing 
and the like and affiliate themselves to these institutes. It is natural that in such a case 
ministries act based on sector’s interests and not the interests of the whole economy 
(national interests). This is because authorities in the sector are usually unaware of the total 
state of the economy and do not hold themselves accountable. It is the president and his 
advisory organizations that need to take care of the inter-sector interests and the whole 
well-being of the society. Most of such organizations have been part of the administrative 
body and in the Management organization and some have been part of the education and 
research institutes. In the legislative body, the Islamic Majlis has been responsible.  
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Expediency Council that is responsible for the generic policies could also contribute to 
inter-sector coordination. Meanwhile, if these organizations do not have enough 
information and act poorly, the inter-sector coordination will not be realized. Consequently, 
the result could be construction of hospitals that lack doctors, ships that do not have piers to 
discharge their cargo, and graduates for whom there's no employment opportunity in the 
economy. Such a situation could lead to wastage of resources and failure of all 
development attempts. A positive feeling and result of a good decentralization in Iran 
would be the increase in the coordination among different sectors and particularly at the 
level of provinces and cities. If the discussion around integrated urban management (and 
provincial) is realistic and unexaggerated, in other words if the issues we raised on 
decentralization are observed, it could lead to a decentralized system that achieves saving 
and coordination in development decisions and eventually the country’s progress.  
As discussed, decentralization transfers the responsibility from central government to 
local and regional authorities, and emphasizes their accountability, therefore this process 
not only becomes a strong incentive for local authorities to consider the priorities of the 
regional people, but also leads to innovations and initiatives in the production of goods and 
services, cuts production costs, and helps improve quality (Loehr and Manasan 1999). 
Through decentralization accountability of politicians to public increases, and by extension 
curbs corruption in the public sector (ibid).  
So, the extent of the right to decision-making and its implications, and the mechanism 
on which the decision-maker has to be accountable to the public, and under the supervision 
of the   people   or   their   legal   representative(s),  is   the  base  and  foundation  of  an  
ideal management system. In more recent times and at the global level, commitments of 
decision-makers are measured by the degree of their accountability vis-à-vis their formal 
responsibility (UNCRD, World Bank).  
Any failure in the realm of decentralization would result in the inefficiency of 
implemented development plans. In the words of Wood (1997), real decentralization, 
privatization, deregulation, and economic liberalization should be accompanied by a) 
democratic political system, b) dynamic civil society, c) local and regional elected 
decision-makers with enough authority, d) participation of NGOs, e) active private sector, 
f) decentralized budgeting system, and finally g) an efficient budget allocation model 
(Wood, 1997).  
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So, the conceptual framework of this research is based on points "f " and "g " of Wood, 
emphasizes on greater participation of the public and NGOs in regions.  
According to these frameworks, the research will explore the changing role of  the 
central government in the final years of the Fourth 5-Year Development Plan in 2009. It 
argues that although economic policymaking is now conducted in a very different political 
climate compared to the years before the 1979 revolution, there remains a powerful 
institutional legacy. The thesis examines the evolving role of the national planning process 
and looks at the implications of the new law on national planning, especially delegating the 
task of decision-making to and among the national planning agencies (Management and 
Planning Organization) and its provincial branches which are now affiliated to the Interior 
Ministry. 
 
Methods and Methodology:  
Every effective scientific research is informed by and relies on a philosophical 
perspective, a methodological framework in line with that philosophical perspective and 
approach, and methods and techniques compatible with the methodological framework in 
question. For research in the field of Human and Social Sciences, to which the present 
study belongs, usually a number of standard philosophical perspectives are utilized.  
The present research  which is a critical review of the process of planning and budgeting 
in Iran over a period of 60 years (thirty years before and thirty years after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran), makes use of the philosophical perspective of Critical Rationalism, 
methodological framework of Situational Analysis, and various methods such as sifting 
through library documents, reports issued by various government agencies in Iran, books 
and papers on planning in general and on the case of Iran in particular, expert and official 
reports of international organizations concerning the issue of planning, as well as in-depth 
interviews with Iranian experts on planning.  
The fact that the present research is partly a descriptive study does not conflict with its 
analytic, critical and applied aspects. A descriptive research can be used for elaborating on 
and rational criticism of a theory (Babbie, 2001). On the other hand, the descriptive part of 
the  research does not clash with either quantitative or qualitative methods for gathering the 
required data and information. 
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A descriptive research can either be carried out on a very small number of observation 
units (cases) and hence, there is no need to apply statistical approaches to the analysis of 
the results. Or, it can be carried out by using a big number of observation units (cases) and 
therefore, it necessitates the application of statistical approaches. However, a descriptive 
research can also be a field, survey or documentary research depending on the data 
collection tools it utilizes (ibid).  
Using the survey method does not necessarily mean the use of a particular technique for 
data collection. For the present research I have not only used questionnaires but have made 
use of other techniques such as face to face interviews and content analysis (or more 
accurately, secondary analysis of existing data and interviews), as recommended by (De 
Vaus, 1991). In Babbie’s  words (2001), a survey research is the application  of 
questionnaires on a  sample of  respondents  who are selected from among a population, 
and this is exactlty what I have done through face to face interviews with Iranian experts 
for collating their ‘tacit knowledge’ concerning the process of planning in Iran. Details of 
this approach are explained in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Also, Alreck and Settlle (1995) believe that face to face interview provides the most 
actual contact with respondents since it facilitates both auditory and visual communications 
with them. Face to face interview can help to acquire the cooperation of respondents and 
maintain it for a long time. This method minimizes no-response bias and is appropriate for 
small and geographically concentrated samples. It is faster than postal surveys. However, it 
is usually the most expensive method per respondent due to the travel and the interviewer 
expenses particularly if the respondents are scattered across a wide geographical area.  
According to Alreck and Settlle (1995) the questions addressed to respondents make up 
the main part of the survey plan. Every effort is aimed at questioning and investigation. 
Questions are the elements that do the actual interrogations. The questions which address 
the respondents are the most basic elements whose application usually has more 
fundamental impact on the survey results. The task of writing the questions, which is so 
important and should be carried out with precision and accuracy, is considered very 
essential. Therefore, attention should be paid to three features in drafting the questions: 
focus, brevity and simplicity of design. With all the above in mind, I developed a 
questionnaire containing fifty- one questions which were divided into seven sections.  
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Part of the present study covers the experiences of Iranian experts actively involved in 
the development of budgeting at both the central (national) and regional (provincial) levels. 
For this purpose, a group of experts with development planning and budgeting experience 
at the national and provincial levels were identified and were invited to answer and discuss 
research questions and deliberate on complex ideas.  
As almost all books on methodology suggest, in a study of the type undertaken here, the 
persuasiveness of the group providing expert judgment is central to its success. The 
persuasiveness, in large part, is linked to the reputation of the planning and budgeting 
experience of the members of the group.  
The experts who were invited to take part in the process of data-collection and 
information gathering for the project, constituted two major subgroups. The first were 
senior experts in national planning and budgeting who, as members of the central office of 
the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO), have been    actively   involved   in   the   
preparation   of    national development plans and budgets in Iran over the past two 
decades. The second group was comprised of senior experts who were affiliated to the 
Office of the Governor Generals or provincial bureaus of the PBO and have been actively 
engaged in preparing and implementing provincial development plans and budgets. Using a 
combination of random and non- random sample strategies, a representative sample was 
taken from each of the above groups. Given the relatively small size of the number of 
experts who were involved in the above exercise, a sample size of 30 was considered 
adequate for each group. 
Regarding the philosophical perspective/methodological framework of the research, 
from among the available philosophical perspectives and frameworks usually entitled as 
positivism, hermeneutic, phenomenology, constructionalism, Critical School, etc. (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000), the philosophical perspective known as Critical Rationalism has been 
selected. 
Critical Rationalism (CR) is a school of thought particularly associated with the Austrian 
(naturalized British) philosopher Sir Karl Popper (1902-94). The main tenet of this school 
is defined by Popper in terms of intellectual attitude: “An attitude of readiness to listen to 
critical arguments and to learn from experience; it is fundamentally an attitude of admitting 
that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the 
truth” (Popper 1971). 
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Popper has made significant contributions in many fields of traditional philosophy, in 
particular, epistemology and scientific method, and his work has been influential on many 
distinguished scholars/academics/researchers working in various branches of natural and 
social sciences and humanities.  
According to Popper (1972) explanation and justification run in opposite directions. 
When confronted with this opposition, we can either abandon justification or 
explanation.Popper pointed out we can never justify anything, we merely criticize and 
weed out bad ideas and work with what’s left.  
Popper maintained that science moves forward through a method of conjecture and 
refutation. He emphasizes the need for an open society, a society where people can speak 
out and criticize. After all, if science progresses through refutations, criticizing becomes 
essential. We need to speak out and therefore we need the freedom to do so. Popper was 
against any form of government that didn’t give people the chance to speak out. Popper’s 
thinking could probably best be summed up in this quote, “I may be wrong and you may be 
and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (Popper 1971). 
Critical Rationalism upholds a kind of Socratic Method which rejects the conviction of 
most philosophical traditions which regard knowledge as something that has to be certain 
and justified. CR takes the view that we don’t have ultimate answers, but knowledge is 
nevertheless possible; through error-elimination we will be able to get closer to the Truth.  
While CR often emphasizes criticism, it also encourages, epistemic pluralism and 
creative thinking; we need to come up with as many new ideas as we can, then let the 
process of criticism weed out the less workable ones (Popper 1972).  
Critical rationalism relies on a non-naive and minimal realistic point of view, suggesting 
that there is a reality independent of our minds, languages and conventions. .  
Critical rationalism subscribes to the view that attainment of objective knowledge is 
possible. Knowledge, according to critical rationalists, is neither ‘justified true belief’, nor 
‘reliable true belief’, nor ‘self-evident true belief’ (Miller, 1996). It is a set of conjectures 
constructed by us to ‘represent/explain’ reality (in the areas of interest, whether in the realm 
of nature, or the territory of socially constructed enties (Popper, 1963/1965). ’Objectivity’ 
boils down to ‘public accessibility and public assessability’ of our knowledge-claims (Paya 
2011, Popper, 1979).  
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Critical rationalism divides reality, from a general perspective, into three scopes of 
physical realities, subjective realities,and "constructed realities" which are the products of 
cooperation between mind and the world outside it (Popper, 1985). These three territories 
have been respectively named "World 1" "World 2", and "World 3". Popper defines the 
three Worlds in the following way:  
"First, there is the physical world – the universe of physical entities-; this I will call 'World 
1'. Second, there is the world of mental states including states of consciousness and 
psychological dispositions and unconscious states; this I will call 'World 2'. But there is 
also a third such world, the world of the contents of thought, and, indeed, of the products of 
the human mind; this I will call 'World 3' …"(Popper  (1984)cited in Faludi 1986). 
World 3 which is the result of the interaction between worlds 1 and 2, is the container of 
theories, thoughts, the content of ethical and legal systems, lyrics and music, stories and 
legends,… and the entire humans' developmental products. Many of these exist in the form 
of material and belong to World 1, but here what matters is what they express (Faludi 
1983).  
This world is objective and independent of individuals. The sign of reality for any entity 
is its capability of causing change in other entities. According to Popper, "… that the 
entities which we conjecture to be real should be able to exert a causal effect upon the 
prima facie real things; that is, upon material things of an ordinary size…" (Popper and 
Eccles (1984),cited in Faludi 1986, p.274).  
This applies to W3. That is, World 3 affects World 2 (humans' minds) and consequently 
(World 1)…..and, in turn, is affected by W2 and W1 (the latter affects it through W2). For 
example, in the time of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the cassettes containing the late Imam 
Khomeini's speeches played an important role in encouraging and guiding the revolutionary 
movement. The contents of these cassettes belong to World 3.  
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Figure 1-1: Different aspects of the three worlds 
 
                       Problems                                                                    World 3 
 
 
Physical world                 Knowledge                           World 1                       World 2  
                      (Body) 
Source: Mark Amadeus Notturno, On Popper, Wadsworth Publishing Co, 2002 
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Source: Mark Amadeus Notturno, On Popper, Wadsworth Publishing Co, 2002 
 
As indicated by Faludi (1983), Popper suggests three "building blocks for the 
methodology of planning as regards the definition of decision situation". One of these 
building blocks is "Situational Analysis". Popper gives the following account of this 
concept:"by a situational analysis I mean a certain kind of tentative explanation of human 
action which appeals to the situation in which the agent finds himself… we can try… to 
give an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation in which the agent found himself, 
  
50    
and to that extent make the action 'understandable'… that is to say, adequate to his situation 
as he saw it" Popper (1979), cited in Faludi (1983).  
An advantage of this framework which is one of the most appropriate methodological 
frameworks for humanities and social sciences is that it makes adoption of many different 
methods and techniques possible. Moreover, this methodology enjoys the strengths of 
methodologies like hermeneutics while is free of their weaknesses such as their tendency 
toward relativism.  
A further strength of this methodological framework lies in the objectivity of its 
findings. That is, in this methodological approach instead of relying on subjective and 
unavailable epistemic aspects of socio-economic actors, attention is directed to objective 
aspects such as the desired goals and values for the actors, and available knowledge to 
them, and the environmental circumstances (in its general sense) within which they act. It is 
in this context that  the dynamism of interaction among socio-economic actors is assessed. 
In interpreting the action of each actor, this methodology stresses on aspects which can be 
publicly criticized, assessed and consequently improved.  
Another important point to note about the methodology/method of Situational Analysis is 
that it not only can be used for explaining the behavior of individual actors, but also the 
behavior of institutions, organizations, and other collective entities such as nations. Here, 
the principle of ‘Methodological Individualism’ informs the application of the 
methodology/method of Situational Analysis. (Popper (1945) 1966, pp. 88–99).The 
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Figure 1-2: Different components of the methodological framework/method of  



















Sourse: Ali Paya 2011, “The Misguided Conception of Objectivity in Humanities and Social Sciences”,  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
 
 












For decades thorough and reliable reviews and informed critical analyses of the 
planning, budgeting and developmental process in Iran have been a rare if not extinct 
feature. The absence is as conspicuous in Farsi-language economic studies as it is in other 
(English) languages related to and dealing with Iran’s economic health. 
The focus of this chapter is to provide a critical assessment of planning and budgeting 
and their subsequent relevance to development patterns in Iran. A historical overview of 
planning and budgeting in the country is also presented and special effort has been made to 
demonstrate why the two processes--planning and budgeting -- have been unable to 
produce the desired results. 
Planning is usually regarded as a rational method to allocate scarce resources to the most 
important goals considered necessary to build and elevate a society to a higher status. 
Perhaps the first question that arises is indeed what type of a society planning could  create  
and  nurture. Prioritizing the goals is the next step in the complex exercise known as 
economic development. An elaborate roadmap to achieve the goals is desired function of 
the planning process. 
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There is hardly agreement among economists with regard to an acceptable universal 
meaning of the term economic planning. Economic planning refers to any directing or 
planning of economic activity outside the mechanisms of the market. According to Prof. L. 
Robbins economic planning is the "collective control or suppression of private activities of 
production and exchange" (as cited in Jhingan, 1978). According to Hayek planning means 
"the direction of productive activity by a central authority" (ibid). According to Dalton, 
"economic planning in the widest sense is the deliberate direction by persons in charge of 
large resources of economic activity towards a chosen end". (ibid) Even though there is no 
unanimity of opinion on the subject, yet economic planning as understood by most 
economists implies deliberate control and direction of the economy by a central authority 
for the purpose of achieving definite targets and objectives within a specified period,(ibid). 
Planning is the exercise of intelligence to deal with facts and situations as they are 
andfind a way tosolve problems (Nehru, Jawaharlal1961). If we could first know where we 
are,and whither we are tending, wecould better judge what to do, and how to do it 
(Abraham Lincoln1858). 
National economic planning is a wide, complicated and diversified phenomenon and 
defines not only the political and economic system of a country; it also illustrates its 
structure, size and level of economic development. As such, economic planning activities in 
all countries can be associated with one or two planning systems, which include developed 
and developing countries. It seems the main differences in the nature and method of 
planning between countries are the starting point of planning and their ulterior intention of 
planning. Regarding this framework, planners and theorists generally have defined two 
methods of economic planning: 
The first recognizes the social goals, sources of achievements, and analyzes the means 
of accession of goals in detail. This technique which was usually practiced in socialist 
countries was named conventional planning by Limdlom, 1973 and 1977. The second type 
of planning, usually in the western world, is strategic planning which avoids details and 
further formulates processes which could be in contradiction with future transformations, 
(ibid). 
According to some economists, planning is a sign of regularity, logic and rationality. To 
others planning means regulation, more control and curbing economic freedoms (Ejllali, 
2005). The varying interpretations actuate to present an independent and impartial 
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definition of planning. One definition of economic planning to which most economists and 
planners subscribe is a type of scheduling future activities. Thus, economic planning could 
be defined as a process of preparing a timetable for national economic activities and has 
three main characteristics: 
a- Plan related to the future 
b- Plan includes timetable for specific activities in national economy 
c- A responsible organization should implement the plan (Asgari, 2005). 
Although, economic planning is a form of decision-making, it transgresses, because it 
involves the implementation of specific policies and activities, and also includes forecasts 
of economic variables. Furthermore, planning, does not necessarily mean interference of 
the government, because in many cases the government interferes but without any 
planning. Since the emergence of development economies after the Second World War, the 
pursuit of economic development was reflected in the almost universal acceptance of 
development planning as the surest and most direct route to economic progress (Todaro, 
1994). Planning may be described as a deliberate government attempt to coordinate 
economic decision-making over the long term and to influence, direct, and in some cases, 
even control the level and growth of a nation's principal economic variables (income, 
consumption, employment, investment, savings, export, import, etc.) to achieve a 
predetermined set of development targets (ibid). 
In essence, economic planning was to allow choices about social welfare to be made 
consciously, instead of haphazardly, as the outcome of erratic market processes. 
(Kalecki,M.1986).The quest for rapid economic progress predicates largely the formulation 
and implementation of comprehensive development plans. Over the yeas planning has 
become a key instrument in the strategy of modernization. Ministries of economic planning 
in these nations are largely preoccupied with the process of drawing up such plans to be 
able to set forth in a logical and consistent manner the priorities, goals, and aspirations of 
their government (Todaro, 1997). 
In predominantly private enterprise economics like those of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Japan, planning plays a vital yet relatively indirect role in the 
economic process. In the content of those economics, usually exists in the conscious efforts 
of governments the aim to attain rapid economic growth with high employment and stable 
prices through various fiscal and monetary policies (ibid). 
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The second category of economic planning was associated largely with central planning  
as  seen  in  the  former  Soviet-type  economics  in Eastern  Europe and  Asia, 
where the government actively and directly controlled the movement of the economy 
through a strict and centralized decision-making process. The essential difference between 
planning in capitalist and collectivist (socialist) economies is one of inducement verses 
control. While the former seeks to prevent the economy from straying off a desired path of 
stable growth through active but indirect instruments of policy, the latter not only draws up 
a specific set of targets representing a desired course of economic progress, it also tries to 
implement its plan directly and by controlling the activities of practically all productive 
units in the national economy (ibid). 
An important feature of economic planning lies in the realm of development planning 
within the framework of the mixed economy. These economies are characterized by the 
existence of an institutional setting in which part of the productive resources are privately 
owned while the other part belongs to the public sector. The actual proportionate division 
of public and private ownership varies from country to country (ibid).In the context of such 
an institutional setup we can recognize two principal aspects of planning in mixed 
economies. First, governments' deliberate utilization of domestic savings and foreign 
finance to carry out public investment projects and to mobilize resources into areas that can 
be expected to make the greatest contribution to economic progress. Second, government 
policy is to facilitate, stimulate, direct and in some cases control private economic activity 
to ensure a harmonious relationship between the desires of private businesses and economic 
plans of the central government. 
Another criterion for survey of economic planning experiments refers to those usually 
prepared according to time limits -short, mid and long term. Short time economic plans are 
mostly yearlong and relate to annual budgets, while midterm plans are prepared for five 
years to cover the trade circles and provide enough space for major projects to yield. The 
main aim of such plans, irrespective of the system of government, is to create structural 
changes induced by investment in these countries.No single definition incorporates all of 
the different strands of economic development. Typically economic development can and 
should be described in terms of objectives. These are commonly portrayed as the creation 
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of jobs and wealth, and improvement of the quality of life, (IEDC1). Economic 
development also can be described as a process that influences growth and restructures the 
economy to help enhance the economic wellbeing of a community, (ibid). 
It can fairly be said that the bottom line of economic development today is about 
building prosperity-- a high and rising standard of living. Productivity and productivity 
growth are the fundamental pillars of prosperity and innovation is a key driver of 
productivity. The focus of economic development should be on supporting innovation and 
increasing prosperity, (Sampson, D.A, 2010). 
Economic development, according to Harvard University Professor Michael E. Porter is 
the “Long-term process of building a number of interdependent microeconomic capabilities 
and incentives to support more advance forms of competition .“  
These capabilities and incentives, which were originally identified in Porter's paper ‘The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations’ (1990), include the nature and extent of the inputs 
required by firms to produce goods or services, the rules, incentives and norms governing 
the type and intensity of local rivalry, the quality of demand for local services, and the 
extent and quality of local suppliers and related industries. 
The main goal of economic development is improving the economic well being of a 
community through efforts that entail job creation, job retention, tax base enhancements 
and quality of life, (IEDC, 2006). 
Development cannot be considered as a series of disconnected sectoral activities or 
purely technological choices. It implies global coherence and the political will to bring 
about social change. It often occurs through institutional changes: it assumes a certain 
degree of articulation and organization on the part of the agents of social change (Henry, 
P.1991). 
The process of development, in many developing countries, must be redefined as an 
attack on the primary evils in today’s world: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums (having 
long emerged as a growth industry), unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of 
aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. But measured in terms of 
jobs, justice, and the elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success 
(Streeten, 1997). 
                                                 
1International Economic Development Council 
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Interference or the lack of it by a weak and inefficient government does not bear fruit 
because interference of such a government in the economic affairs of a country would 
result in one set of crisis while non-interference would create other ills. Special attention 
has thus been paid to cognition, recommendations and applications of this theory in most 
developed and developing countries. Application of good governance and executive 
policies of this theory are the main subjects of economic, planning and budgeting surveys 
in recent years. This theory recommends a wide-range of executive policies to 
policymakers, of which improvement in the operation of public institutions, modification of 
fiscal and budgetary systems are the most important. 
 
Historical Pathology of Economic Planning in Iran 
Until the world economic crisis in 1929, due to the sovereignty of classical thoughts, 
planning was not popular. The justification for government intervention in economic affairs 
was made by John Maynard Keynes after the great global recession and devastation of the 
Second World War. It resulted in the creation, expansion and extension of planning as tools 
of development in many countries. In Iran before WWII the necessity of a socio-economic 
development plan was felt and the first step was taken in 1937 by the Supreme Economic 
Council. But after the destruction and breakdown of economic affairs due to the war, the 
idea of adjusting to and embarking on meaningful economic development gained currency 
among statesmen (Kordbache, 2004). 
It was first in 1937 that Iran faced the concept of planning in its formal context. That 
year according to a proposal by the Bureau of Commerce of the cabinet, establishment of 
the Economic Council was approved. One responsibility of the council was preparation of 
economic plans and to offer practical ways to implement them. The council set up a 
permanent commission to explore policies to reform agriculture statutes and address 
problems emanating from migration. However, in 1938 the subject was suspended and the 
commission disbanded, (PBO2, 1995). Six years later in 1944 the government reestablished 
the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) according the same pattern as in 1937. Due to 
changes in cabinet members nothing was achieved up until1946 when a government was 
formed by the new Prime Minister (Ahmad Qavam) and it was decided that the SEC should 
                                                 
2Plan and Budget Organization 
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present its plans based on two principals. First, improving living standards and second, 
adjusting wealth distribution. 
To this end a new committee was formed and in a report outlined the impediments to 
preparing development plans, namely lack of necessary data and accurate information, 
newness of relevant subjects, unspecified policies, the scale and scope of the task along 
with punishing schedules. The committee presented the first draft of plans to the SEC with 
emphasis on a proposal to create a Supreme Plan Committee (SPC) to finalize the plans, 
(ibid). After a review of the proposed plans, the SPC realized that the financial capacity of 
country would not allow for the implementation of the plans. On this premise it suggested 
to apply for a USD 250 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). The move resulted in a contract between the government of Iran and 
an international American company ‘Morisen Nodsen’ for preparing details of plans and 
projects to be presented to the IBRD to qualify for the loan. 
Morisen Nodsen published its final report ‘Iran Economic Development Plan’ and 
submitted it to the government in Tehran in late 1947. A year later Iran's first seven-year 
development plan with a budget of 21 billion Rials was approved by parliament. For the 
first time this ancient land was introduced formally to a development plan and an 
organization tasked with economic planning (ibid). 
Iran's history of experiments with planning is marked by two phases: before and after the 
Islamic Revolution. The 1979 revolution put an end to the rule of kings and replaced it with 
a republic system of governance (ibid), which follows view of the doctrine of five mid-term 
development plans and their core elements which was the product of the ‘Kingdom 
Experiment’ that initiated the first plan in 1946. The second experiment includes 4 five-
year development plans prepared in the post-revolution era. 
A survey of Iran's economic planning from 1948 to 2009 could be classified into ten 
phases subject to time. The first goes back to the years before 1948 when there was no 
scope for planning in the contemporary sense and individual and abstracted decision 
making was the rule. Phases 2-5 followed with the aim of establishing modern planning 
ystems to replace individual and cumbersome decision making during the years spanning 
from the second to the fifth development plans. Phases six and seven can be constituted as 
the duration of preparing revolutionary plans and also the transition phases from 
revolutionary decisions to equinoctial and rational decisions. Phases eight and nine in fact 
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refer to the process during which moderate and rational decision making found blazon 
value. The tenth phase, which started from 1999 with the baggage of 50years of planning 
experience, was, among other things, intended to help build and ensure a strong future 
based on long-range planning. This last phase of planning during which the future 
transformation of society could take place remains ambiguous because it is still saddled 
with sectorial tendencies and in a palate budgeting framework. The circuit transition of 
planning knowledge with emphasis on concepts of sustainable development and spatial 
planning uses budget planning and budget allocation in the last phase and particularly in 
view of implementation of plans. In the following pages I briefly explain the traits and 
performance of mid-term development plans both before and after the Islamic Revolution. 
 
First 7-Year Development Plan 1948-1955 
The planning system in Iran, before the 1979 revolution and during the five subsequent 
plans was based on a central approach: intensive concentration of all affairs in the political-
administrative center of the country. This led to a top-down system of planning in most 
plans prepared by the government and the relevant institution(s), and the lack of a regional 
planning and decision-making paradigm in the structure of the macro-sectorial plans. 
Policies were based largely on economic growth levels drawn from the theory of ‘Growth 
Pole’ with attention on regional metropolitan centers and industrial poles that in effect 
produced imbalances at the regional and local levels. 
After the end of the First World War, the issue of planning, which already had been 
suggested during the 1930s, was reinvented with added emphasis and concentrated on two 
goals, namely, rehabilitating the structure of non-profit organizations, except the oil 
industry, tobacco products and railroads, which was transferred to the Bank of Industry and 
Mine, and also conceiving a national development program.In 1946 a ‘committee for 
preparing the development and reform plan’ headed by the finance minister was 
established. According to a report by this committee, the council of ministers established a 
new commission, the Supreme Committee for Programming headed by the prime minister. 
In 1948 the government set up an administration organization for planning responsible 
for preparing the seven-year plans. This office was later renamed as the Provisional 
Organization. After that, to benefit from technical services a contract was signed with the 
American company ‘Overseas Consultants Inc.’. A five-member team from this company 
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studied the economic and social conditions in, and traveled to, different parts of the 
country. It produced the ‘First Seven-Year Plan” on January 12, 1948. This plan was 
approved by Parliament on July 4, 1949. According to the legal framework outlined in the 
First Plan, a special body, the ‘Plan Organization’ was responsible for the performance of 
the plan. Goals of the First Plan included:  
 
Table2-1: Goals and Targets of the First Development Plan 1948-1955 
No. Goals and Targets 
1 Increasing production and exports 
2 Internal production of basic goods 
3 
Improving the agricultural and industrial base, exploration of mines 
andundergroundresources, oil in particular 
4 Improving healthcare and education 
5 Raising living standards 
6 Reducing the cost of living 
Funding for the First Plan focused on some main sectors. The first sector dealt with 
agriculture. The second sector aimed at the construction of roads, railways, ports and 
airports, the third sector was mostly concerned with mines and industries. In the fourth 
sector the development of post, telegraph and telephone was in perspective and finally, 
social and urban reform was the focus of the fourth sector. 
From budget allocation point of view the important sectors in the plan were social 
modification with 28.6 percent, agriculture 24.8 and roads and transportation 23.8 percent 
of the total budget. Mines and industries ranked on fourth with only 14.3 percent. Besides 
expenditures mentioned in the plan, the income table shows that the financial resources for 
the plan consisted of: Oil revenues 37%, loan from the National Bank of Iran up to 750 
million Rials, borrowing from the IBRD up to USD 250 million, and loans from internal 
non-government institutions. 
The budget outlay indicates that the working development model was tuned to 
agricultural development through the private sector. However, it was the government that 
precedes dam construction and trench of agricultural lands. Industries as the second 
productive sector got fourth place in the budget allocation with an eye on industries 
producing consumption goods, particularly the textile industry. 
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The plan prepared by the American company tried to attribute to Iran the role of a 
producer of agricultural raw materials that at best could also have some industries for 
consumer goods. It was for this reason that the plan was unable to address and alleviate the 
inherent causes of underdevelopment across the country. 
The first year of the plan was taken up in establishing the Plan Organization and 
reforming the Industrial Organization which was transferred from the Bank of Mines and 
Industry to the Plan Organization. A special budget was earmarked for operations of the 
Plan Organization. It was decided that the total oil revenues be used for construction 
projects.The performance of the First Plan showed that no loan was received from 
international banks or lenders and the National Bank of Iran could provide only a small part 
of the designated loan. Therefore oil earnings were the main financial source for funding 
construction programs and that too was cut off after nationalization of the oil industry in 
1951. Although oil income resumed from 1954, the three-year gap was more than enough 
to render impossible the main targets of the program. 
Total income during the program, except 4.2 billion Rials in foreign aid, was 7.6 billion 
Rials or almost 1/3 above the estimated amount. Despite lapses in income generation, 5.3 
billion Rials was added to the budget plan in 1952 (agriculture 2.1billion Rials, road 
construction 2billion Rials, mines and industry 1.2billion Rials). As expected, funds 
allocated by the Plan Organization were significantly less than what was decided and till 
September 1956, only 6.7bilion Rials, equivalent to ¼ of the expenses outlined in the 
revised program in 1952 was allocated. The known outcome of the plan was limited to 
setting up six factories, building roads and railways, several irrigation projects and 
mechanization of agricultural production. 
The First Plan was indeed short-lived and was implemented only for 2 years. By 
initiating a move to nationalize the oil industry in 1950, and the added constraints of the 
multilateral sanctions due to the nationalization, earnings from oil exports forecast for 
implementing the plan dried up and Iran's foreign exchange reserves in Britain were frozen.  
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development also joined the sanctions 
regime and suspended the loan to Tehran. It linked resumption of lending to a protocol to 
be signed between Iran and the British oil company which was at the center of the 
dispute.After oil revenues resumed the need for a new economic development plan was 
found necessary, more so because of the fallout from the oil embargo. For this purpose 
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implementation of the First Plan was suspended in 1950 while barely 31.4 percent of the 
total 21 billion-Rial budget for the plan was allocated and paid. 
 
Second 7-Year Development Plan 1955-1962 
The oil embargo was lifted and exports resumed in 1958 following an agreement 
between a new consortium and the government of Iran. Financial resources were made 
available for the Second Plan. The plan, however, was overhauled in 1958 and a completely 
new version was presented. 
This plan was similar to the First Plan and lacked a holistic and comprehensive 
approach. It included a list of projects in diverse sectors without offering clear proposals for 
control or internal harmony. It was simply a combination of projects visibly lacking 
conventional wisdom and the instruments of cost-benefit analysis. The most important 
change that occurred then in the planning system was the responsibility of the Supervising 
Committee for introducing the evaluation tools in the process of programming. The 
committee (comprising six members, three selected by the Senate and three by Parliament) 
was responsible for controlling project costs and ensuring their consistency with the plan 
estimations.For the first time in 1960 a mid-period evaluation was undertaken to assess the 
performance of the plan which to some degree proved effective in the better performance of 
the plan in the remaining period. Spending in the Second Plan had two parts. The first part 
included the residual budget from the First Plan and the second part consisted of total 
budget amounting 52.8 billion Rials and its programs fell under the following titles: 
 
Table2-2: Programs of the Second Development Plan 1955-1962 
No. Programs 
1 Agricultural development 
2 Infrastructure development, roads, ports 
3 Setting up foundries 
4 Creating an atmosphere friendly to private investment 
5 Assisting production of basic goods namely sugar, textiles and cement 
6 Emphasizing the role of government in industries lacking appeal to private enterprise 
7 
Expanding education, health, and treatment of pandemics, namely, malaria and pox (PBO 
reports) 
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Execution of the revised plan coincided with the economic expansion and stability 
program that was proposed due to rising inflation and decline in resources caused by the 
Second Plan. Targets of the program included maintaining the value of the local currency, 
stability of prices, maintaining the foreign trade balance via import restrictions, bank 
facilities, balancing the budget deficit, reducing government debt to the domestic banking 
system and boosting bank deposits by raising interest rates. 
Each of the targets was divided into sub-groups and an annual budget was proposed for 
each. Except for the total expenses there was no other specific general target in the plan and 
financial resources had to be acquired through oil exports. It was expected that the Plan 
Organization would receive 60% of the annual oil income in the first two years of the plan 
and 70-80% in the next five years. 
It was also forecast that annual spending would increase to its highest level in the second 
year of the plan and decrease gradually in the following years, but annual income had to 
increase constantly in a way that in the first half of the plan there may be deficit and the 
deficit should be offset from the surplus in the second half. In 1956 there was discussion 
about addressing the deficit problem by applying for 5.7 billion Rials in loans from the 
International Banks. 
As is apparent, the goals of the plan were defined broadly in global terms and little if 
any effort was made to clarify aims such as increase in national income or job creation. So, 
the Second Plan cannot be considered as an economic development plan in the true sense. 
In essence it was a budget distribution scheme between projects and different economic 
sectors of the country and a project- by-project approach to planning (Waterson, 1965). 
According to Lewis, (1955 ) most developing nations which usually do not have enough 
reliable information necessary for economic planning, should concentrate on bringing order 
into the public sector programs and their economic policies. This would help administrators 
and decision-makers acquire a certain degree of experience in planning and plan 
implementation which is the basis for effective planning. But the piecemeal project-by-
project planning approach seen in the Second Plan did not benefit from such an experiment 
and faced serious challenges. 
The estimated budget for the plan initially was 70 billion Rials, but with an increase of 
7.2 percent it reached 75 billion Rials which was 3.5 times over and above that of the First 
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Plan. It should be mentioned that a major part of the increase was due to the leap in price 
levels and also increase in foreign exchange rates. 
As shown in the table below, communications with 39.8 percent, agriculture and 
irrigation with 31.1 percent, and mines and industries with 11.8 percent of total budget of 
the plan, were the key sectors in the Second Plan. 
Although the plan reemphasized the agricultural sector through dam construction and 
efficient water utilization, more funds were allocated to communication and 
telecommunications and this sector emerged as a fundamental base for development. As 
was the case in the First Plan, industries again received less importance and the plan paid 
no attention to heavy industries. 
Yet again spending in the plan period was largely from oil revenues. About 80 percent 
of total oil earnings generated in the first two years of the plan, 60 percent in the next one 
and the half years and about 55 percent in the last two and half years were apportioned for 
the Second Plan. Other than the oil revenues allocated for implementing the second mid-
term plan, an extra 25 billion Rials in a variety of loans was given to the government for the 
plan. 
 
Third 5-Year Development Plan 1962-1967 
The Third Plan, which was to cover five years in fact extended to 5.5 years. It was the 
first comprehensive development plan of the country and almost all important economic 
indices were targeted. Based on three different assumptions for GDP growth rates, the 
annual growth rate was set at 6% and the total budget of the plan was 140 billion Rials. 
However, later it increased first to 200 billion Rials and then to 230 billion resulting in the 
economic growth rate of 8.6% at fixed prices. One of the secondary targets of the plan was 
creating one million jobs to curb growing joblessness, especially in the large urban areas. 
That was setting the bar too high as not only creating jobs was far away from the priority 
list, the increase in the working-age population to 1.8 million made a bad employment 
situation worse. 
Economic expansion in the Third Plan was undermined by inflation and limitations 
related to and emanating from the balance of payment because of three reasons. First, 
although private consumption expenses had a faster growth compared to the Second Plan, it 
was compromised with the increase in consumption by private industries. Second, many 
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programs in the pipeline in the Second Plan would reach fruition during the Third Plan 
period, and third, oil income from exact payments310 and taxes added to the growing 
import bill. Therefore, the planning system underwent major changes in the Third Plan, 
namely: 
1-Executive administrations and ministries directly entered the planning process. Initially 
the general format of the plan was determined by the director for economic assistance at the 
Plan Organization. It included targets and budget allocations. In the next phase executive 
programs of different sectors were prepared by sectoral committees that consisted of 
representatives from the economic assistance department of the Plan Organization and 
relevant executive bodies. The reason for establishing the committees was to help facilitate 
sectoral programs and expansion/extension of planning concepts in the ministries. 
2 - The Plan Organization lost its executive power and this part of its authority was 
transferred to executive departments and ministries. The organization continued the 
execution of plans which were under its domain in the Second Plan. 
3 - The Supervision Committee and the Supreme Committee were dissolved and replaced 
by the Supreme Organization Committee, the Executive Plan Committee and an 
Accounting Committee. 
4-A department for Program and Plan was established in the Plan Organization and its key 
responsibility included preparing economic reports and economic evaluation of plans. 
5-The Plan Organization was responsible for presenting an economic report for the current 
year and one forecasting economic trends in the following year to the Supreme 
Organization Committee at the end of each September. 
6-Total budget in the Third Plan was 230 billion Rials in order to reach a target of 6% 
growth in national income including oil. According to the plan a part of the annual oil 
income was deposited in a special account known as the Plan Account and the government 
was authorized to use foreign financial resources to offset income deficits during the Plan. 
7 - According to the plan, almost 50% of the assumed investment in industry and mines was 
to come from private enterprise. However, because of government support during the plan 
period participation of the private sector was higher and its share in industrial investment 
was close to 65%. 
                                                 
3The exact payment was equal to 12.5% of the fixed oil price with the rent, which the member oil company in 
the consortium paid for the quantity of the exported oil to the government. 
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The Third Plan in comparison to the earlier two consisted of more sectors (10 sectors). As 
mentioned earlier, the first and second plans consisted of a list of different development 
projects, but the third was comprehensive and envisioned the following goals: 
 
Table 2-3: The Goals of the Third Development Plan 1962-1967 
No. Goals 
1 Creating and expanding industries that augment national income; 
2  Facilitating proper conditions for creating foundries along with chemical, automobile,  
aluminum, tractor and pipe factories; 
3 Expanding infrastructure, education and health services; 
4 Agriculture and irrigation development; 
5 Housing and construction; 
6 Improving data collection, statistics and planning; 
7 Cultural development and improvingquality of education in schools and uiversities; 
8 Creating jobs and training the labor force; 
9 Developing energy and power plants; 
10 Urban development. 
 
One key feature of the goals of the plan was land reform, initiated in 1962 and with all 
its significance to the political climate in Iran then, which ultimately paved the way for the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, which was not a part of this plan. 
The total budget estimated for the Third Plan was 222.4 billion Rials or 2.7 times the 
amount allocated for the Second Plan. The communication sector with 25.6%, agriculture 
and irrigation with 21.5% and energy with 15.8% were the most important sectors 
respectively. As for revenues, almost 66 percent of the 222.4 billion allocated to the plan 
was financed by oil exports and 13% from domestic borrowing. The balance was the 
function of foreign loans and miscellaneous resources. 
The development model in the plan accorded priority to communication and 
telecommunication. In the production sectors agriculture stood first while industries 
received a lesser share compared to the Second Plan. As indicated in the plan, the 
government participated in sectors in which private companies, due to technical and 
financial constraints, were unable or unwilling to enter. As a result the government 
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embarked on expanding infrastructure networks and spent generously thanks to oil 
revenues which almost doubled in that period. 
Needless to say, land reform unleashed the migration of millions from the rural to urban 
areas and by extension led to private sector growth. That phenomenon not only could not 
provide cheap labor for economic activities, such as the construction industry and services, 
but also production and consumption markets in rural areas suffered due to the anti-
development move under the banner of the highly controversial land reforms.Although the 
plan was successful in achieving the relatively high growth rate due largely to the huge and 
unexpected increase in international oil prices, it was shy of attaining sectoral goals. 
The government’s total investment increased, but these were aimed mostly at the 
domestic market irrespective of their levels of comparative advantage. This notion was 
indeed strengthened in the next two development plans resulting in the expansion of the 
heavy base industries and an apparently costly and controversial industrialization drive in 
the country. 
 
Fourth 5-Year Development Plan 1968-1972 
The Fourth 5-Year Development Plan was approved on March 18, 1967. Like its 
predecessor, it was launched with three different assumptions regarding the national gross 
production rate, i.e. 6, 7, and 8%. However, in light of the high growth rate in the Third 
Plan, at last 9% growth rate was determined as the target for the new plan. To achieve this 
figure, 810 billion Rials in investment was forecast almost 60% of which had to be made by 
the government. According to the single article of law of the plan, 480billion Rials from the 
government sector had to be transferred to the Plan Organization to help achieve the 
following targets: 
Table2-4: Goals and Targets of the Fourth Development Plan 1968-1972 
No. Goals and Targets 
1 
Expedite economic growth and increase national income by augmenting purchasing power 
and industrial expansion 
2 
Fair distribution of income by ensuring employment and expansion of social and welfare 
services 
3 
Reducing dependency on foreign countries for basic commodities by increasing domestic 
agricultural output 
4 Diversifying exports and market expansion 
5 Improving administrative services through reforms in the administration system 
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During plan period the government paid more attention to capital incentive industries 
like steel and aluminum plants and machine manufacture. Steel mills and petrochemical 
industries under construction during the Third Plan came on stream. During this period the 
share of the American businesses in the total investment was 50%, Germans 14% and 
Britons 10%. 
During the Fourth Plan relations between oil producing countries were placed on a firm 
and friendly footing. The move resulted in the increase in international crude prices and had 
a positive impactvis-à-vis attaining targets of the plan. In the last year of the plan, oil 
revenues increased 2.6 times compared to 1967. Average annual growth in oil production 
and export was accordingly up 14.3% and 16.1% respectively. During this period the 
Tehran Oil Refinery was inaugurated with a capacity of 85,000 barrels per day. In next 
phase the refinery’s capacity increased to 95,000 bpd. The Madras Oil Refinery was also 
built in India with Iran’s financial input. A deal for exporting natural gas to the Soviet 
Union was signed in 1970. 
The Fourth Plan came into effect with a total budget of 480 billion Rials but increased to 
554 billion during the plan period. Although this plan’s declared mandate was to promote 
economic independence in actuality the opposite happened. More than ever before the 
Iranian economy fell in the throes of foreign dependence. Budget for the plan was 2.5 times 
that of the Third Plan. Funds for the key agriculture sector were deducted and diverted to 
the industries, oil and gas and housing sectors. The most important sector in the Fourth 
Plan that received the biggest amount of money was mine and industry with 22.3% of the 
total budget. 
Almost 96 percent of total spending in the plan came from oil exports and the remaining 
from other financial sources. One main pillar of the plan was development of the industrial 
sector. The industrialization movement which was in its infancy after being launched in the 
closing years of the Third Plan was reinforced. During the plan period gross domestic 
investment grew by 13% per annum and the share of public and private sectors in total 
investment stood at 58 and 42%respectively. Gross domestic production increased at the 
rate of 11% a year. 
Impressive economic growth and stability during the plan period notwithstanding, it was 
marked also by several shortcomings, namely, lack of sectoral balance in economic growth 
and yawning gaps between the urban and rural areas. Another shortcoming concerned 
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unprecedented dependence on imports which, among other things, further saddled the 
balance of payment, and finally, the industrialization rush in that period dislodged the 
agriculture sector as an important segment of the plan. 
 
Fifth 5-Year Development Plan 1973-1977 
The Fifth Plan was finalized and approved in the second half of 1973. Steadily rising 
global oil prices and the systematic increase in Iran’s oil exports ushered in windfall profits 
in a manner unheard of in the history of the country. As money flowed into state coffers, 
the temptation was high to review and revise the Fifth Plan in 1974 with extra infusions of 
petrodollars. The main goals of the plan were: 
 
Table 2-5: Goals and Targets of the Fifth Development Plan 1973-1977 
No. Goals and Targets 
1 Improving the quality of life of all social strata 
2 Rapid and sustainable economic growth rates 
3 Minimum increase in prices 
4 
Job generation across the country and improving the quality and availability of human 
resource 
5 Conservation and protection of the environment 
6 
Improving and augmenting comparative advantage in the production and export of 
industrial goods 
7 Safeguarding the cultural heritage 
 
During the plan period the Central Bank extended considerable facilities to the Plan 
Organization to help underpin economic growth and reduce inflationary pressures as 
demand for goods and services had outstripped supply. The relative GDP index increased 
annually by 4.3% and price of goods and services index reached 3.7%. Despite some 
imbalances between supply and demand, relative stability in prices was maintained through 
proper and timely financial policies. 
Total budget for the plan was 1,560 billion Rials which was divided between three 
important segments: public affairs 7.9%, social affairs 30.1%, and economic affairs 62%. A 
review of the segments shows that public institutions and construction with 75% of the 
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budget allocated to public affairs, education with 49% and housing at 17.7% in social 




First 5-Year Development Plan 1989-1993 
Given the upheavals during and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and devastation of 
the1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, there was no time or space for meaningful economic planning in 
Iran until 1989.However, due to similarities in the preparation of development plans in the 
past with annual planning and budgeting frameworks, it can be fairly claimed that planning 
did exist in some form up until1989. In that year the First 5-Year Economic, Social and 
Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran was endorsed by the Parliament. 
Planning after the revolution incorporated a broader and systemic approach and as the 
name indicates covered social, economic and cultural development for more than 20 years 
since inception. The focus of the first development plan after the revolution was on 
rehabilitating the war-torn economy. Function of the First Plan was built upon a financial 
framework compatible with the needs of rebuilding the country after eight years of death 
and destruction unleashed by the Iraqi invasion. The process was made possible, inter alia, 
with a moderate budget and new income-generating systems including higher taxes/tariffs 
and adjustment of services cost. 
The plan set into motion a new-found strategy that came to be known as ‘Free market 
economy’. The main goal of the plan was to utilize state funds for massive post-war 
reconstruction projects and draw efficiently on potentials to reverse the negative trends in 
the economy and make way for sustainable growth. Therefore, the first plan was also 
known as the ‘reconstruction plan ‘. In those years decent economic growth was 
understandably one of the fundamental prerequisites of national development and economic 
policy was tuned to raising production levels. The main attributes and main policies of the 
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Table2-6: Attributes of the First Plan 
No. Attributes 
1 
Incentives for investment, productive employment, and economic growth while reducing 
outside dependency ,promoting self-reliance in strategic agricultural products and taming 
inflation; 
2 Reducing population growth and mortality rates, increasing literacy and education rates; 
3 Attempts to promote Islamic social justice; 
4 Spreading public awareness about the needs of the younger generation; 
5 
Reconstruction, rehab and mobilization of defense power, infrastructure and manufacturing 
sectors; 
6 Reforming the administrative and judicial organizations, 
 
Table2-7: Policies of the First Plan 
No. Policies 
1 Strengthening the national currency and controlling inflation by reducing budget deficits; 
2 
Curbing government spending by encouraging the people to participate in and contribute to 
establishing and managing educational and medical institutions; 
3 
Revisiting the rationing system of basic goods  in a way that subsidies would be allowed 
only to low-income groups; 
4 
Changing policies for price regulation of both goods and services in a way that balanced 
prices for economic resources would be possible; 
5 Putting an end to years of state/government monopoly in foreign trade in specified cases; 
6 
Eliminating special centers created during the 1980-88 war for the procurement and 
distribution of goods; 
7 Supporting cooperatives and creating the conditions for improving their competitiveness, 
 
 
Performance of the First Plan 
The first years of the plan period registered decent economic growth that, however, did 
not last in its final years. GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.3%, which was slightly 
 
72    
less than the targeted 8.1% (MPO4, 1994). This indicates that the plan was unable to ensure 
sustainable growth rates and economic growth was apparently under the influence of 
factors beyond the command and control of the plan. A large part of the growth during the 
first half of the plan was a result of the access to previously unused capital. The degree of 
capital utilization was about 40%t at the end of the 1980s (Amuzegar, 2005). This is the 
primary reason why economic growth demonstrated a lackluster performance towards the 
end of the plan (ibid). Furthermore, during the plan period import of goods and services 
saw a monumental increase from USD 13 billion in 1989 to $31 billion in 1992 (Pesaran, 
1995). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the high growth in the first three years of this plan is 
largely attributable to the increase in imports. However in the last year of the plan, when 
the exchange unification policy was launched, total exports did not keep pace with 
increased demand for imports (Valadkhani, 2001). Consequently, Iran faced some 
difficulties with respect to the repayment of its external debt, which was estimated in 
1993at $23.4 billion (Dadkhah, 2009). 
Among the major developments in this period was the temporary increase in oil incomes 
resulting from the invasion and military occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, injection of foreign 
loans into the national economy and consequently the predicament of meeting debt 
repayment deadlines. In addition, during its implementation, the plan underwent certain 
changes, among them not using the existing potentials, prioritizing the strategy of 
encouraging exports, the policy of a fixed rate for foreign exchange, price liberalization, 
and rapid privatization. In the First Plan, about 384,000 job opportunities were created each 
year (on average) and this realized 97% of the plan’s objective. The plan succeeded in 
lowering the unemployment rate in a way that it fell to 11.5% at the end of the plan period, 
(Table 2-11 and 2-12).The plan targeted increase in the non-government sector investment 
by 12.2% per year on average, i.e. higher than the rate forecast for the government sector. 
In practice, however, average annual investment by the government was higher than that of 
the non-government sector. Therefore, it can be said that the approach of the plan with 
regard to enhancing private sector role in the economy was not successful. The 
performance of liquidity growth during the plan period was higher than the target (i.e. 8.2% 
per year).Average annual liquidity growth in the first plan was 25.1%. Based on the data in 
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the said table, average increase in annual inflation was 18.9% in the five year period of the 
plan, i.e. 4.5% higher than presumed.The First Plan produced major achievements in the 
social sphere, including reduction in population growth rates (from 3.5% to nearly 2%), 
curbed the mortality rate, and improved literacy rates along with education coverage. 
In sum, the plan lacked impetus when it came to providing the legal basis in accordance 
with strategic policy in a way that the privatization strategy, the policy for freeing currency 
exchange rates and foreign trade were not effectively implemented. These problems drove 
up prices in the last two years of the plan period and the negative trend continued well into 
the first years of the Second Plan. 
 
Second 5-Year Development Plan (1994-1999) 
One main feature of the Second Plan was to sustain the achievements of the First Plan, 
stabilize the positive economic trends, and reduce the burden of severe economic 
fluctuations on the masses. In terms of structure and nature the plan was almost similar to 
the First Plan and was based on economic liberalization and privatization. Economic 
growth and development were among its fundamental pillars with added emphasis on 
sustainability. No wonder that the plan was also known as the ‘Economic Stability Plan’. 
The major objectives and targets of the plan included: 
Table2-8: Second Plan Goals 
No. Goals 
1 Promoting social justice; 
2 Elevating the virtues of Islamic ethics, and upgrading public culture; 
3 
Advancing the rule of law, protecting the people’s security, encouraging the culture of 
upholding and respecting the law, social harmony and improving work ethics; 
4 
Guiding the youth and encouraging their role in the economic, social, cultural and political 
spheres; 
5 Upholding the demands of wisdom, dignity and national interest in foreign policy; 
6 Augmenting defense power, 
7 Raising productivity, protection of the environment and optimal use of resources. 
 
The Key Policy Initiatives of the Second Plan are as follows: 
 
 
74    
Table2-9: Second Plan Key Policy Initiatives 
No. Policy Initiatives 
1 
Encouraging exports by drawing effectively on the country's comparative advantage, improving 
competitiveness with the outside world to improve domestic technology; 
2 Developing the financial, capital, labor and service markets; 
3 
Improving financial policy by addressing and developing the planning and budgeting structures, 
raising the share of tax revenues in the budget, creating a logical balance between income and 
expenditures, delegating affairs to people, downsizing and curbing the government’s economic 
control authority; 
4 
Population control through effective public awareness and holding national census to learn more 
of the country's demographic trends and labor market; 
5 
Creating jobs thorough efficient use of labor market data and associated networks, promoting 
small-scale and conversion industries, 
6 Price reforms. 
 
Performance of the Second Plan 
The plan came into effect under circumstances after which access to the available 
untapped potential of the First Plan years and changes in the economic direction was 
subject to investment flows in new economic spheres. Factors such as the hard currency 
crisis in the early period of the plan, increasing need for savings in foreign currency, 
instability in the monetary, financial and currency policies, sliding global oil prices 
compared to those forecast in 1997 and further drops in 1998, drought in most provinces, 
and political developments were among the obstacles to realizing the objectives set out in 
the plan. In short, a fundamental change emerged in the direction toward implementing the 
plan. Currency controls, the pressure of foreign financial commitments, galloping inflation, 
public concern over possible further rise in prices, and increasing demand for goods and 
hard currency brought in its wake new economic control mechanisms including a multi-rate 
currency system, new controls on prices and imports, and monetary contraction measures. 
The performance of the plan shows that the average annual GDP growth was 3.2%, 
which was lower than the plan objective (5.1%). Since investment by the non-government 
sector in the second plan period increased by an average 13.7% per year, it can be claimed 
that the role of private enterprise in the economy was higher than in the First Plan. 
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Furthermore, in terms of creating jobs and checking unemployment the plan was not in 
compliance with its objectives. As per the plan, unemployment should have been reduced 
to 12.6% but it stood at 13.1%, (Table 2-13 and 2-14). Also, new jobs created in the Second 
Plan period were in the region of 263,000 while the target was 404,000. In the monetary 
and inflation area, the plan’s declared objectives were not realized as the average 
performance of liquidity growth in the plan period was 25.5% but its forecast target was 
12.5%. Finally, the average inflation rate during the yeas of the plan was 25.6% -- almost 
double the figure that was forecast at 13.2%, (MPO, 2001). Macroeconomic instability and 
declining growth rates compelled the government to delay much needed structural reforms. 
However, because of the lack of a systematic insight into the complex structure of the 
economy, the performance of these plans has been far from satisfactory (Valadkhani, 
2001). 
In sum, despite implementation of the two plans, as well as the exchange rate unification 
policy, demand management adjustment measures as well as structural and institutional 
reforms after the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 and the National Rehabilitation Plan 
initiated by the government of President Muhammad Khatami in 1998, there was little if 
any success in reversing the deteriorating economic conditions. 
Inflation at 20.1% and unemployment hovering near 16.2% in 1999 indicated that the 
government was unable to get the job done. A low GDP growth of 2.4% in 1999 clearly fell 
short of enhancing the misery index --the summation of the inflation and unemployment 
rates (Ibid). The economic climate was characterized largely by widespread rent-seeking, 
government-mandated panoply of financial rates of return and huge credit allocations to 
inefficient revolutionary foundations and state-owned enterprises, unaffordable energy 
subsidies, and multiple foreign exchange rates. The Second Plan too failed to get rid of the 
huge subsidies, privatize the long-list of inefficient and wasteful state-owned enterprises 
and unify the exchange rate. 
 
Third 5-Year Development Plan (2000-2004) 
Structural problems of the first and second development plans, need for better 
international ties and improvement of relations within OPEC, as well as the economic 
reform plan in 1998 collectively led to a new model for reforming the economic structure 
within a domestic approach in the Third Plan. An instrumental element of the Third Plan 
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was its intention to create and provide the instruments necessary for sustainable 
development. Accordingly, the plan was premised on the strategy of economic reforms in 
line with ‘competitive economic development’ by moving towards economic liberalization, 
forming a comprehensive social security apparatus, legal and institutional reforms and 
eliminating monopolies of various stripes to be able to pave the way for enhanced private 
sector role and by the same token diminish government controls. Hence, the plan came to 
be known as the ‘structural reform plan’ -- a central and critical aspect of the plan. The 
main orientation of the plan was toward structural and institutional reforms to help 
liberalize the economy and induce privatization. Reforming the business environment, 
easing rigid regulations governing investment procedures, strengthening competitiveness 
by moving towards liberal pricing systems and setting prices based on market economics as 
an efficient tool for resource allocation were among the strategies of the plan. 
A single foreign exchange rate, trade liberalization, elimination of non-tariff barriers, 
judicious allocation of bank/lending facilities, establishment of private and non-government 
banks, setting up a special forex fund, and lifting energy subsidies were among the 
paradigms essential for price reforms as emphasized in the Third Plan, (MPO,2000). 
 
Orientation of the Third Plan 
1 .Structural and institutional reforms in the public sector to increase the government 
effectiveness and improve efficiency of national resources. 
2 .Reviewing and regulating financial, monetary, foreign currency, trade, employment and 
production policies along with expansion of social security networks with the aid of 
supportive policies. 
3 .Encouraging productive employment. 
4 .Privatization and government downsizing. 
5 .Curbing dependence on oil revenues. 
6 .Disbanding monopolies plaguing the distribution of sugar, sugar cubes, and tobacco. 
7 .Increasing non-oil exports. 
8 .Eliminating non-tariff barriers. 
9 .Disengaging policymaking bodies from absolute power and control. 
10 .Judicious use of domestic construction capabilities and encouraging Iranian contractors 
and consultants. 
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11 .Creating bodies that support risky investments. 
12 .Reforming the direct tax act and ways to collect custom duties. 
13 .Decentralizing the administrative and economic structure. 
14 .Promoting human values, enhancing the moral and spiritual capacity of the society and 
enhancing religious beliefs to help the process of cultural development. 
15 .Guaranteeing legal rights and liberties to all citizens and stimulating a secure and lawful 
environment for all activities, (MPO, 2000). 
 
Performance of the Third Plan 
The above mentioned policies came into effect in 2000. Some reforms and measures 
were undertaken, including reforming the foreign exchange rate, implementing a single-tier 
rate for foreign exchange, gradual replacement of tariffs instead of non-tariff barriers, 
creating conditions for reduction of tariffs and allowing Iranian and foreign banks in the 
free economic zones. Other moves focused on strengthening the bourse (launching regional 
and commodity stock exchanges) and non-bank financial bodies to eliminate monopolies in 
the banking sector for ensuring more security for businesses, enactment and 
implementation of the foreign investment act, a new tax act, customs collection act, 
elimination of brokers in the export sector, privatization of banks, allowing private 
insurance companies, and provisions to open accounts in foreign currency to help 
strengthen the foundations of production and investment. 
Two outstanding moves during the Third Plan period were namely the creation of a 
special hard currency fund and unifying the foreign exchange rate. Deposits in the Forex 
fund (also known as the Oil Stabilization Fund) were made solely from crude oil exports 
and aimed to reform the budgeting structure, oversee oil revenues and help encourage 
investment, particularly from the private sector. The unified foreign exchange rate came to 
the aid of annual national budgets as that (Rial) rate was used in budget outlays and 
forecasts, (ibid). 
The Third Plan achieved a 6.1% annual economic growth and a 10.7 %( Table2- 15 and 
2-16) increase in investment, which was higher than the plan’s target. Moreover, 
performance of the labor market in the plan period was better compared to the Second Plan 
as almost 76% of the new job opportunities were realized and the unemployment rate was 
below the rate seen in the plan.  
 
78    
On the whole the plan was more effective than its predecessors and helped improve the 
general business environment. The average annual increase in inflation in the plan years 
was 15.9% and thus considering the target of 14.1%foreseen, it can be said that the plan 
was also successful in this arena (ibid). The plan, however, was a failure with respect to 
other objectives. The slow pace of privatization, continuation of costly subsidies in the 
energy and manufacturing sectors, failure to deregulate, persistent monopolies and rampant 
smuggling, emergence of informal (black) markets were among its major defects (Ibid). 
However, unlike the previous two plans, one paramount concern of the Third Plan was 
the growing unemployment among the youth. As a result of the population explosion in the 
1980s, the population structure in Iran could be referred to as a time bomb. 
During 1996-2000 on average 296,250 new jobs were created per annum, while in the 
said five years on average 692,750 new job-seekers entered the already saturated labor 
market (MPO, 2000). Trends in investment during the Third Plan show that the reversal of 
the present conditions without meaningful constitutional amendments and real change in 
the state’s attitude toward free enterprise and free market reforms is immensely difficult, if 
not impossible (Ibid). The annual average share of private investment in GDP did not 
change much from the period 1959-1979 to the years 1980-1999. On average, this share 
was hardly 11% in both pre- and post-revolutionary eras (Tabibian, 2005). During the plan 
period (2000- 2005) the share of private investment in GDP shows a moderate increase. 
This share has been fluctuating around a mean of 9.2%, whereas private consumption has 
shown an overall upward trend in the post-revolutionary decades (Toufigh, 2004). If private 
sector investment grew by more than 8 percent, the government would have to earmark 
extra oil revenues for capital expenditure to stimulate output and investment growth, which 
so far it has been unable or unwilling to do. Due to the lack of sufficient domestic savings 
annual GDP growth was 5.2% during the course of the plan (ibid). 
 
Fourth 5-Year Development Plan (2005-2009) 
The Fourth Plan as become singled out as compared to the previous ones due to the fact 
that it was so far the only plan dully developed and approved within the Iran's 20-Year 
Vision and the macro policies stipulated by the supreme leader. The objective of the plan 
was a dynamic and forward- oriented view towards problem based management. Within the 
framework of this view, planning and individual and social movements are oriented toward 
the future. All economic, social, cultural, and environmental issues were approached and 
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addressed as one entity. In addition, upheavals in the global economy, and proposed 
debates for, inter alia, convergence of policies, globalization of production, international 
division of labor, access to advanced science and technology, reforms in government 
functions, requirements and regulations in the new globalized setup led architects of the 
Fourth Plan to forge a new platform for changing the development patterns in the country 
while at the same time reemphasizing policies pertaining to structural reforms as outlined in 
the Third Plan. 
 
Main issues in the Fourth Plan 
As noted above, the Fourth Plan was prepared in the framework of Iran’s long-range 
2025 vision while having a general orientation toward rapid economic growth. This plan 
was billed as a roadmap for ‘sustainable development with a global approach ‘.  
The outlines of the plan were prepared and defined in 4 areas: the first area included 
cultural, scientific and technological affairs; the second area dealt with social, political, 
defense, and security affairs; the third area was mostly concerned with diplomacy and 
foreign relations; and finally, the last area consisted of economic affairs. The main features 
of the plan are listed in the following table: 
 
Table2-10: Features of the Fourth Development Plan (2005-2009) 
No. Features 
1 Creating the conditions for rapid economic growth 
2 Active interaction with the global economy 
3 Economic compatibility 
4 Knowledge-based development 
5 Protecting the environment 
6 Efficient and planned use of land and regional balance 
7 Elevating health standards and the quality of life 
8 Enhancement of human security and social justice 
9 Cultural development 
10 National security 
11 Developing the judicial apparatus 
12 Better governance and government rehabilitation 
 
80    
In the Fourth Plan goals were set in terms of geographical coverage and at the national, 
sectoral and provincial levels. 
 
Performance of the Fourth Plan 
It is yet not possible to have a comprehensive evaluation of the plan as there is no formal 
review and also because of the lack of relevant data. Only a few social-economic factors 
are discussed here. 
A comparison of what the plan had forecast and its objectives shows that the average 
annual economic growth in the first three years was6.7%, or lower than the figure 
predicted, which was 7.4%. Average annual investment growth in the plan period was close 
to 6% (Table 2-17 and 2-18). 
A scrutiny of the other three important indices -- new jobs, unemployment rates, and 
inflation rate -- indicates that according to the objectives of the plan, unemployment should 
have declined to 10.1% at the end of the third year, while it remained at 12.7%. As to jobs, 
job opportunities in the first 3 years of the plan stood at 725,000 jobs per year, while the 
forecast figure was 848,000. The rate of inflation jumped from 10.4% in 2005 to 18.4% in 
2007, (Central Bank of Iran, 2008). 
 
Conclusion: 
Iran is amongst the first countries that have adopted "planning" as an important tool for 
drawing the prospect of its socio-economic future since World War II. After the Islamic 
Revolution, "planning" was continued in a structure adapted to the values of the revolution. 
There is no doubt that the welfare and prosperity of the people and social justice in the 
society depend largely on the manner of using the material and intellectual resources 
(physical and human capital) of the country which would appear in the framework of 
"plans." This part of research highlights the inappropriateness of the administrative 
structure of the government devised for the planning functions. In this respect, it elaborates 
on the structural mismatch existing between the planning body and the executive organs, 
lack of organic relationship between the plan and the budget, lack of feedback mechanisms 
in the government structure and lack of organic relationship between the parliament and the 
planning system of the government. 
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At the beginning of the Constitution System era, the administrative structure of 
government in Iran was a mere copy of the then-existing administrative systems in France 
and Belgium. Human resources and management features and the administrative structure 
had been designed for limited executive functions. Those functions were prompted by the 
conditions of a rather agricultural-nomadic country with its special characteristics. Under 
the influence of the culture and worldview of domestic bureaucrats and foreign consultants, 
a system was formed that was not efficient even for the current affairs of that time. 
In the process of development and transition, affected by internal and external 
socioeconomic forces, the country slowly entered an era of modernization at first, followed 
by a swift pace during the 40s (1960-1970). 
 Despite contradictory views on the achievements of this era, the dramatic 
transformation of government functions, both in terms of nature and extent of the coverage, 
cannot be denied. On the one hand, huge revenues from oil sales created the possibility of 
extending an unprecedented deepening of the government dominance (which of course, 
theoretically faced a lot of problems) and made it possible for the government to enter into 
significant civil affairs unprecedented in the history on the other.  
Both these aspects, particularly the latter which substantively required completely 
different organization, forced the administrative structure of the government to experience 
a severe dichotomy in the existing and the desirable situation, removal of which required 
general substantive restructuring. Unfortunately, this substantive restructuring was never 
effectuated and only some reforms in the existing structure was thought to suffice; in other 
words, instead of creating a new structure in accordance with or proportionate to the new 
needs, it was thought that manipulation of the old structure by omitting some parts or 
adding new ones will suffice. 
 Consequently, what is left now is a system based on principles of line and staff, which 
at its best can be used for administrative duties but by no means appropriate for the 
execution of civil plans. These asymmetries have not been hidden to the experts, 
policymakers and statesmen, and measures have occasionally been taken to correct them. 
The creation of the Kingdom Auditing Organization before the Revolution and the need for 
administrative revolution after the Islamic Revolution is apparent instances of feeling such 
necessity. 
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In a general classification, the Iranian centralized system of planning can be considered 
as being composed of two main parts: one part is dedicated to policymaking, designing, 
monitoring and evaluation and the other is known as the bidder and performer. Although 
the first part is mainly centralized in the Plan and Budget Organization, it is depended, 
especially in matters of policymaking and financing, on other agencies, including the 
Central Bank, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, The Cultural Revolution Council 
and many other institutions and organizations. The second part is generally under the 
control of the ministries and other executive organs whose planning is largely based on the 
discretion of the Minister or the head of the organ. Even in this centralized system, there 
are two main kinds of inconsonance: 
a) Inconsonance in the manner of communicating by the organs with the Plan and 
Budget Organization which is not based on an automated and clear mechanism but largely 
influenced by the relationship between the two Directors on either side of the function. 
Therefore, planning experiences abound fluctuation and ambiguity over time, generally 
with regard to policymaking jurisdiction, monitoring degree, evaluation mechanisms, 
selection and finally budget allocation criterion. 
b)The second inconsistency relates to the method of organizing the plan activities within 
administrative bodies. Tasks related to the plan in these bodies can be generally divided 
into two main groups: The first group includes preparation and proposing the Plan and the 
second includes the administrative duties after the approval of the plan. 
 It is obvious that these two groups should enjoy a very close and strong relationship 
because, on the one hand, each plan takes shape based on the executive performance of the 
previous plan and, on the other hand, the planners should be fully aware of the qualitative 
and quantitative progress of the previous plan so that, if needed, they can make the 
adjustments necessary to achieve the purposes of the plan. These communication and 
coordination are not structured and organized and the plan is formed or altered within each 
body on the perceptions, experiences and tastes of senior directors. Though it appears that 
due to major differences in the functions of the bodies having flexibility is desirable, 
ignoring the general and necessary principles may result in the loss of opportunities, 
wasting resources and diversion of executive plans from the designed purposes. 
Another necessary feature of every system is the existence of automated feedback 
mechanisms and refining. In other words, if the system fails to revise and correct its 
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functions over time and in proportion to the changes and scientific advances in a variety of 
economic, social and cultural structure, even if it initially lacks any defect and constraint in 
its original design, it will lose its efficiency and will face slowness and inefficiency. In a 
dynamic system like planning such an issue is of vital importance and should not only be 
coordinated with changes and domestic developments constantly but also have an eye on 
international events. In so called developing countries, including Iran, another dimension is 
added to the issue which is the uncertainty of the data and information needed and used in 
planning. In other words, even if we ignore the economic, social and cultural changes, 
access to newer and more accurate information may dictate revisions in the plans. This 
feature should exist in the planning system somehow automated and with a dynamic 
mechanism while the lack of such mechanism is strongly felt in the planning system of 
Iran. 
Although from a legal point of view, enactment by the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(the Parliament) on one hand gives credibility to the plan, approves the allocations and 
reinforces the implementation, this enactment is essentially the result of a higher value, that 
is, the endorsement of the plan by the public through its representatives. The normal 
procedure of such relation between the government and Parliament is that the plan is 
brought before the Parliament after preparation in the Cabinet and competent bodies of the 
government the components of which are thoroughly reviewed in the specialized 
committees of the Parliament. Then, it is presented for approval to the parliament floor. 
This procedure is proved to be efficient if and only one of the following two assumptions is 
in process: 
Firstly, the plan provides a degree of accuracy that the parliament does not deem any 
changes necessary, and secondly, the plan is prepared using so precise and consistent a 
mechanism that any proposed legislative changes in each of its components (objectives, 
strategies, policies, plans and projects for broadcast) transferred to all other elements of the 
plan are immediately affected in accordance with that modification due to the relation 
existing among activities, subsectors and the master plan. If this is not the case, which surly 
that is, if the changes imposed by the legislative lack the ability to be conveyed to the rest 
of the plan and modify it, one of the two following possibilities has to be admitted: 
First: The plan, as prepared by the government, has been absolutely consistent and the 
modifications made by the parliament have disrupted the harmony. In other words, the 
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modifications have emptied the plan of its basic characteristics of harmony and 
consistency; therefore, the approved plan is not a desirable one. 
Second: The plan prepared by government lacks certain characteristics necessary for a 
good plan and the legislative has optimized it completely or partially by making 
modifications in it. In this case, the rationale behind having a planning body as a 
specialized institution for preparing plans is put into question. 
The fact is that none of the above assumptions is true. In other words, the optimality of 
the government's plan is not certain and the efficiency of the proposed legislative 
modifications in the total plan is neither estimable nor measurable. 
This has roots in the problems in the Parliament and government relations in the process 
of preparing plans. Continuous and direct communication does not exist between these two 
main institutions (preparatory and approver) and all stages of planning (long-term, midterm 
and short-term) is done within the administrative and planning bodies without the 
participation of the parliament. It might be argued that the parliament foreknowledge of the 
plan or consultation with the parliament in the preparation of various sections of the plan is 
not necessary, because if the plan has the confirmation of the parliament, it will be 
approved otherwise, it will be rejected. However, we know that this is not the case; and the 
plan is usually submitted to Parliament when the time for scrutiny is very short and due to 
this shortage, there is no opportunity for cross-commenting and making modifications by 
the parliament in the plan. This is also because any proposed change will cause a loss of 
balance and coordination in the plan (if present) and re-establishment of harmony and 
balance using the present mechanism of planning requires a rather long time which is 
almost out of question. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
 
 












This chapter focuses on the 60-year history of budgeting in Iran and tries to explore how 
the budgetary process works and why annual budgets have often not been accurate 
roadmaps to achieving the goals of national plans. The chapter consists of two parts. The 
first concentrates on concepts and theoretical foundations of budgeting and rational linkage 
between planning and budgeting, and the second is an overview of Iran's experiment with 
budgeting in four stages. 
 
Meaning and Significance of Budget 
Conventionally, budgeting is considered as the most important management tool to steer 
an organization, evaluate its performance and motivate its people, (AndreA de waal, 2005). 
Budgeting means deciding or estimating in advance, the course of action to achieve a 
particular target or objective in a given period of time along with numerical expression of 
the inputs required and outputs expected. Normally, a budget statement is expressed in 
both the terms-currency and quantity (units). Currency refers to the cost or value and 
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quantity refers to the activity level or volume of function, (GP Jakhotiya, 1992). Certain 
budgets can be expressed only in currency as the function cannot be quantified. Hence, 
any budget statement has the following essentials: a. preparation in advance; b. inputs 
and outputs are properly estimated and defined, in relation to a well-defined objective; 
and. should be for a definite period of time, (ibid). 
In a broader context, budgeting defines our priorities; it reflects our inner beliefs and 
guides our behavior; budgets establish the winners and losers in policy debates that 
shape the future of our collective society (Wildavsky, 1999). Fundamental questions 
posed in the budgetary process remain unchanged by the passage of time. Budgeters ask 
how to maximize the value of scarce resources, how to make comparisons between 
competing demands, how to raise revenues, and how to determine aggregate spending 
levels, (ibid). 
Presumably, those who prepare a budget intend to configure a direct connection 
between what is written in it and future events. If requests for funds are granted, if they 
are spent in accordance with instructions, and if the actions involved lead to the desired 
consequences, then the purpose stated in the document will be achieved (Kordbacheh, 
2005). Budgets, thus, become links between financial resources and human behavior in 
order to accomplish policy objectives. 
Today, budgeting has emerged as a key issue in national politics and the lifeblood of 
governments. How large government will be, the part it will play in our lives, whether 
more or less will be done for defense or welfare, how much and what sort of people will 
pay for services, in what kind of society. 
 In sum, all these are routinely discussed in budget debates. The importance of 
conflict over the size and distribution of the budget- failure to pass a budget on time or 
at all has become a sign of inability to govern - underscores the overriding importance 
of budgeting. As the sheer volume of budgeting has risen along with increasingly higher 
stakes and ever-changing procedures, the need grows apace for an up-to-date account of 
the new process through which spending decisions are made. 
One of the features of public budgeting is that decisions about how money will be 
spent are made not by those providing the money but by their representatives. The 
payers and the deciders are two distinct groups. The payers are not given a choice about 
whether they want to pay or how much they want to pay. (Rubin, 1992). 
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The distinction between the payers and the deciders leads to two crucial characteristics 
of public budgeting: public accountability and political acceptability. Accountability means 
to make sure that every penny of public money is spent as agreed and to report accurately 
to the public on how money was spent (ibid). 
 Acceptability means that public officials who make budget decisions are constrained by 
what the public wants, (ibid). Sometimes they will do precisely what they think the public 
wants, even if the results are inefficient or inequitable, and sometimes they will present the 
budget so that it will be accepted by the public, even if they have not precisely followed 
public will. This effort may involve persuasion or deception (ibid). Because public 
demands may not be clearly expressed, and because different segments of the public may 
make different and competing demands, and because public officials themselves may have 
other priorities, officials may not be able or willing to be bound tightly to public opinion 
(ibid). 
Nevertheless, if politicians knowingly make decisions that differ from what the public 
seems to want, there is pressure to present the budget in a way that makes it appear 
acceptable. That pressure creates tension between acceptability, which sometimes involves 
hiding or distorting information or presenting it in an unclear fashion, (ibid). 
On the other hand, the application of private sector standards to public sector budgets 
may be impossible. Growth in public sector agencies appears to be a function of public 
perception of need and legislative willingness to meet that need. Growth in the private 
sector appears to be more a function of the willingness of buyers in the marketplace to 
purchase specific goods or services. Perception of need in the private sector must be backed 
by purchasing power (Koven, 1988). The commonly recognized goal of profit in private 
sector is not applicable to the public sector. How, then, do public sector policy analysts and 
budgeters assess the policy effectiveness of resource allocation? 
Because of separation of payer and decider, the budget document itself becomes an 
important means of public accountability. How did the public's representative actually 
decide to spend taxpayer money? Did they waste it? Did they spend it on defense or police 
or on social service? A citizen does not typically watch the decision-making, but they and 
the press have access to the budget document and can look for answers. They can hold the 
government accountable through the budget, to see that what officials promised them was 
actually delivered (Rubin, 1992). A budget, therefore, may also be characterized as a series 
of goals with price tags attached. When the choices are related to one another so as to 
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achieve the desired goals, a budget may  be  called  coordinated.  Should  it include  a  
detailed  specification  of  how objectives are to be achieved, a budget also may serve as a 
plan of work for those who assume the task of implementation. If emphasis is placed on 
achieving the most policy returns for a given sum of money, or on obtaining the desired 
objectives at the lowest cost, a budget may become an instrument for ensuring efficiency 
(Wildavsky, 1999). 
Although the language of a budget calls for achieving certain goals, through planned 
expenditures, investigation may reveal that no funds were spent for these purposes, that the 
money has been used for other purposes, that quite different goals have been achieved, or 
that the same goals have been reached in different ways(ibid.) 
The central government uses the budget to establish and pursue national objectives, to 
promote favorable economic conditions, to manage its diverse activities, to respond to the 
demands of citizens and groups, to assess past performance, and to plan for the future. 
Analysis is an increasingly important part of the budgetary process, providing 
information that contributes to informed decisions (Durning and Campbell, 2002). 
 A government's budget is the product of numerous policy decisions, made over many 
years, about what services it will provide and who will pay for them. Such budgetary policy 
decisions distribute both the benefits and financial burdens of government, and they usually 
involve difficult choices among competing claims on government resources. When 
allocating benefits and burdens, elected policymakers consider the political implications of 
their decisions, but beyond that they are also expected to be concerned with the political 
implications of their decisions. Beyond that they also are expected to be concerned with the 
economic efficiency and the equity effects of their decisions, (Durning and Campbell, 
2002.) 
Using formal cost-benefit analysis, analysts can even suggest which programs should be 
included in the budget to maximize net social benefits, (ibid.( However, both analysts and 
decision-makers have more difficulty using analytic methods to determine which 
expenditures and taxes are fairer than their alternatives. When they try to compare the 
equity of alternative expenditures and taxes, they face many competing measures of equity 
but no method to determine definitively which is the "right" or  best  measure  (ibid.) 
Among the continuing fiscal management difficulties in many countries is the reliance 
on the central bank for data on budget execution and the absence of a clearly defined fiscal 
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management role for the ministry of finance authority and a standard of accountability   for   
public   spending.  Development  of    legislation   embodying   these 
principles is an essential base for building fiscal management institutions in these 
economies (ibid). 
It could be concluded that the old role of budgeting was cost control and prevention of 
mal-finance. The new role as the second wave of budget reform would be management in 
pursuit of the public good which aimed squarely at financial accountability. A more 
expansive definition of accountability emerged, and it was linked to the notion of public 
management (Gulick and Urwick, 1937). 
To develop the idea of accountability it is good to review words of Burkhead (1961) the 
budget was conceived as a major weapon for instilling responsibility in the governmental 
structure: the budget system rests on popular control; the budget will publicize what 
government is doing and make for an informed and alert citizenry; the budget will destroy 
the rule of invisible government.  
The question that emerges immediately is that how well has budgeting met professional 
standards of accountability, and how well has it achieved its broader obligations? With 
reaction to the growth of government in an environment of mixed level of economic 
growth, broad and fundamental changes brought about by globalization have strengthened 
government accountability by tightening the link between budget decision and government 
performance (Miller, Baterly& Rabin, 2000). 
 
Process of Budgeting 
Budget formulation, or the proposed allocation of resources for the next fiscal year, 
usually comes in three phases. At the outset the chief executive and central staff agencies - 
primarily the budget office- send a long list of do's and don’ts to the operating agencies to 
guide them in the preparation of their budget requests. These admonitions and exhortations 
cover a wide variety of predetermined policies and procedures, large and small: fiscal and 
economic policy, expenditure ceilings and other constraints, program priorities and 
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In the second stage, the operating agencies take over and, in conformity with "top-down" 
guidance, prepare their budget requests for submission to the central budget office by a 
fixed date. The third stage begins when the central budget office receives the massive   
tomes   containing   thousands  of  budget  requests. That  office  analyzes  them  and  
recommends  appropriate  action  to  the  political  leadership  of   the  government, which, 
of course, has  the final  word. Equally  important,  the  central  budget office must   
balance   proposed    expenditures   against   estimated   revenues   in 
order to come up with a financial plan that either results in a balanced budget or limits the 
size of the deficit (ibid). 
None of these three processes are mutually exclusive. In developing budgetary 
guidelines, the central budget office consults widely with the operating agencies (in effect, 
"bottom-up" participation). The operating agencies begin budgeting the instant they receive 
instructions from the budget office. Knowing generally what's expected, many agencies (at 
least the better-managed ones) start the process earlier to provide adequate time for analysis 
and internal debates. Similarly, the central budget office anticipates many of the problems 
that will arise and begins working on them long before the requests arrive (ibid). 
In preparing departmental budget requests the head of each agency faces the chal-lenge 
of producing a budget that will be compatible with the policies, guidelines, cash ceilings, 
and instructions of the chief executive and the central budget office,(Kordbacheh, 2005). At 
the same time the budget must be sensitive to the needs of major programs in the agency 
and responsive to the phalanx of interest groups, legislators, and bureaucracies that support 
these programs. 
It must also take into account the many constraints that burden budgeting-legal 
restrictions, relatively uncontrollable costs, spending caps, judicial decisions, legislative 
intent, legislative investigations, fund structures, and the requirements imposed by other 
levels of government, (Axelrod, 1999). These assorted pressures complicate budget 
decision making in every agency. Hence, many agencies attempt to design custom-tailored 
budget systems that will meet their needs and facilitate decisions (ibid). 
The quest for the ideal system never ceases. What internal budget procedures are most 
appropriate? What are the best ways and means of developing an overall budget strategy 
that will enhance the accomplishment of an agency's objectives and priorities? In what 
specific ways should the budget reflect the administration's policies and political positions? 
What budget controls will ensure prompt attention to the critical issues in budgeting? What 
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are the best ways to overcome vulnerable policies and cost overruns? How far down the 
organization should budgeting take place? How adequate are performance and cost data? 
To what extent will the budget system flush our realistic options for decision by the agency 
head? These are some of the key issues in departmental budgeting that affect every agency 
(ibid). 
No  matter  how  simple  or  complex  an  agency  may be, budget  making  requires  it 
to  pull  apart  its  entire  budget, to  disaggregate  it, and  to  examine  the  needs  of  each 
program, project, activity, and organizational  unit.  The  review  can  be  cursory  or 
detailed, superficial or searching. At the end of the review the agency must somehow 
reconcile its internal differences and pull together the separate bits and pieces of the budget 
into a coherent whole that will be compatible with the administration's policies. Where the 
agency is to compress budgeting into a few short months, the task would be staggering. So 
onerous, however, are the demands of modern budgeting that it has become a year-round 
exercise. Budget decision making, performed in a short period of time, intensifies and 
accelerates what is an on-going process (ibid). 
An annual budget law, which is enacted under the provisions of the constitution or budget 
management law, primarily serves the purpose of appropriating funds from the public 
account--that is, obtaining authorization from the legislature for expenditure from public 
funds to carry out the programs of government. The law may also include conditions 
applicable to elements of the budget (e.g., for a specific level of borrowing) consistent with 
the provisions of the budget management law (Wildavsky, 1999). 
The existence of such legislation compounds the problem of providing a consistent legal 
and administrative framework for budget management. It is necessary to have some form of 
reconciliation process to ensure as far as possible that budget decisions take into account 
both annually voted and standing appropriations. In most countries, the executive branch of 
government takes administrative steps to review relevant legislation either prior to or at the 
same time as the budget appropriation, (Allan, 1995). 
Generally, the budget management law also gives to the minister responsible for public 
finance the authority to issue detailed regulations and instructions. These itemize the 
financial duties of public officers and the current practices and procedures for release of 
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Budgeting Perspectives and Approaches in Brief 
Among all budgeting theories, Wildavsky (1999) successfully proposed an incremental 
theory applied especially to government budgeting. The Wildavsky model consisted of 
budgeting "base," calculations of "fair-share" changes to the base, agency heads as 
advocates of increased spending, and a single central role of guardian of the treasury. This 
explanation seemed germane for several national states. Change in this model is slow and 
not sensitive to policy decisions because of its bottom-up focus on growth, (Trautman, 
1995). 
Niskanen (2008) concluded that the budget increments were more likely to move up 
than down. He found that a bureaucrat's rational goal was to  maximize the  budget of his 
or her bureau and that congressional review also favored increases over than decreases in 
agency budgets. Niskanen's bureaucrats were seen as maximizers rather than 
incrementalists; however, resource constraints produced budgetary outputs that were 
incremental (ibid). 
Incrementalists saw budgeting as a formal process, based on bargaining and technical 
needs, but fairly devoid of policy concerns. Money had to be appropriated to run the 
agencies, the fiscal year had to begin, and divisive policy matters were decided elsewhere. 
As a result, the incrementalists did not envision the budget process as responding to 
perceived societal problems, emerging situations, or environmental changes. They assumed 
budgets would continue to be allocated pretty much the same way from year to year. Thus 
instrumentalism was unable to theorize about changing budgets or budget process, (ibid). 
The incremental perspective suggests that in order to find out how much to spend on a 
particular good or service, the best method is to identify how much was spent on that item 
in the preceding year. Barring any catastrophe, the safest and least controversial manner of 
deciding who gets what is to give everyone what they received in the prior year, plus a little 
more to account for inflation and marginal growth. In this incremental scenario there are no 
real winners or losers and budgeters do not have to go through the difficult and emotionally 
draining task of informing certain agencies that they have been targeted for bigger 
decreases or smaller increases than others. 
Furthermore, in the incremental budgeting scenario analysts do not have to go through 
the difficult process of evaluating agencies and objectively quantifying needs. 
Instrumentalism, in short, is a seductively appealing concept to budgeters because it makes 
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their job relatively easy, (Koven, 1999). All that is needed is a pocket calculator and a copy 
of the previous year’s budget. Instrumentalism, however, is limited in that it does not 
reflect priority changes that occur over time. 
Although in recent years observers have agreed that variations in budgeting from place 
to place and from time to time are significant, when the relationship of budgeting to society 
are examined, each theoretical school makes its own assumptions (Rubin, 1992). 
 
Neo-Marxists Approach 
Neo-Marxists  have  argued  that  class  interests  dominate  budgeting  and  allocation 
choices.  Several   different   schools   of   thought   argue    that   government   itself,   as 
represented by the bureaucrats or agency heads, determine allocations, while some scholars 
have argued that interest groups dominate or even determine budgeting (ibid). 
The Neo-Marxists, generally argue government is controlled by capitalists, or those who 
own the means of production, and that they determine spending priorities to serve their own 
needs. Those needs include particular programs and funds that aid in the accumulation of 
capital. Social welfare programs in this theory are used to buy off opposition from the poor 
who would otherwise protest the system and possibly overturn it. Neo-Marxists call 
attention to military spending as enriching arms manufacturers, to increases in spending for 
economic development, much of which is a transfer payment from the average citizen to 
the relatively well-to-do, and to a variety of tax breaks that have benefited the well-to-do 
more than the poor. In a Neo-Marxian perspective, maintaining markets abroad has been 
the reason for both imperialism and wars, and preserving bond markets has been a major 
reason for much of state and local fiscal policy (Rubin, 1992). 
 
Political Approaches 
A second approach to the study of budgeting is found in the so-called political 
perspective. This perspective of budgeting focuses upon the bargaining and negotiating that 
occur between budget actors in the process of resource allocation. The political perspective 
is somewhat complex and can be broken down into a number of components. Elections, 
legislative behavior, bureaucratic interests, political ideology, individual interests and 
lobbying all influence public sector budgeting. When these political factors are considered, 
budgeting is viewed from the perspective of being the result of bargaining and compromise 
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between competing forces in society. This view rejects the perspective of so-called 
scientific analysis that characterizes the rational perspective and accepts the perspective of 
outputs resulting from the conflict over who is able to get his or her policy preferences 
implemented and who has the power to shape events. 
Elections shape budgets because they determine which candidate and which preference 
will prevail to exert influence on policy. This is often, however, a hazardous assumption; 
yet from the perspective of democratic theory, this scenario is viewed positively because 
power can ultimately be traced back to the citizenry, (Koven, 1999). 
A second perception of political budgeting involves the behavior of legislators. 
Legislators are well known for their logrolling or trading votes in order to secure pork-
barrel legislation. This type of legislation results in passage of bills that will secure benefits 
for constituents back home. Budgeting under this perspective is more a test of a legislator's 
ability to bring tangible benefits to constituents than of his or her ability to pass sound and 
responsible budgets. 
Another perception of political budgeting involves the role bureaucratic interests play in 
determining outputs. Career bureaucrats invariably prefer larger budgets for their agencies 
and support policy changes that will lead to these ends. Bureaucrats become advocates for 
specific public sector action. As advocates of their chosen agency, they desire bigger 
budgets, larger staffs, and other responsibilities that will lead to larger salaries, larger 
offices, and more prestige. The goal of optimizing scarce resources is replaced by the 
bureaucratic priorities of power and prestige (ibid). 
Political ideology also affects budgeting because ideology shapes values and these 
values in turn shape spending priorities. Key recognized this link between values and 
budget priorities back in 1940 (as cited in Koven, 1988). Gorham also identified this 
phenomenon during testimony before the Joint Economic Committee in 1967(ibid). 
Gorham accurately noted that the "grand decisions" such as how much health, how much 
education, how much welfare, and which groups in society should benefit were really 
questions of value judgment (ibid). 
Individual interests may also have a subtle but pervasive effect on budgeting. For 
example, if you are the head of an agency and your best friend is in charge of a department 
within your agency, the personal relationship that you have developed with your friend can 
either subtly or overtly influence funding decisions (ibid). 
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Public Choice Approach 
Another theoretical approach to linking budgeting and society is the public choice 
school. Individual theorists have taken widely varied positions, but what they share is the 
assumption that human behavior is based on individual economic rationality and the 
maximization of individual benefits, or what economists call utility. Their model of the 
ideal government is an extension of the marketplace where citizens can buy exactly the 
amount of services they want in the combinations they prefer. They deplore any departure 
from this model that provides people with more government services than they would 
choose on their own. They argue that a combination of majority voting and the ability of 
individuals and groups to share the cost of what they want with other taxpayers make the 
costs of many benefits to individuals too cheap and inflate the demand for public goods and 
services. Government thus tends to over provide services in comparison to a true market, 
(Rubin, 1992). 
Public choice theorists emphasize the very important issue of the relationship between 




Hierarchy theory says that the top levels of the executive branch make decisions about 
broad policy issues, and judge the environment, and pass that information down through the 
budget office to the agencies before they make their requests. Thus the identification of 
current problems and the selection of which ones will be addressed in the current budget 
are made early and frame the decisions of subordinates. Perceptions of interest group power 
may enter at this level or at the level of the budget office when it is judging requests from 
the agencies. The budget offices judge the requests based, to some extent, on knowledge 
and performance of the agencies, and to some extent on the priorities given to them by the 
chief executive (ibid). 
 
Macro-Micro Approach 
The macro-micro budgeting theory argues that bargaining still goes on over budget 
strategies, but broader policy issues are also explicitly dealt with and frame the choices and 
outcomes of the bargaining. On the parliamentary side, economic policies, priorities, 
spending ceilings, and assumptions about the growth of the economy are made by the 
 
96    
budget committees and to some extent guide or determine the decisions of the other 
committees as they work on parts of the budget(ibid). 
The integration of budget policy and consideration of the environment and its constraints 
go on at federal, state, and local levels, regardless of the structure or degree of 
independence of the executive and legislative branches. The current consensus is that 
budgeting is linked to the society and to the environment by both technical constraints and 
policy, and that interest groups are sometimes important in determining outcomes, although 
their role has not been well specified. Also Coalitions of interest groups usually tend to 
form class boundaries. However; there is no evidence of continuing such class dominance. 
None of the deterministic models has survived well, and their inability to predict or explain 
change has been a major factor in their obsolescence. Current theory has drifted toward a 
consensus that allows for both direct and indirect influence of the environment over 




Lobbying as another approach can also influence budget allocations. Lobbyists attempt 
to shape budget priorities in favor of private clients or any public project in a specific 
location. Lobbyists can distort rationally in the budgetary process if they are powerful 
enough to have their client's interests prevail over the interests of the general public. 
Rationally in terms of allocation analysis that will result in the greatest good for the greatest 
number is willingly sacrificed by lobbyists at the altar of personal gain (ibid). 
 
Rational Process Approach 
Finally, the next perspective from which to view budgeting is a rational process of 
decision making. According to this perspective, budgeters employ empirical techniques to 
optimize the allocation of scarce resources. This perspective follows principles of 
economics and assumes that subjective values can be quantified. Once values are 
quantified, budgetary problems are solved, as one would solve a problem in mathe-matics 
or physics. Through rational, comprehensive analysis it is assumed that one can objectively 
determine proper levels of spending and maximize the social good for society. Over time, 
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various rational techniques for budgeting have been developed. The success of these 
techniques, however, has been at best limited (ibid). 
 
Budgeting Techniques 
Public managers and policy planners are painfully aware of the need to show the 
benefits of public expenditure. When analyzed carefully, these benefits are construed 
around three notions: the impact of expenditure; the outputs to achieve that impact and the 
processes to achieve that output. In the private sector, no such concern exists because of the 
underlying efficiency forced by the requirement for real profits over operating costs. The 
market is the test. No such test exists in public administration. 
 
Performance Budgeting Technique 
Yet in practice, performance budgeting (PB), acknowledges the conceptual and practical 
difficulties of making it work to the satisfaction of both politicians and public managers. 
PB is one attempt to establish a public (non-trading) sector equivalent to the discipline of 
the market. If this is so in the most economically advanced nation on earth, why should it 
not apply, with benefit, to developing countries? (McGill, 2001).PB refers generally to the 
process of linking expected results to budget levels but not to any particular approach. 
Thus, there is no definitive PB process."Performance budget'' intended to shift the focus 
away from inputs of government to its functions, activities, costs and accomplishments. 
Thus, rather than emphasizing items of expenditure, salaries, rent and supplies, a 
performance budget was to describe the expected outputs resulting from a specific function 
or activity, such as weapons or training. However, PB has to reconcile the program 
structure with the organizational structure it represents (ibid). 
 
Planning Programming Budgeting Technique 
The other popular rational budgetary techniques, according to leading authorities, are 
Planning Programming Budgeting (PPB) a system where competing expenditure options 
are evaluated for their marginal benefit to the program. PPB was hailed as a way to 
integrate planning and budgeting by using systems theory and cost-benefit analysis. It was 
superior to performance budgeting, its proponents claimed, because the work activities 
being measured in a performance budget are simply the process by which inputs are 
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converted into outputs. In PPB, substitutable alternatives are evaluated for their 
contribution to the program objective, yielding high quality budgetary decisions (Kelly, 
2005).PPB assumed that different levels and types of performance could be arrayed, 
quantified and analyzed to make the best budgetary decisions, (McGill, 2001). 
 
Management by Objective Technique 
Management by objective (MBO), as another technique loosely based on Drucker 
(1954), looked promising for two reasons. First, it offered a way to align activities with 
objectives; and second, it seemed to address the widely perceived management problem in 
the government. MBO’s fate was sealed by its implementation instructions. However, 
MBO endures in the sense of "negotiating goals and holding subordinates accountable for 
achieving them'' (McGill, 2001).MBO establishes the principle of management 
accountability for program outputs and the patterns of expenditure for achieving them. PB 
is the foundation for performance agreements with any agency's senior (program) manager. 
 
Zero-Based Budgeting Technique 
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB), a system which would force agencies to examine their 
activities anew each year and consider new ways to deliver benefits at the least cost, is the 
next budgetary system. As Lauth (1980) pointed out, zero based budgeting may not 
substantially reduce program costs nor change program activities as a result, though it 
surely will facilitate redistribution of resources among programs, (Kelly, 2005).ZBB 
required agencies to set priorities based on the program results that could be achieved at 
alternative spending levels, one of which was to be below current funding. The key to ZBB 
as a process is that planning and budgeting are to be done at the same time; they are part 
and parcel of the same process. 
 
Appropriate Budgeting Technique  
Budgeting is a financial reflection of economic and social alternatives of a society and 
like other economic policies functions as a key policy-making tool in a macro scale. 
Financial discipline and allocation of resources are the general goals of budget management 
which introduces itself as a powerful tool in achieving macro goals. 
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The fundamental issues in budgeting system of each country are the allocation of limited 
resources based on the needs, different goals and benefits and their prioritization. The 
question on what basis should one proceeds with decision-making when there is a 
limitation of resources has nowadays turned into a challenge for the economists. In the 
course of the last seventy years, theorists have made continuous attempts to compile the 
basics of decision-making required for appropriate allocation of limited resources in the 
public sector. This has, on the one hand, resulted in the compilation of principles and 
guidelines as basics of decision-making for the allocation of resources in the public sector 
and discovery of techniques for the application of the said principles. On the other hand, 
approaches such as administrative budgeting, rationalism, instrumentalism, and public 
choice have each influenced the budgeting institutions and procedures and have 
transformed public budgeting into a concept open to theories. Although no comprehensive 
theory on budgeting and resolution of the issue has been introduced, significant progress 
has been observed in suiting the needs of different applicants in order to benefit from the 
public resources. Obviously, these approaches cannot provide a satisfactory basis for the 
allocation of resources exclusively. However, when combined, in case decision-making on 
costs, government interference logic, and the costs and profits thereto, and the distributive 
influences of the public expenditure are concerned, they play a decisive role. 
Each of these techniques enjoyed periods of respectability, but eventually all were 
discredited. The focus is now on improving public sector efficiency. An efficient solution is 
one that maximizes social welfare subject to a given flow of land, labor, and capital 
resources. The rule for achieving an efficient allocation of resources is to supply a service 
up to that point where at the margin--for the last unit of the service supplied--the welfare 
benefit to society just matches its cost. In the private sector, as a general rule, the market-
price system accomplishes this goal. For circumstances where the private market fails in 
this objective (pure public goods, externalities, monopoly), there is a case for public 
intervention--the public's commandeering of resources in order to supply the activity. Once 
the public sector intervenes, the efficiency logic is in favor of some form of fiscal 
decentralization. The argument is that because of spatial considerations sub-national 
(regional or local) governments become the conduit for setting up a system of budgets that 
best approximates the efficient solution of equating benefits and costs. In the economist's 
jargon, this is the benefit model of local finance (Ebel, 2003). 
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To satisfy these conditions, sub national (regional or local) governments must be given 
the authority to exercise own-source taxation at the margin and be in a financial position to 
do so. This is the essence of decentralization and this is why sub national local tax policy 
design matters. 
In countries with more government's intervention in economic activities the modern 
legacy of the cutback budgeting era is backward budgeting. The government determines 
how much revenue it is able or willing to raise and makes program-funding decisions based 
on those resources. This is fundamentally different from deciding what level of programs 
and services are necessary and appropriate to meet needs and raising the revenue necessary 
to provide them. Another legacy that endures from this period is the idea that government 
programs are generally ineffective and inefficient. The idea that government is wasteful and 
inefficient is accepted in public opinion and supported by most of economists that a weaker 
public sector would strengthen the private sector (ibid). 
In conclusion, these theories and techniques just summarized deal with why 
budgeting is important and provide an overall orientation to the field. Budget theory can be 
helpful in explaining what budgeting is and how it operates. Much of this literature has 
taken the perspective that budgeting is decision making, and the task of theory is to 
describe the decision making that occurs during budgeting. Key issues have been how 
rational budgeting has been, how much effort has there been to get the best possible results, 
how much comparison of alternatives has there been, and what criteria are used to make 
decisions (Rubin, 1992). 
 
History and Process of Budgeting in Iran 
A: Before the Constitutional Era 
To describe solely, the Iranian economy in the 19thcentury was an obvious model of a 
traditional atrophy (Katouzian, 1981). Until 1906 the main economic role of the 
government was restricted to selling a variety of concessions to foreign companies to 
encourage the exploitation of national natural resources. Some of the concessions had 
noticeable income for the government. Concession of South Fishery to Lianas off, the 
concession of Debenture Bank to Russia, oil, tar and wax concessions to the Australian 
William Knox D’Arcy, and the concession of the Iranian Imperial Bank to Britain’s Baron 
Jolious Dorwiter all instigated outrage and protests in opposition ranks. Although the 
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concessions became a basis for progress in some aspects of the economy and secured 
financial resources for the government, they were not premised on economic development 
plans. In fact they were inherently and collectively to the benefit of the countries and 
companies receiving the grants, (Kordbacheh, 2004). 
According to estimates in the years 1870-1886, almost 60% of income was allocated to 
the army and government administration, and the balance to the royal court, pensions for 
aristocrats, the clergy and other specific groups. Except for ensuring funds for schools, 
which was equal to 6% of all recorded expenses in 1875, a paltry amount was spent for 
public services (Katouzian, 1981). 
In the early20thcentury, the government in Iran had a minor role in the economy and its 
annual budget was hardly 2% of gross national product (GNP). The government had no 
practical role in capital formation and in many cases government expenses were not 
justifiable by any means. There were some transfers in the form of wages and/or pension to 
the imperial family, and spending for the army was the primary annual expenditure of the 
government. State bodies and ministries did not present cost control accounts or audit 
reports. 
Government revenues came from two sources: First, regular income consisting of tax on 
agricultural land, domestic animals and birds, craftsmen, trade and miscellaneous, and also 
revenues from industrial land, custom duties, rent and other sources including mortgages. 
The second source was irregular income such as that from public taxes, gifts, and fines and 
penalties from offenders and criminals. In 1901 total government income from all of the 
resources was almost 6.7 million ‘Toomans’ -- 25% from custom duties, 8% from 
monopolies, and the remainder 67% from public taxes. The tax calendar was usually old 
and outdated resulting mostly in unfair taxation and in many cases the process was to the 
benefit of tax collectors. Tax was paid in cash or in kind and the tax in kind was 15 to 20% 
of the total. Because of the fact that taxation was undertaken by the higher bidder (winner 
of the tender) through a contract, 50% extra tax was always demanded from taxpayers in 
addition to the recorded tax. 
Besides granting concessions there was no other important economic activity nor 
government industry or industrial policy. Agriculture was not included on the government 
list and was the sole premise of feudal interests. During the reign of Mozzafar-al-Din Shah 
(1895-1906) government expenses were always over and above its income and deficits 
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were plugged through foreign loans. In the last years of his rule the government budget 
deficit was ‘six crore Tooman’ (3 million Toomans), which was almost 30% of the total 
budget. 
 
B: From the Constitutional Revolution 
Victory of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution offered modernists an opportunity to 
emulate western models and initiate some reforms to the inefficient and wasteful 
administrative system. As a result, the first public accounting procedure in Iran was 
imitated from public commercial rules in France which was endorse by the Majlis 
(Parliament) in 1909.That move was limited to the process of budget preparation for the 
government and related needs and ensuring financial accountability (Shobairi Nejad, 1996). 
The first new general budget was prepared in 1910. In that the rule of consistency of 
budget was configured on the patterns in developed countries. It had some other features, 
namely that taxpayers could pay a part of the tax in wheat, grain and rice. Spending was 
divided between eight ministries. The changes notwithstanding; the budget was not 
approved by Parliament, (Kordbacheh, 2004). 
American W. Morgan Shuster arrived in Iran with four assistants in May 1911and was 
appointed  High  Treasurer.  He  had  the  authority  to  overhaul  Iran’s  financial  system 
(law of June 1911). In his book "The Strangling of Persia" he wrote when he was financial 
advisor in Iran the total estimated tax revenue was 5 million Toomans , and if the full 
amount was received there would still be a 6 million Tooman deficit, which was 40% of the 
total annual budget (Jamalzadeh, 1981.) 
According to records, 50% of the budget was for the army, 30% for salaries, and 10% 
for the Royal Courts, 10% for internal and foreign affairs. Payment of salaries was at the 
bottom-end of the list while the army could not always expect to receive the money it 
needed. Shuster first obliged the ministries to spend thriftily. He prepared a plan for the 
gradual phasing out of pensions and the Council of Ministers approved the measure 
(Bharier 1984, p.89.) 
There was no indirect tax in Iran until after the Constitutional Revolution. From 1906 
when budget deficits were of the ascending order, the Parliament and Council of the 
Ministers had to find a solution. They started introducing new taxes such as: tax on salt 
(from1910), opium (from1912), alcohol (from1909), means of transportation (from 1910), 
and tax on tobacco (from 1915). Usually two-thirds of the revenue from custom duties was 
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confiscated by the Russian and British governments in lieu of loans given to the 
government of Iran. Generally two-thirds of the custom revenue was deducted for loan 
repayments and the balance was given to the government, (ibid.) 
Most government expenses included two parts: spending for government administration 
and repayment of loans taken by the government. Total government income and 
expenditure in the fiscal year 1910 as indicated in the “Ganj-e-Shayegan” is shown in Table 
3-3. As per the table it is clear that the budget deficit (not provided) in 1910 was nearly 8.4 
million Toomans. The figures are approximate and display the area and combination of 
income and expenses (Jamalzadeh 1983). 
In the years 1912 to 1918 the government cancelled some of Shuster’s reform measures. 
Until 1920 the concept of balancing official accounts was consigned to oblivion. The 
budget office of the Ministry of Finance was inactive. In that year a British committee, 
headed by Armitage Smith, came to Iran to investigate four years of delay in presenting 
government accounts to the Ministry of Finance. However, the mandate of the committee 
before leaving Tehran was to negotiate a new agreement between Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (Bharier, 1984). 
By the end of the First World War in 1918, Iran’s economy gradually stabilized and 
was, to a certain degree, balanced. After the coup in 1920, with the expansion of power of 
the central government, some effort was made toward further strengthening national 
security (Katouzian 1981).In 1922, a second American committee, headed by Dr. A.C. 
Millspaugh traveled to Iran. It started rehabilitating aqueducts and monuments and 
imported machinery and tools for agricultural development. Despite a series of 
disagreements, Millspaugh stayed in Iran for five years during which he had full authority 
to reform and rewrite the financial system of the country. 
Iran’s annual budget was first published in 1924 and in 1927government debt declined 
to 3% of the total (165 million Toomans) budget. Although, defense spending amounted to 
40% of the budget, salaries were cut making it possible to allocate 13% of the budget to 
public institutions. The remaining amount was divided between ministries. 
In 1927 the Millspaugh team left Iran and a German banker was appointed the head of 
Iranian finance and a Swiss banker his treasurer. In the opinion of the then government 
economic expansion was not fast enough, therefore in 1929-1930 new rules and regulations 
were introduced to expand the economic authority of the government.The most important 
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sources of government income in that period were direct and indirect taxes, custom duties 
and oil. The first general law for income tax was approved in 1930. 
From 1933income tax charts were changed at regular intervals, but none of the changes 
affected government income system and the distribution of income. The first change came 
into effect in 1933 based on net income system and decreased levels of income categories 
to 4 levels. Each type of income had its own tax bracket, which in any case did not exceed 
4% of net income, (ibid).In 1937 government earnings rose significantly with the 
establishment of government monopolies on cotton, sugar, sugar cube, tea, opium and 
tobacco products, and also from government administrations. 
During the period 1921-1941 Iran received 40 million pounds in oil exports through the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). The industry fully provided the oil consumption 
needs and in the end of that period Iran had no need for imported oil products. The said 
amount was the result of exporting almost 123 million tons of crude and equivalent to one-
third of the total income generated from oil export.It needs mention that up until 1921 
Iran’s franchise from oil export was paid directly into government coffers. But after that the 
amounts were deposited into a special ‘savings account’. Thus, the general budget was 
prepared without oil income for nearly 10 years and marked the first experience of 
budgeting without oil revenues (Pakdaman, 1972). 
There are no precise figures on spending during those years. According to data, from 
1927 to 1941, of the 31.9 million pounds paid to the government for oil concessions, 16.3 
million was spent on arms; 11.4 million for constructing railroads, and the remaining 4.2 
million pounds was incorporated in the government budget (ibid). 
A basic expenditure during those years was construction of the Iranian National 
Railroad, which connected Shah Port (renamed Torkaman Port) via Tehran to Ahvaz 
stretching 1,400km, linking the west to the southwest. Work on the major project 
commenced in October 1927 and was completed in 1938. Money for the railroad came 
mostly from a special tax on tea and sugar, bank loans and government credits . Besides the 
railroad the government had also embarked on a program to expand and improve roads. 
Overall close to 13,00km of new roads were built interconnecting main provinces across 
the country, (Katouzian, 1981, p.161). 
Over the years the industrial sector emerged as a pet project. In 1941 budget for the 
industrial sector was eight times over the amount allocated in 1932. Consequently the share 
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of industries in the general budget jumped from a meager 3.3% to 22.9%. Funds were 
largely made available for modern factories for production of sugar, sugar cube, silk and 
cotton, and construction materials. The second priority was for units producing glass, 
matches and wooden products. However; the increase expected in employment of the 
industrial workforce was not noticeable as compared to that of production. For instance, in 
1941the industrial workforce (excluding oil sector) was about three times bigger than what 
it was in past ten years (Katouzian, 1981). 
During the years there was no integrated chart for the annual budget in which 
government income and expenses could be compared. By comparing tables 3-5 with 3-6, 
we see that in 1922 the budget was in the red to the tune of 26.7 million Rials, or 10.5% of 
the total. It seems that in 1931 the government budget was balanced with a slight increase 
(24,000 Rials) in income compared to expenses. Ten years later (1941) the budget deficits 
reached 610.1 million Rials or 14% of the total (ibid). 
In 1937 it was decided that construction activities needed planning and organization. In 
March of that year an ‘Economic Committee’ was formed for economic studies headed by 
the prime minister. The committee in its 10th session (June 22, 1937) presented to Reza 
Shah Pahlavi a report proposing ways to prepare a general economic plan. Consequently a  
permanent  commission, for preparing the plan under supervision of the Economic 
Committee, was set up. The commission in a report to the prime minister outlined reforms 
on agriculture and settlement of tribal affairs known as the  ’Seven-Year Agricultural 
Program’. However, breakout of the First World War sealed the fate of the plan and it was 
never implemented (Toufigh, 2004). 
 
C: From 1941 to 1972 
Iran was occupied by the Allies during the First World War and faced chaos, instability 
and insecurity. The government was weak and on the defense against the hostile powers. 
Struggling with the major political challenges of the time, governments in Tehran lasted for 
short periods and was removed in quick succession. Foreign occupation plus internal 
instability gave rise to crippling shortages and galloping inflation. As if that was not 
enough, hoarding by and corruption of government workers made a bad situation worse. 
Private investment was risky and thin, demand was of the downward order while 
unemployment and poverty spread across the country. The national currency had lost value, 
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hoarding was rearing its ugly head and those with money were buying up urban land and 
property. It was only with oil income that government(s) survived and was (were) able to 
pay for imports (Katouzian, 1981). 
In 1951 Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in a speech ‘A Message to Iranians’ 
announced the income and expenses of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for 1934 to 
1949.The amount paid to Iran was only 11.9% of the total gross income of the company 
and less than 19.5% of the tax the company paid to the British government as its main 
shareholder. Iran’s share was less than 12.8% paid to shareholders among which the 
imperial government in London was the biggest. About 55.8% of the total income of the 
company was kept for investment or as undistributed profit. Iran’s share in the net profit of 
the company (even after tax paid to the British government) was 14.6%. It should be noted 
that according to the 1903 D’Arcy concession, Iran’s share should have been 16% of the 
net profit. Lastly, although the oil in totality belonged to Iran, 88% of the oil revenues went 
into British coffers presumably for oil investment and exploitation (ibid). 
Iran’s oil industry was nationalized according to a law passed on April 30, 1951, but did 
not come into effect until 1954 when a new deal was signed with the consortium (some 
exception was made for oil export and maintenance). The new consortium consisted of 5 
important US oil companies with 40% share; the British Petroleum Company had 40%, a 
Dutch oil firm 14%, and a French company 6%. The new concession was officially 
confirmed in October 1954. In April 1955 the US companies transferred one - eighth of 
their shares (5% of the total shares) to 8 independent American companies as hush - money 
(against  the  rule  of  anti - trust). The  consortiumaccepted responsibility for producing 
and exporting Iranian oil for 25 years in return for 50% of net oil income export gained by 
the government. 
Regarding budgetary systems during the period of the first and second plans, though the 
national budgets were prepared thoroughly but spending for most government bodies and 
companies was not indicated in the budget document. Funding for these entities was 
referred by a code in the total to be finalized in detail by the ministry of finance, other 
ministries or relevant organizations and then approved by the Budget Commission of the 
Parliament. After approval by the Cabinet, the budget bill was finalized by the finance 
ministry and presented to Parliament by the prime minister. Parliament would debate the 
 
107    
bill in a set time and after approval by majority vote officially send it to the government for 
execution, (PBO publication 1995). 
From 1960 the government started a fresh study to modify the method by which the 
budget was prepared. A year later the budget was drawn up methodologically as a plan (a 
long list of projects), but because of impractical estimations and executive constraints it 
was shunned. Budgets for the preceding years were prepared as per old procedures. 
Monetary and banking systems underwent major changes in the Second Plan. With the 
founding of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) in 1960, monetary and banking affairs came 
under the supervision of government and to a large degree planning and execution of 
financial policy became a CBI function. In late 1960 a new policy was adopted to address 
deficits in the balance of payment and prevent increase in price of goods and services. 
Extra banking facilities(loans) were fixed at 6 billion Rials , the discount rate increased 
from 4to 6% and the minimum rate of borrowing from the National Bank was fixed at 2.5% 
,more than the official rate. To encourage people to deposit their money with the bank, 
interest rate for deposit accounts increased from 4 to 5% (Kordbacheh, 2004). 
Budgeting was again subjected to major changes in the Third Plan. In September 1964, 
responsibility of preparing the budget was transferred from the finance ministry to the Plan 
Organization and a new office‘ Budget Central Office’ was set up in the in the 
organization. The primary reason for this move was to help forge harmony and closer 
coordination between the general budget and the development budget, (PBO 1995).In 1965 
a detailed budget for ministries and government bodies (including 19 subtitles) was 
appended to the budget. The 1966 budget had three annexes. First, description of 
government executions; Second, performance of budget for non-profit and trading 
institutions affiliated to the government; Third, report on the performance of budgets of 
ministries and government bodies in the previous year. 
Since 1967 responsibility for preparing the general and development budgets, which 
were prepared separately by the Central Programming Office and Budget Central Office, 
were transferred to the newly founded ‘Plan and Budget Central Office’. The outcome was 
better coordination in preparing the general and development budgets. In the budget law of 
1967 a new provision was made for provincial budgetary allocations for the ministries of 
education, housing, habitation and sanitation (ibid).The most important change in the 
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monetary and banking system during the Third Plan was the establishment of a capital 
market. In 1967 and after relevant studies the stock exchange opened. 
A crucial aspect of change in the planning and budgetary system in the Fifth Plan was 
approval of a law guiding plan and budget in March 1972and preparing annual budgets and 
five year development plans. Approval of a law for public accounting in 1970 was another 
important change in the budgetary system that came into effect a year later. During the 
Fifth Plana monetary and banking law was approved in July 1972 and due to changes in the 
economy an earlier piece of legislation had to be revised. The new law, modified in March 
1979, is still valid. 
 
D: After the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
In light of the conditions after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iraqi-
imposed war the government was unable to put together a long-term development plan. The 
first development plan was prepared in 1982 but due to the war and critical conditions it 
could not pass in the parliament. Consequently, because of the lack of a mid-term 
development plan preparing the annual budget in the framework of a five-year development 
plan was untenable. This condition prevailed until the end of the war (1988) and the First 5-
Year Development Plan in the post-revolution era was launched in 1989. 
During the First Plan, an important financial law "Income generating and spending for 
special cases" was approved. After the revolution and since 1981, due to financial restraints 
and inadequate income for executive bodies, some regulations were gradually annexed to 
the budget laws. As per these regulations some executive departments were allowed to 
generate appropriate income for goods and services provided by them and use part of it for 
their own expenses. The regulations included 73 articles and 6 annexes that were approved 
by Parliament in December 1990and became law. A key deficiency of this law was its 
discrepancy with the doctrine of non-allocation of budget, in that it annually wrenched 
away a considerable share of credits in the budget for itself. In 1997 according to a proposal 
by a group of lawmakers a sumptuary section of the law was eliminated. Changes in the 
budget and economic condition of the government during the First Plan (1989-1993) can be 
analyzed in two parts. 
Firstly, coordination and compatibility of executive budgets with targets/ policies of the 
plan as well as with annual budget laws. One main drawback of budgets before 1989 was 
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the inability to generate revenues forecast in the document that resulted in rectification 
notes and supplementary budgeting that were sent to parliament. But during the First Plan, 
income and expenses of the government were in tandem with figures mentioned in the 
budgets and also with targets of the plan. The rates of income and expenses from 1989 to 
1993 compared to figures in the budget laws were 101% and 105% respectively. 
Secondly, positive changes regarding volume and combination of incomes. From 1985 
to 1988, government earnings were precarious and decreased 6.3% annually. However, 
revenues increased 57.5% and the ratio of income of public budget to GNP increased from 
9.6% in 1988 to 21.8% in 1993, which was 17% above the target set in the First Plan. 
During this period annual average increase in government spending was 47.8%, therefore 
given the increase in income, budget deficit dropped significantly and the ratio of budget 
deficit to the general budget decreased from a massive 50.1% in 1988 to 2.5% in 1993.  
Regarding government debt to the Central Bank for bank liabilities related to foreign 
exchange, the budget deficit in 1993 was 7.1% of GDP.Higher tax revenues and increase of 
its share in the gross national income were considered as the main income source of the 
government. In this respect, tax income, which was way below expectation in the three 
years before the plan and was pegged to 1,000 billion Rials, had increased more than four 
times compared to 1988 during the First Plan period reaching 4,061 billion Rials. 
One declared aim of the budget in the First Plan was to increase the share of 
development spending in the general expenses of the government and raise it from 19.4% 
in 1988 to 28% in 1993. Performance of the budgets shows that the share of development 
budget in general expenses of the government in 1993 increased to 34.6% and development 
spending also increased from 32% in 1988 to more than 48% in 1993. In sum, spending for 
development projects during the First Plan period was 75% above the figure approved in 
the plan. The reason, albeit, was largely due to the decrease in the dollar exchange rate. 
Another goal was prioritizing the social and cultural sectors and increasing their budget. 
Performance of the budget shows that the share of key social and cultural sectors, i.e. 
education, higher education, health, social security, culture and the arts, increased from 
31% in 1989 to 36% in 1993. Byimplementing the law of ‘coordinated payment system’ the 
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Table: 3-1 Main features of the Second Plan 
No. Main features 
1 To study and codify planning and budgetary system for achieving targets stipulated in the plan; 
2 To underpin financial discipline and encourage savings both in the development and general budget and assets of government companies; 
3 
To downsize the government by abolishing overlapping departments, merging ministries, 
organizations and government companies and delegating their tasks to the private sector and 
cooperatives; 
4 To expedite the process of transferring government firms and affiliated organizations to private ownership and cooperatives as per Article 44 of the Constitutional Law; 
5 To undertake accounting standards based on cost prices to help protect the public treasury; 
6 To continue subsidizing basic goods, expose hidden subsidies and strengthen the social security system and the culture of insurance; 
7 To increase the share of direct taxation in tax revenues, except payroll taxes; 
8 Gradual phasing out tax exemptions; 
9 Adjusting and finalizing tax regulations to implement direct tariffs in an efficient manner and based exclusively on product value; 
10 Reforming organizations and taxation procedures, modernizing the overall tax system and minimizing tax collection time; 
11 To reorient oil revenues towards development expenses; 
The bill of the Second 5-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1994-1998), was presented to Parliament in December 1993. But 
because lawmakers demanded a longer period to debate the bill, it was approved one year 
later in December 1994. So the duration of the Second Plan was from 1995 to 1999 with no 
program for 1994. 
All these policies were in fact not implemented because of the lack of a clear execution 
framework for each. Those that were implemented were at best haphazard. Getting rid of 
tax exemptions/holidays and privatizing government companies are two examples of the 
latter.From the total development budget in the Second Plan almost 93.7%, was allocated, 
but the current budget, which was at 133,156 billion Rials, actually jumped to 233,268 
billion, i.e. 75% over and above the forecast amount. From 100,000 billion Rials surplus 
predicted in the current budget, 11% went for public spending, 18% for defense, 42% for 
social affairs and the rest for miscellaneous purposes. Thus, the share of development 
budget in the total budget, which was predicted to increase to 48% in 1999, was restricted 
to 28.6%. The government’s annual revenues on average increased by 26.4% and were 
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nearly 323,000 billion Rials -- oil export and sale of hard currency accounted for 52.8%, 
tax income 25.3%, and others 21.9%. The ratio between tax income of the government and 
its total earnings increased from almost 20% in 1993 to 27.3% in 1999. Similarly, the ratio 
between tax income and gross domestic product also improved from 4.3% in 1993 to 6.4% 
in 1999.However, in contrast, the ratio between revenues (minus oil) to current expenses, 
which was 41.1% in 1993, declined to 35% in 1999. 
In a letter attested to the Third Plan (2000-2004) the president (Mohammad Khatami) 
called for “special attention to the basic necessities and future challenges, namely: needs of 
the youth (almost half of Iran’s population is below 30), increasing social participation, 
creating jobs, achieving decent economic growth rates to help curb unemployment, 
improving human resources and technological prowess, and protecting and sustaining the 
resources and capabilities of the country and its advantages.”Central monetary and 
budgetary policies of the Third Plan can are summed up as follows: 
 
Table: 3-2 Central monetary and budgetary policies of the Third Plan 
 
No. Policies 
1 Eliminating discounts, preferential treatment, and tax and custom duty exemptions for all executive bodies 
2 
Establishing an ‘Organization of Tax Affairs’ as a government body to help boost the 
performance of the taxation system, removing existing organizational hurdles, and 
concentration of taxation affairs 
3 
Establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund on the basis of national and hard currency generated 
from oil exports to create a balance between the foreign and national currency revenues from 
crude oil exports 
4 
Planning and launching the general taxation system for compiling and processing 
information related to the economic activities of tax collectors in the expanding network, and 
expansion and advancement of the voluntary system 
5 Specifying the current and development budget on the basis of separating the public (government) functions from those that can be delegated to the private sector 
6 Paying a part of the development budget in form of various facilities, technical and financial assistance by specialized development banks 
7 Organizing the annual budget according to a “no debt policy” from the Central Bank 
8 Reviewing fixed assets of government companies100% of which belongs to the government 
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The important aspect of the Third Plan was adjusting the capacity and balancing the 
income and expenses of the government (current budgetary system).The income aspect was 
such that, except in the special period (1985 to 1989), the share of the non-oil income did 
not exceed 50% of the government income. Besides, an important part of non-oil income 
was directly or indirectly dependent on oil, which rendered government revenues extremely 
vulnerable to international oil price volatility. 
More than 20% of income tax was the function of import tariffs, which directly 
depended on the foreign currency earned from oil exports. Since the huge increase in global 
oil prices in 1974, import duties leaped from almost 60 billion Rials in 1973 to more than 
169 billion in 1976 and to 5,805 billion Rials in 1999. The figure estimated for import 
duties in 2000 was 6,900 billion Rials, which was 20.3% of the total income of the annual 
budget.  
The capacity and rate of income tax can be judged from factors such as taxation effort 
and the ratio between tax incomes to the current expenses. The result was that the taxation 
effort was not compatible with tax capacity nor global rates at the time. The ratio of income 
tax to GDP fluctuated heavily in the past, which at maximum was 9.1% in 1972 and a 
minimum 4% in 1995. In sum, the ratio during 1971 to 1978 was equal to 8.1% on average 
and declined to 6% and 5% between 1979 to 1988 and 1989 to 1999 respectively. 
From the financial perspective, current expenses were justified, if, however, it could be 
funded by the increase in income tax and not by added value of the productive sectors. 
Under those conditions, increase in current expenses would be considered as increase in the 
supply of social services, and tax on that is like the share that consumers pay for social 
services. 
A review of the earlier process of increase in current expenses in relation to income tax 
reveals an intense and growing dependence of current expenses on oil income. The 
deepening gap between current expenses and income tax, which was 117.2 billion Rials in 
1971, increased to 814 billion Rials in 1977 and further  to 2,397 billion  Rials  in 1988 
and to 42,178 billion Rials in 1999. The figures display huge deficits in the general budgets 
of the government, which in recent years have been plugged thanks to high oil prices and 
the generosity of the national treasury. 
Current expenses in the general budgets during the years 1971 to 1999 were of the 
ascending order except for a few years. However, the momentum of the increase was 
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different at various levels. Before the revolution, current expenses increased from 199.4 
billion Rials in 1971 to 1,387 billion in 1977, the average annual growth rate being 32%. 
During 1973-1974, because of the increase in global oil prices, current expenses shot up 
from 370.2 billion Rials to 825.8 billion. It can be said that the government embarked on a 
spending spree with unprecedented generosity in 1974 and did not curtail it in the 
preceding years as was apparent from the nature of the current expenses which were mostly 
to cover civil services payments. 
In the first decade after the revolution, despite the Iraqi-imposed war, there was a big 
decrease in the growth of current expenses to the extent that the average growth rate was 
limited to 9.4% from 1979 to 1988 (the 8 years of war) .By the end of the war and when 
reconstruction projects started the growth in current expenses shot up. During the first and 
second development plans the average annual growth rate in current expenses was 32.2% 
and 37.6%. 
It needs mention that despite the significant share of civil service payments in current 
expenses; restriction of the growth in expenses was actually aimed at curbing the 
purchasing power of government workers that included a large segment of the society. For 
compensating the said decrease, transferred payments from current expenses increased 
from 296 billion Rials in 1989 to 17,511 billion Rials in 1999. Consequently, transformed 
payment per person increased from 5,568 Rials in 1989to 279,000 Rials in 1999. With the 
elimination of transformed payments from current expenses, these expenses were equal to 
1,857 billion Rials at fixed prices in 1999 which was nearly 30% less than the 
corresponding figure in 1979. 
Development spending in the years 1971-1977 at current prices had increased from 116 
billion Rials in 1971 to 926.8 billion in 1977 and showed an average annual growth rate of 
41.4%. In those years the huge increase in development spending plus increase in oil 
revenues from 1973 to 1974 was so significant that development expenses increased from 
161.2 billion Rials in 1973 to 384.7 billion in 1974 -- a growth of 138.6%. In the period 
from 1979 to 1999, development spending had changed in line with changes in government 
income and increased from 657.1 billion Rials in 1979 to 816.4 billion in 1988, or  at  an 
annual  average growth rate of 2.2%. After 1989 the development  budget 
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Nature of Public Budgeting in Iran 
Administratively, Iran has traditionally been a highly centralized country with most 
national resources owned and operated by the national government. Despite strong 
emphasis on the need for and belief in local councils and the active participation of the 
people in running their affairs as enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, little 
has been done to revamp the rigid centralized administration. Although the formation of 
publicly elected urban and rural councils and the appointment of mayors in several cities 
and towns is a step toward devolution to local authority, details of their sphere of authority, 
responsibility and sources of revenue remain sketchy (Farjadi, 2001). 
Full control of the central government over natural resources, particularly oil and gas, 
major industries, railroads and other major means of transportation, and fiscal bodies 
(banks, insurance companies) also means that the bulk of government budget is derived 
from nationalized resources rather than taxes or local revenue (ibid).State influence and 
interference in the economy covers a wide spectrum: wages, prices, exchange rates, trade 
and business, interest rates, lending rates plus direct industrial, agricultural and commercial 
domination (Farjadi, 2001). 
In the economic arena, oil revenues constitute the lifeline of government spending and 
the latter tends to suffer as a result of periodic fluctuations in oil production and prices. 
Despite general consensus regarding the long-term implications of overdependence of the 
budget and the national economy on a single product, almost all efforts to build an oil-free 
economy have had little success if any. Although not the largest sector, oil accounts for 
more than 80% of annual foreign exchange earnings and70% of annual state finances. 
While reduction and eventual elimination of this risky dependence has been mandated in 
every one of the past development plans, reliance on oil has indeed become more not less. 
The government’s need for oil receipts increased from $16billion in 2001 to $41 billion in 
2009. Recent oil price volatility in the face of Iran’s increasing dependence on imports of 
essential capital and consumer goods now presents a bigger and more ominous threat. 
According to a recent IMF survey, a protracted oil price below $75 per barrel could play 
havoc with Iran’s economy. The ultimate material success may, in fact, depend largely on 
the fate of Iran’s gas and oil industries (Amouzgar, 2011). 
The financial program of the government for any financial year, which usually 
corresponds with the Iranian calendar year (starting March 21), is known as the 
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government's total budget for that year. It includes the government's public budget as well 
as the budgets of banks, government corporations and government affiliated bodies. The 
government public budget is the portion of total government budget which provides for 
financial resources needed by the government to implement its annual programs and to 
determine current and development credits for executive bodies. 
Government public budget covers two broad spheres: payments and receipts. Payments 
of the public budget comprise all expenditures, both development and current, paid by the 
government from general and special revenues during a financial year. Receipts of the 
public budget contains all amounts known as general and special revenues as well as 
miscellaneous sources of credit and funds that as per law should be deposited with the 
treasury. General revenues consist of revenues from oil and gas, taxes, and other incomes 
of the public budget. Special revenues are revenues allocated for special expenditures in the 
government’s public budget as mandated by law. 
All funds allocated for special expenditures in the annual budget approved by the 
Parliament are known as credits. Credit is defined as a sum allocated by the Majlis for 
special expenditures to achieve certain goals and to implement specified plans and 
programs. Credits fall into two broad categories: Development credits and current credits. 
Development credits refer to credits provided for in the five-year development plans as a 
whole, and in the government public budget in parts, to implement development projects 
and expand current expenditures for socioeconomic plans. Current credits refer to credits 
provided for in the five-year development plans as a whole, and in the government public 
budget in parts, to meet the government's current expenditures and spending for 
maintaining the level of socioeconomic activities. Activities and financial commitments of 
the government are classified into four major categories: 
i) Public administration 
ii) National defense 
iii) Social affairs 
iv) Economic affairs 
Inherent lack of transparency in the government budget remains a grate economic 
challenge. The annual budget approved by Parliament usually after weeks of 
deliberation, is hardly ever faithfully adhered to. Always formulated in balance at the  
time of  endorsement, the budget invariably ends up in deficit due to a poor and 
 
116    
inflexible tax base, recurrent losses of state-owned organizations, haphazard tax collection 
and unaffordable public welfare spending. A shortage of funds in current expenditures is 
routinely made up by cuts in the development (capital investment) sphere. In recent years, 
one-fourth of the annual capital investment budget has been diverted to regular 
expenditures, with the result that thousands of development projects lag behind and remain 
unfinished due to lack of funds. Budget deficits are normally financed by the Central Bank, 
operating as the government's cash cow. Iran’s endemic double-digit inflation, the highest 
in the region and among the eight highest in the world, is the result of monetization of the 
public debt (Amouzgar, 2011). 
Over the years figures have been added gradually to the income side of the budget, 
which have led to difficulties in international comparisons of the government income and 
even in internal annual comparisons due to inadequate classification and placement. 
For example, income generated from selling shares of companies owned by the 
Expansion and Renovation Organization of Iranian Industries was included in the 
miscellaneous income, but income from selling shares of the National Industries 
Organization was stipulated in the third part of incomes. Also income from leasing 
government buildings was shown in the third part of the income section, but income from 
sale of the government buildings was enumerated in the fourth part of the same section. 
According to Clause 12 of the public accounting law, figures considered as loans, 
issuance of bonds, return of previous payments (loan repayments) and similar topics in the 
general law of the budget are not considered income but projected as “other resources”. 
This was at a time when sale of goods income from the sale of participative bonds was 
registered in sale of goods income section from 1997, and facilities (credits) from the 
World Bank were stipulated in the miscellaneous income section of the general budget in 
1994. 
A share of 30% of the total budget is stipulated in concentrated sections (without listing 
projects), which causes a series of problems in optimizing the allocation of resources. In 
recent years, a number of secondary lines under the main lines of the executive sections in 
the budget have increased and each executive department has positioned a specific 
budgetary line for itself. These moves not only increase the physical capacity of the budget 
document in an illogical way, but also result in an increase in the total current budget. 
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Political and Other Aspects of the Budgetary System in Iran: 
Political and peripheral considerations have always been a part and parcel of budgeting in 
Iran with negative impact on both the preparation of budget draft and its final approval in 
parliament. These factors have led to unhelpful changes in the financial process and 
ineffectiveness of policies. Some instances are noted in this chapter: 
First, budget evaluation and outlays for executive departments are key factors in budget 
preparation by the Plan and Budget Organization. Considering the fact that these 
evaluations are basic elements of a budget, they should be based on careful and critical 
analysis without the influence of individuals or interest groups. 
Second, some executive departments unable to pass the scrutiny of the budget preparation 
process and with close relations to the Majlis Budget Commission or other factions in 
Parliament try to lobby and assert their positions when the budget bill is debated by 
lawmakers. 
Third, MPs normally do their best to be become members of the influential Plan and 
Budget Commission or Economic and Commercial Affairs Commission of the Parliament. 
This is largely because of the important role of these two commissions, especially the 
former, in scrutinizing annual budgets. To limit the role of Plan and Budget Commission, a 
temporary commission, comprising members of the same commission plus one 
representative from each of the other parliamentary commissions, are responsible for 
studying the draft budget. 
Fourth, the process of preparing a budget normally takes two months in the government 
and Parliament also needs nearly the same time for debate and final approval. Changes to 
the budget bill in Parliament have no restrictions and there have been cases when 70% of a 
budget has been revised and altered. The changes were often in sectoral and regional 
priorities so that it differentiated priorities of programs outlined by the government and 
created constraints with regard to achieving government targets. 
Fifth, at times decisions by Parliament are inclined toward soliciting public support 
without due attention to economic and social feasibilities and their future impacts. Some of 
these decisions can and should be referred to the subsidies for food, fuel and energy 
approved by the legislature in recent years. 
Sixth, parliamentary factions have a role in the approval or rejection of proposals in the 
open sessions of the Majlis. There have been instances when proposals were endorsed 
despite their contradiction to what the government wanted. One case was the stipulation of 
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a $330 million loan from foreign countries for water and wastewater projects in the 1999 
budget bill. Seventh, political leanings of the majority faction in the Parliament result in 
special emphasis on ensuring credits for some pet executive departments and imbalances 
between funding for of these organizations and others. The significant increases in the 
budgets for the state-owned Radio and TV Organization okayed in Parliament can be an 
example. Finally, although live radio and TV broadcasts of the open session of the 
Parliament have a basic role in informing the public, TV cameras in essence have led to an 
increase in proposals by the MPs and lengthened the time for debating/approving the 
budget in the chamber. 
 
The Supervisory System of Budgeting: 
In the budgetary system in Iran, the general entity of operational supervision has 
discrepancies from legal and executive points, which in part is due to the performance of 
the budgetary system, the performance of the Management and Planning Organization 
(formerly the Plan and Budget Organization) and other executive departments. First, 
presently, one problem of the budgetary system is performance responsibility of the 
government. The government has taken upon itself many commitments without considering 
income possibilities. Programs with less priority get a large share of the budget. Second, 
Because of weak information feedback, enforcing political notions of responsibilities and 
also weak authority of supervising departments, there is no strong interconnection between 
the supervisory system and other budgeting processes. 
Third, given the essence of annual budgets that should consider previous projects, 
development spending is allocated through a bargaining process between executive 
departments and the MPO. Fourth, The MPO’s supervisory role, due to changes in the 
recent past, does not have the necessary clout and authority in relation to preparation, 
outlay and technical/economic evaluation of programs. Regarding oversight and 
supervisory visits, hardly 50% of projects on average are under the auspices of this key 
organization. Other executive (government) departments supervise the rest of the projects. 
Moreover, given the fact  that preparing  reliable supervisory reports is subject to extended 
periods, their results have little functional value. The MPO  is  responsible for technical and 
economic evaluation of projects as well as supervisory visits, but has not been successful in 
fulfilling its mandate. These constraints have had negative impacts, one being that 
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development projects are almost always delayed and never completed on schedule. For 
instance,  according  to  a  recent  MPO  report 77.4%  of the projects were under 
execution, 13.9% were completed, 4.4% ceased to exist and 14.3% still remain on paper. 
The average time for executing 114 projects under supervision which were completed by 
that time was 8.7 years. Estimated period for completing new projects under supervision 
was 4.4 years, and for all the projects supervised was 9.7 years. In addition, supervision 
and operational control of the budget in Iran does not have a clear and defined system. An 
important phase of supervision is undertaken by executive bodies and organizations 
which are funded by the government and are obliged to write reports on the performance 
to the government. Because of ingrained bureaucracy and since each of these 
organizations work according to their own regulations, systemic supervision is not 
possible. This causes discrepancy in law or may lead to poor performance of Article 90 of 
the Law of Public Audit for execution of activities and development programs, and also 
inhibits execution of Article 37 of the Plan and Budget Law. 
 Moreover, effective supervision and oversight of development plans and projects needs 
an integrated computerizes accounting system, which efficiently informs those in charge 
about the performance of expenditures. In the prevailing financial system, developmental 
accountancy is performed according to executive guidelines of accounting development 
projects approved in 1973 that are inadequate and inefficient. In addition, according to 
Article 55 of the Constitution, a Supreme Auditing Court (affiliated to Parliament) is 
responsible for the parliamentary oversight of the annual budget by preparing a report of 
settlement of budget. This tribunal has the following problems in carrying out its tasks: 
First, the content of Item 42 of the law of audit, which allows the tribunal to investigate 
every case it deems necessary does not have the necessary help and cooperation from 
relevant organizations and executive bodies. Moreover, in the second chapter of the Law 
of Public Audit approved in 1960, the time and method of financing budget resources, 
and alterations and appendixes to the budget was outlined. 
However, this point was deleted in the new audit law passed in 1987 and has 
undermined compilation of a fair and impartial report on the settlement of budgetary 
issues. In addition, according to Amendment 99 of the law of the Second Plan, the 
ministry of economy and finance and the Plan and Budget Organization were responsible 
for supervising the performance of executive organizations and reporting to the Cabinet, 
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financial tribunal and parliamentary commissions. No such report has been received by 
the financial tribunal. Furthermore, lack of coordination between the accounting system 
of the economy ministry and that of the tribunal. Likewise, numerous concentrated lines 
in the annual  budget and preparation of  reports on budgetperformance and settlement are 
cumbersome. What is more, heavy concentration of credits and basic lines make qualitative 
and quantitative control over the performance of executive organizations impossible. 
 
Challenges of Budgeting in Iran  
As noted earlier, during the last decades of the conventional budgeting system in Iran, the 
utmost efforts of the administrative bodies of the nation have been to acquire more 
resources to spend and it has not been made transparent that at what cost and quality the 
responsibilities regarding the public are met. In order to submit their next year's budget 
estimate to the cabinet, every administrative body considers the country's annual inflation 
rate and other possible costs as well as its current year’s budget as the criterion and adds 
some percentages to its revenues and expenses, without evaluating its performance or 
calculating the actual production costs for each unit of its goods or services. 
Officials of public institutions and budgeting system in Iran always ignore the bottom line 
of their agencies and the efficiency at which the results of their activities are delivered to 
the public. It is not clear that if the actual costs associated with their initiatives are justified 
against the value delivered by those activities. The question is whether or not it is possible 
to provide for more and higher quality services while decreasing the loss of time? 
Unfortunately, during budget preparation, approval and implementation, no attention is 
paid to macro budgetary characteristics and the respective economic and social effects. 
Moreover, annual budgets do not include all the country's public resources and expenses. 
The following are some of the reasons for the outstanding difference between budget 
forecasts and budget performance: 
a) Conflicts between development plans and annual budgets;  
 b)  Giving priority to some administrative bodies; 
 c)  Creating false revenues to offset costs and false budget balance; 
 d) Spending funds to meet the demands of specific individuals and groups; 
 e) Overestimation of revenues and underestimation of costs, 
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 f) Making new budgetary decisions while implementing the budget.  
Therefore, the budget fails to conduct one of its major tasks, i.e. the establishment of fiscal 
discipline in the country which is then creats a vicious cycle in Iran’s budgeting 
system(figure 3). Another disadvantage of currents budgeting method is that if an 
institution acquired higher budgets compared to its actual needs, it would get more budgets 
in the next year and it would deprive people from the goods and services of the other 
agencies that get lower budgets. Finally, in the budgeting of Iranian public institutions, the 
important matter is their survival, not the actual needs of the society. It is always ignored 
whether or not the survival of a public institution can meet the social needs stated in its 
objectives. The actual cost for each unit of work is not calculated and no matters if the 
private sector can offer these services with better quality and lower cost. 
However, we know that budgeting is based on the principle of saving financial resources. 
If these studies are conducted, one will observe that based on economic calculations, many 
public institutions and organizations are redundant, parallel, vain, and imposed on the 
country's scarce resources.  
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The studies conducted in this research suggest that the current budgeting system is 
underdeveloped and flawed and requires fundamental reforms. The current budget structure 
is such that it simply incurs costs, and it does not separate actual resources from non-actual 
and inflation resources. Moreover, unlike its definition in the Public Audit Law, it is not 
comprehensive, complete and balanced. The current budgeting system considers the 
receipts from oil exports as "revenue" while they should be considered as national wealth. 
In addition, its spending must change from "current expenditure" to "capital expenditure". 
For many years, the national budget relied on borrowing from the central bank and other 
financial agencies. The reliance on unrealistic, monetary and credit resources which inject 
to the national budget to meet the annual budget deficits are the main sources of inflation in 
Iran. 
The authority of the Management and Planning Organization of Iran has decreased due to 
political and unprofessional considerations of some individuals and institutions over time. 
This is the reason why the bargaining logic has become the dominant logic in public 
resource allocation in the last few decades. The dissolution of the mentioned organization 
and aggravated this problem. There are no specific criteria for the separation of national 
and provincial activities and there is no clear and fair mechanism to allocate resources to 
the provinces. These are the reasons for the persistence of discriminatory differences 
between the provinces. The Cabinet’s provincial trips did not solve this problem, but 
reduced decision-making capacity and sense of responsibility in the provinces by increasing 
centralization in decision making (resource allocation decisions were made by the cabinet 
instead of the provincial authorities.  
Reforms of the current inefficient budgeting system require substantial activities which, 
in turn, require professional studies and planning in a broad level and gradual 
implementation over time. Temporary and everyday behaviors cannot solve problems and 
address the existing deficiencies in the country's budgeting. Such a reform needs thinking, 
expertise, time, training, and a powerful custodian. To achieve the above objectives, the 
current budgeting system, which can be mainly classified in the context of incremental 
budgeting system, should become performance-based. Such a system measures the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the utilized resources for offering services to the public. 
Thus, in this method, the main emphasis is on the "results management" instead of the 
service "preparation process" and the ultimate goal is to increase sense of responsibility, 
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improve management and ensure efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, the expected 
results are matched with the budget's required resources. In other words, the performance-
based budgeting system determines the quality and quantity of expected services based on 
the resources allocated to public agencies. This process allows policymakers to allocate 
resources to the promised results and the future orientations of institutions. 
 
Conclusion: 
Budgeting is a financial reflection of economic and social alternatives of a society and 
like other economic policies functions as a key policy-making tool in a macro scale. 
Financial discipline and allocation of resources are the general goals of budget management 
which introduces itself as a powerful tool in achieving macro goals. 
The fundamental issues in budgeting system of each country are the allocation of limited 
resources based on the needs, different goals and benefits and their prioritization. The 
question on what basis should one proceeds with decision-making when there is a 
limitation of resources has nowadays turned into a challenge for the economists. In the 
course of the last seventy years, theorists have made continuous attempts to compile the 
basics of decision-making required for appropriate allocation of limited resources in the 
public sector. This has, on the one hand, resulted in the compilation of principles and 
guidelines as basics of decision-making for the allocation of resources in the public sector 
and discovery of techniques for the application of the said principles. On the other hand, 
approaches such as administrative budgeting, rationalism, instrumentalism, and public 
choice have each influenced the budgeting institutions and procedures and have 
transformed public budgeting into a concept open to theories. Although no comprehensive 
theory on budgeting and resolution of the issue has been introduced, significant progress 
has been observed in suiting the needs of different applicants in order to benefit from the 
public resources. Obviously, these approaches cannot provide a satisfactory basis for the 
allocation of resources exclusively. However, when combined, in case decision-making on 
costs, government interference logic, and the costs and profits thereto, and the distributive 
influences of the public expenditure are concerned, they play a decisive role. 
Despite the widespread involvement of the Iranian government in the economy of the 
nation due to reasons such as access to oil revenues and based on specific religious beliefs, 
the importance of budgeting, as one of the most important economic policy-making tools, is 
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accentuated. Nevertheless, this document hasn't proved to be a practical tool in the 
implementation of development plans. 
Prior to the recognition of government as a key player in the economic development in  
Iran,  budgeting functioned  merely as a tool  for controlling and  auditing  financial 
flows. With the emergence of government in the realm of economy and the assumption of 
new responsibilities for providing the society with services, the application of budgeting as 
a management tool became necessary. This necessity has resulted in different 
classifications of budgeting; namely, organizational and institutional classification through 
which each executive body annually receive funds under the incremental budgetary 
method. 
One of the decisive factors involved in determination of budgeting methods is 
considered to be the degree to which the government involves in and influences the social-
economic activities. These methods are chosen based on the planning system (the openness 
of the economic atmosphere of the country) and also the designed mid-term plans to 
achieve the determined economic and social goals. Iran has experienced diverse methods of 
budgeting and in each point of time in history a special method has been applied for the 
regulation of the budgeting document and the credits required in each sector. However, due 
to the centralized planning structure in Iran and the dispersion of construction and 
development activities of the country, the incremental method of budgeting has been 
applied; whereas, the type of government activities necessitates an integrated method. 
Based on the constitution law and the items in the third, fourth and fifth national 
development plan, the activities which lie under the authority of the government, the 
operating budgeting method shall be applied, so that the finalized cost of each activity can 
be evaluated. Moreover, where possible the economic-social activities should be delegated 
to the private sector and for the delegation of such activities, the PPBS1 method is 
recommended. In addition, the adoption of a policy which bans the consideration of oil 
export revenues in the current expenditure budgets seems to be one of the main challenges 
for the budgeting system. In spite of the fact that this issue has been raised in the last few 
years, the consumption of oil revenues in the expenditure budgets of the country is common 
and regular. 
Another point in the analysis of the budgeting system in Iran is the fact that in addition 
to sever dependence on oil revenues, the budgeting system lacks a comprehensive outlook 
                                                 
1planning Programming and Budgeting System, 
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on economic sectors. This system doesn't hold a precise attitude towards the capabilities, 
capacities, weaknesses and the requirements of the private sector whether the incomes and 
the revenue resources or the costs are concerned. In other words, the national budgeting 
system and also the development plans, do not consider an appropriate place for the 
participation of the private sector in the implementation of development plans. 
In summary, one could claim that there is no compulsion for the application of one 
single budgeting method in Iran, but quite on the contrary and due to the importance and 
the level of government's involvement, the application of integrated methods deems vital, 
and this wouldn't be feasible unless necessary reforms in the budgeting system are 
implemented. These reforms will be covered thoroughly in the following chapters. 
 
 




GOOD GOVERNENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY 












This chapter comprises a theoretical framework and literature review for the discussion 
on the concept and role of ‘good governance’ in development management and public 
administration, which emphasizes the responsibilities of governments as service providers 
and architects of development. 
Through this chapter I seek to illustrate what steps should be taken from the point of 
good governance and characteristics defended by scholars of this paradigm to promote the 
path of development as a whole and regional development and poverty alleviation, 
specifically in Iran. These are shown through a mix model of Transcendental Value 
management (TVM) and public value management (PVM) which have been proposed with 
regard to the goals of Iran Vision 2025. 
The momentum of national and international development has inevitably challenged 
all the structures, institutions and management of public affairs. In such a situation, 
where the public needs and demands are under the influence of the mass media, 
information technology and other tectonic changes in the information-age,  every action 
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of the staff and government decision-makers who have been chosen by the people to take 
responsibility for managing their affairs, is open to question and critical evaluation. 
As a result, governments are expected to introduce a set of reforms in their 
administrative, political and economic systems, which are generally known as “good 
governance” and have attracted the attention of the media and public opinion. 
 
Governance 
Governance was traditionally associated with the government, with the service of power 
by political leaders (Mette Kjaer, 2004). Although, imposing this restriction on the scope of 
governance, still leaves us with concepts that have multiple meanings. Governance is the 
act or manner of governing, to govern to rule or control with authority. Governance is the 
stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game. Governance refers to those 
measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and setting conflicts over 
such rules (Hyden, 1999:185) 
Governance does not point to state actors and institutions as the only relevant 
institutions and actors in the authoritative allocation of values (Stern, 1996). They all, to 
some extent focus on the role of networks in the pursuit of common goals; these networks 
could be inter-organizational (Rhodes, 1996). They can be transnational (Rosenau,1997) or 
they could be networks of trust and reciprocity crossing the state-society divides 
(Hyden,1999). 
Governance is the capacity of government to make and implement policy and to steer 
society (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In new governance theories, analysts often explore the 
nature of governance: has the role of state declined, or if it has not declined, has it changed? 
Some use governance in both the old and new sense: governance is the institutional 
capacity of public organizations to provide the public and other goods demanded by a 
country's citizens or their representatives in an effective, transparent impartial and 
accountable manner (World Bank, 2000). 
To steer and improve accountability in this sense, governance should resurrect 
relationship between legitimacy and efficiency (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The main 
creations identified for  
the setting and management of political rules of the game, are legitimacy, efficiency, 
democracy and accountability. 
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A useful distinction here is between "input-oriented" and "output-oriented" legitimacy. 
(Scharpf, 1997b: 525). Input oriented legitimacy derives from agreement of those who 
are asked to comply with the rules (establishment of democratic procedures 
for taking collectively binding decisions). Output oriented legitimacy derives from the 
effectiveness of rules to produce tangible results (if they serve the common good). Thus, 
legitimacy may derive from democracy as well as from efficiency. The issue is whether it is 
possible to have both or whether there is a trade-off between the two. 
Accountability implies responsibility: to be accountable is to be held responsible. To 
talk about accountability is to define who can be called to account and who has the duty to 
explain (Day and Klein, 1987). Accountability must be direct and continuous. Inability to 
make someone accountable implies a lack of power and control (ibid).  
Increased participation by citizens has been called for, in order to reintroduce direct 
accountability and thereby short-circuit the increasingly complex structures of 
accountability. To ensure that, service providers are responsive to the user's needs. 
Accountability is ensured through traditional parliamentary routes, as well as through more 
participatory means. 
In public administration, the governance debate is about changes that have taken place in 
the public sector since 1980s.The traditional model of public sector that was defined and 
sketched by Max Weber (the principles of a modern bureaucracy), the basic for all political 
authority is the sovereign people; power is exercised by people in an indirect way through 
elected representatives. The basic organizing principle for connecting the people or the 
electorate, to their representatives is the principle of plurality, free association and speech, 
one vote and the secret ballot. The legislature defines the common interest of the nation and 
oversees the government's implementation of its decisions. 
 
The Concept of Good Governance (GG) 
The concept of ‘governance’ is not new. However, it means different things to different 
people; therefore we have to get our focus right. The concept has been around in both 
political and academic discourse for a long time, referring in a generic sense to the task of 
running a government, or any other appropriate entity for that matter. In this regard the 
general definition provided by Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) is of 
some assistance, indicating only that governance is a synonym for government, or "the act 
or process of governing, specifically authoritative direction and control". This interpretation 
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focuses specifically on the effectiveness of the executive branch of government (South 
Africa's National Party Website) 
Good governance is referred to the paradigm which emerged  over  the  past  two 
decades  and  is  regarded as one of  the  international  orientations  in  the  management  of 
public affairs. The idea of good governance has been presented in contrast with poor 
governance. As Ray and May (1996) have stated, in poor governance; firstly, laws and 
regulations overtly curb the proper trend of the market, increase administrative corruption 
and weaken competition; secondly, misplaced priorities result in improper allocation of 
resources; and thirdly, there can be seen inability in policy making and proper 
governmental behavior which results in development. If we accept good governance as a 
new paradigm for using power in managing the country, we should also say that its 
applicability depends on concocting a proper indigenous model. 
The concept of governance, in fact is simple. It is seen as a set of values, as well as 
social processes at different levels, on the basis of interaction among governments, civil 
society and the private sector. It is not new and is probably as old as human civilization. It 
broadly means the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are or 
are not implemented. The concept of governance relates to the quality of relationship 
between governments and the citizens whom it serves and protects. 
The Asian Development Bank states the instrumental nature of governance with its four 
pillars, namely accountability, transparency, predictability and participation. These are 
universally applicable regardless of economic orientation, strategic priorities, or policy of 
the government in question. The universally accepted characteristics of good governance 
include participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, equality, inclusiveness, 
effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. 
Good governance has been defined by Healey,J and Robinson,M. (1992 ) as: a high 
level of organizational effectiveness in relation to policy formulation and the policies 
actually pursed, especially in the conduct of economic policy and its contribution to 
growth, stability and popular welfare. Good government also implies accountability, 
transparency, participation, openness and the rule of law. It also tends to be a prerequisite 
for political legitimacy. Governance, as a process of establishing reciprocal interaction 
between and within government, market-economy and people, is gaining prominence. 
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In this research I have tried to outline the effectiveness of governance as a strategy in 
establishing an appropriate balance in relative roles of public, private and civil society 
organizations, rights and responsibilities of politicians, bureaucrats, and community and 
third sector's players. Public administration is a system of administration created with 
public funds for private gain. The changing concepts of development, globalization and 
growth of new technologies, and the changing perception of the role of state, are some 
important   factors   influencing   the    nature and process of   government (James 
D.Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank). He considers localization with emphasis on 
decentralization of political power and urbanization as important strategies for future 
development (WDR 1999-2000). 
The World Bank Report (1997) envisions a more effective state by restricting its 
activities to match its capabilities, and also advocates improving the state's capabilities by 
reinvigorating public institutions. The market also has been considered a more effective 
institution for allocation of social resources. The key role of the state in development is 
questioned. This market driven approach to development strengthens the factors of 
liberalization and privatization. 
Good governance is a fuzzy concept. According to World Bank,(1992) good governance 
is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and 
social recourses for development. The World Bank has identified following distinct aspects 
in the conceptualization of governance. One of the aspects refers to the form of political 
regime. Another aspect is concerned with the process by which authority is exercised in the 
management of the country's economic and social resources. The third aspect is capacity of 
government to design formulate and implement policies, and in general, to discharge 
government functions. And finally, the fourth aspect deals e- Governance, internet facilities 
and new technologies which facilitate better interface between people and government and 
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Table 4-1: Important Determinants of Good Governance 
No. Determinants No. Determinants 
1 Democratic policy 5  Independent judiciary 
2 Flexible models of government 6  Competitive government (service delivery) 
3 Established legal framework based on rule of law 7  Efficient and result - oriented 
4 Probity in public life 8  Transparent administrative system 
9 Small government in terms of size 14  Responsive to the needs of citizens 
10 Ethical approach to human concerns 15  Quality of services and performance assessment 
11 
Organizational pluralism – state, 
market and civil society organizations 
for governance. 
16  Building social capacity 
12 Decentralization –devolution of power to local organizations 17 
Performance partnership between 
government, NGOs and private agencies 
13 People's participation 18  E-governance 
 
 
The working definition used by the British Council, however, emphasizes that 
"governance" is a broader notion than government (and for that matter, also related 
concepts like the state, good government and regime), and goes on to state: "Governance 
involves interaction between the formal institutions and those in civil society. Governance 
refers to a process whereby elements in society wield power, authority and influence and 
enact policies and decisions concerning public life and social issues, (South Africa's 
National Party Website). 
Governance, therefore, not only encompasses but transcends the collective meaning of 
related concepts like the state, government, regime, and good government. Many of the 
elements and principles underlying ‘good government’ have become an integral part of the 
meaning of ‘governance’. John Healey and Mark Robinson define good government as 
follows: "It implies a high level of organizational effectiveness in relation to policy-
formulation and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy 
and its contribution to growth, stability and popular welfare. Good government also implies 
accountability, transparency, participation, openness and the rule of law. It does not 
necessarily presuppose a value judgment, for example, a healthy respect for civil and 
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political liberties, although good government tends to be a prerequisite for political 
legitimacy, (Healey,J and Robinson,M. 1992). 
We can exercise our minds on the definition of governance provided by the World Bank: 
"Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policymaking, a 
bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the 
rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs. 
Poor governance (on the other hand) is characterized by arbitrary policymaking, 
unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive 
power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption". 
The World Bank's focus on governance reflects the worldwide thrust toward political 
and economic liberalization. Such a governance approach highlights issues of greater state 
responsiveness and accountability, and the impact of these factors on political stability and 
economic development. In its 1989 report, ‘From Crisis to Sustainable Growth’, the World 
Bank expressed this notion as follows: 
"Efforts to create  an  enabling  environment  and to build  capacities will be wasted 
if the political context is not favorable. Ultimately, better governance requires political 
renewal. This means a concerted attack on corruption from the highest to lowest level. 
This can be done by setting a good example, by strengthening accountability, by 
encouraging public debate, and by nurturing a free press. It also means fostering grassroots 
and non-governmental organizations such as farmers' associations, cooperatives, and 
women's groups." 
The World Bank has also used the following definition: "By governance we mean the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's social and economic 
resources". It makes a clear distinction between the political and economic dimensions of 
governance. The Bank's call for good governance is to encourage governments to create the 
legal and institutional framework for transparency, predictability and competence in the 
conduct of public affairs and the management of economic development. (World Bank, 
1994) 
Apart from the World Bank's emphasis on governance, it is also necessary to refer to 
academic literature on governance, which mostly originates from scholars working with 
international development and donor agencies. The majority of these scholars has 
concentrated almost exclusively on the issue of political legitimacy, which is the dependent 
 
133   
variable produced by effective governance. Governance, as defined here, is "the conscious 
management of regime structures, with a view to enhancing the public realm." 
The contribution by Hyden, (1999) to bring greater clarity to the concept of governance 
needs special attention. He elevates governance to an "umbrella concept to define an 
approach to comparative politics, an approach that fills analytical gaps left by others". 
Using a governance approach, he emphasizes "the creative potential of politics, especially 
with the ability of leaders to rise above the existing structure of the ordinary, to change the 
rules of the game and to inspire others to partake in efforts to move society forward in new 
and productive directions" (South Africa's National Party Website). 
By governance we mean the manner in which power is exercised by governments in the 
management of a country's social and economic resources. ‘Good’ governance is the 
exercise of power by various levels of government that is effective, honest, equitable, 
transparent and accountable. Most international organizations and bilateral agencies have 
developed their own definition of governance. 
UNDP1 has developed a fairly broad strategy and policy linking public-sector 
management, governance and sustainable human development. UNDP definition of 
good governance is set out in a 1997 UNDP policy document entitled “Governance for 
Sustainable Human Development”. The document states that governance can be seen as the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at 
all levels. Thus, "Under the Parameters of Sustainable Human Development", sound 
governance has come to mean a framework of public management based on the rule of 
law, a fair and efficient system of justice, and broad popular involvement in the 
process of governing and being governed. UNDP identifies the following factors as 








                                                 
1United Nation Development Program 
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Table 4-2: Influential Factors in Governance Defined By UNDP 
No. Influential Factors 
1 Organizations or entities such as political systems, parliaments, legal authorities and NGOs 
2 Institutions, or the formal or informal system of values, rules and procedures used to manage human, natural and economic resources 
3 
Capacity of government to develop and implement policies (this includes bringing about 
organizational change, influencing institutions, and changing the nature of interaction 
between organizations and institutions) 
4 Nature of interaction between political authority and civil society 
5 Freedom of expression and role of the media 
The following table enlists what UNDP identifies as the principal characteristics of 
effective governance: 
 
Table 4-3: Characteristics of Effective Governance Defined By UNDP 
No. Characteristics No. Characteristics 
1 
political legitimacy and 
accountability; 
6 
effective and efficient management of the 
public sector; 
2 
freedom of association and 
participation; 
7 
cooperation with organizations in civil 
society; 
3 reliable legal system; 8 
decentralization and support for local 
government; 
4 accountability of the public service; 9 civil society; 
5 
freedom of information and 
expression; 
10 policy development planning and support. 
 
Development banks have focused mainly on the social and economic aspects of the 
concept of governance. The European Union and EBRD have broader visions in which 
governance includes political dimensions, such as human rights and democracy. 
The ‘Institute on Governance’ has established the following definition: Governance 
comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is 
exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say. Thus governance is not 
the sole concern of government, but of all those involved in decision-making. 
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Miller, (1996) of the ‘Parliamentary Center’ talks about the concept of the ecology of 
governance. He emphasizes the importance of going beyond a vision of governance that is 
strictly limited to the perspective of government institutions. 
The Asian Development Bank is the only development bank that has developed a policy 
on governance. It focuses primarily on the social and economic aspects of governance, and 
identifies the following basic components: accountability of the public sector, participation 
of the private sector, predictability of the legal framework and public policy, transparency 
of information, and clarity of regulations and policies. 
According to the ADB, governance refers to the institutional context in which citizens 
interact among themselves and with government agencies. Even though policy issues are 
important to development, the concept of governance as defined by the Bank basically 
focuses on the ingredients of effective management. It sees governance as being 
synonymous with effective management of development. The Bank's analytical framework 
for dealing with governance issues distinguishes between the components of governance 
and specific areas of activity for promoting it (such as public sector management). The 
Bank identifies the following key success factors: 
Accountability (government capacity building): public-sector arrangement, 
management and reform of public enterprises, financial management, reform of the public 
service. 
Participation (participatory development process): participation of recipient groups, 
interface between the public and private sectors, decentralization (empowerment 
/accountability of local governments), cooperation with NGOs. 
Predictability (legal framework): law and development, legal frameworks for private 
sector development. 
Transparency (information and openness): disclosure of information, (Asian 
Development Bank 1995). 
The European Union is primarily concerned with the political, social and economic 
dimensions of governance, especially in the context of its support for African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, and its initiatives in the Mediterranean. Special attention is 
paid to human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognition and application of democratic 
principles, and consolidation of the rule of law and good governance (DAC-OECD 1995). 
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To conclude, it is clear that the concept of governance has over the years gained 
momentum and a wider meaning. Apart from being an instrument of public affairs 
management, or a gauge of political development, governance has become a useful 
mechanism to enhance the legitimacy of the public realm. It has also become an 
analytical framework or approach to comparative politics (South Africa's Website 
2010). 
To accept World Bank definition for governance as: The methods of using power in 
managing economic and social resources. in the same line, three different aspects of 
governance may be considered; firstly, the form of the political regime; secondly, the 
procedure of using power for managing the economic and social resources for 
development; and thirdly, the government’s capacity for planning and implementing 
strategies and executive duties. 
In most of the dictionaries, governance is defined as using power in managing an 
institution, organization,ora country, and Weiss (2000) has also posed it at the 
international level. Therefore, governance can be discussed at different levels and 
does not include only the governmental level. Governance can be discussed even in 
terms of the subject. 
Governance, just like government, can be either good or bad. Therefore, good 
governance can be regarded as a new paradigm in governance being recognized with 
specific features. These features are the outcome of the views of some international 
institutions and political and executive experts. As an example, the ‘International 
Fund’, within the framework of good governance, attempts to encourage member 
countries to make clear economic policies, announce public finance as much as they 
can, standardize procedures, and recently, anti-money laundering policies. 
According to the World Bank (1992), member countries have to improve the 
procedures of allocating resources, auditing procedures, selection and implementation 
of strategies, and the relations between citizens and the government. UNDP considers 
good governance as related to the stable development of human resources, while the 
ADB emphasizes the partnership of the private sector. Lyon (2000), borrowing the 
definition used in Australia, regards good governance as effective management of the 
economic and social resources of a country which has to be clear, accountable, 
seeking justice, and open. 
 
137   
In sum, we can consider the following common characteristics for good governance 
(Taylor, 2000; Mobius, 2001; Weiss, 2000; Roy and Tisdell, 1998): 
 
Table 4-4: Characteristics of Good Governance 
No. Characteristics 
1 Establishing and strengthening democratic structures; 
2 Clarity, accountability, intelligence, and joint partnership; 
3 Taking into consideration people’s demands and responding to them; 
4 Proper economic policies to facilitate development; 
5 Respect for human rights and power of the law. 
 
With regard to these characteristics, we can conclude that good governance is an ideal 
situation the realization of which seems difficult on the whole. Few countries and societies 
have managed to reach the status of good governance. Nevertheless, with regard to the 
emphasis of the World Bank (1991) on the establishment of good governance in member 
countries and to guarantee stable development of human resources, the governments’ 
measures are in parallel to the realization of such an ideal (World Bank, 1992; Elgardo, 
1992). 
 
Good Governance as a Paradigm 
A paradigm is a conceptual model according to which and through which we look at the 
realities, judge about them and show reactions (Barker, 1992:12); a collection of thoughts, 
perceptions, and values that reflect a particular aspect of the reality. There can be three 
distinguished levels of paradigm: the first level is a paradigm which is referred to a single 
organization; the second is a general approach to management, strategy and organization 
which has become legitimate through theories and the executers; and the third includes a 
collection of general beliefs, theories and inclinations towards the power based on which 
the managing approach has been structured (Darwin, 1996). 
Based on the above-mentioned definition, good governance is, in fact, a new paradigm 
in exercising governance which seeks to, with accumulation of specific characteristics, 
describe ideal governance. The emergence of good governance can be considered as a new 
collection of governing ideology in managing public affairs that has resulted in the 
formation of ideas and main beliefs in the macro-management of the society. 
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Architecture of Good Governance 
The realization of good governance requires governance architecture at the level of 
the society. Governance architecture includes the formation and continuous management 
of  a  framework   for  ‘future   governance’.  This framework directs fundamental 
andcontinuous changes in the arena of the government and makes it possible to pay 
simultaneous attention to the change of content (the reason) and the procedure (the 
manner) on a large scale. Change in the model of governance on a large scale is a 
stable change in the size of the government which changes its behavior meaningfully. 
The model of good governance architecture is a basis for using administrative, 
political and economic power in managing a country. Borrowing the theory of 
government architecture (CIO Council, 1999), eight elements of this framework are: 
1-Motivesof architectural design: The stimulus for architecture at the level of 
governance can speed up development, new management initiatives, and international 
requirements. 
2-Strategic Inclination: It is guidance for good governance and includes outlook, 
principles, and qualitative and quantitative goals. 
3-Current Architecture: defines present governance and is a representation of the 
ways of using administrative, political and economic power in the current 
circumstances, and consists of two phases of using power at the national and 
international level. 
4-Ideal Architecture: defines expected governance and consists of two national and 
international architectures. This architecture is a representation of the ways of using 
power in managing the country in the future that should play the role of facilitator and 
be accountable to the needs of the people. 
5-Transitive Processes: It shows how the present governance transits to good 
governance. The key processes of transition include planning for the realization of the 
features of good governance. 
6-Architectural Sectors: includes attempts concentrating on major executive fields 
such as administrative, political and economic systems. 
7-Architectural Models: Defines the models of good governance being used in 
architecture. 
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8- Standards: It refers to all the standards, instructions, and circulars related to the 
architecture of good governance at the level of the society. 
 
 








Consensus oriented Participation 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
Equity and inclusiveness 
 
Effectiveness and efficiency 
Transparency 
Rule of law 
 
Characteristics of  
GoodGovernance 
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Criticism of Good Governance 
The model of good governance is a great and rich theory, but disappointingly strict and 
inflexible. The strong point of the theory lies in the recognition of the cause of 
underdevelopment in non-industrial countries, i.e. poor governance. 
The key weakness of this theory is the generalization of governmental characteristics of 
developed countries to other countries. This model is an idealistic model that depicts the 
desired governmental outlook; influences development, but is not necessarily a prerequisite 
to development. It is the selection of the model of good governance by the World Bank as 
the standard for monitoring the performance of governments in different countries that has 
made it different from other excellence models. 
According to the model of good governance, governments should establish a type of 
governance to pave the way for their own national development. Otherwise, their weak 
governance will emerge as a development inhibitor. The evidence largely verifies the 
paradigm of good governance, but it also emphasizes some important warnings: 
 
First: Implicit Presupposition 
There is an implicit presupposition behind the framework of good governance which 
must be considered due to its great influence on the model and the explanation of its 
relations.  Neoliberal  values  are  the  central  base of  the  model  of  good  governance 
(Moore, 1995). Therefore, building this model based on such values will undermine its 
desirability to the followers of other common ideologies in the world. 
 
Second: Unstable Framework 
Lack of accuracy is evident in the hexahedron model of the World Bank. It is not clear 
why the World Bank uses a hexahedron model. Why do some elements such as clarity 
seem to be pale in this model? Has the model been formed based on factor analysis, 
preferences of the persons, or available secondary data? 
 
Third: Deductive Model 
In fact, this model depicts the desired governance in industrial countries, and its 
generalization to all countries, with different conditions and in different stages of growth 
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Forth: Environmental Conditions 
The effect of national conditions, including culture in the development of good 
governance, has not been regarded in this model. According to the Alignment Principle, 
selection of a governance model compatible with the specific conditions of each country is 
necessary and imposition of a single model on different conditions means ignoring the 
Contingency Theory. 
 
Fifth: Regional Unions 
The model of good governance emphasizes the role of governance in traditional 
countries, and is incapable of addressing transnational governance like the European Union. 
 
Eight: Technology 
Since it underestimates the role of technology in deepening the desired democracy and 
governance, the model of good governance is basically a static model. Technology is not an 
exogenous variable; rather, it is an incremental and cumulative process over time. The 
excellence of governance is increasingly dependent on technology. 
 
Ninth: Role of Global Governance 
The model of good governance does not consider the effect of global governance 
on national governance. In many cases, the decisions of international institutions are 
imposed on member countries and the development of some of the characteristics of 
desired governance arises from these countries' following the standards, which is typically 
more observable in small countries. 
 
Tenth: Prerequisite to Development 
Good governance was proposed by the World Bank (1989) to prepare the grounds for 
the development of developing countries; while the successful experience of East Asia 
raises the question that whether good governance is really a prerequisite to development 
(Mette K, 2004). 
 
Eleventh: Contradictory Indicators 
The model of good governance proposes indicators for measurement of each aspect the 
occasionally increase of which in some is associated with decrease in others. For instance, 
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providing emotional citizens and uninformed masses with freedom may galvanize them and 
consequently decrease the indicators of political stability. 
Twelfth: Error of Judgment 
Secondary data is used in the survey of ‘Global Governance’ for the measurement of 
desirability of governance in different countries. Hence, a considerable margin of error in 
judgment should be expected in the evaluation of its different aspects. 
 
Alternative Models of Good Governance 
The question posed here is whether the characteristics mentioned above, which is the 
result of the accumulation of different approaches, are also justifiable with the adjective 
“good” in an Iranian society. In other words, isn’t the idea of good governance in a 
country like Iran, which seeks to implement Islamic governance, a kind of clash? Maybe 
the best answer to such a question is a model of democracy which, given the culture of 
Iran and with regard to Islamic principles and values, has taken the form of Islamic 
democracy (religious democracy). Therefore, to domesticate good governance in Iran, 
the “Islamic” feature should also be regarded as one of the other characteristics of good 
governance, and by “Islam” we mean a collection of principles and values which should 
be taken into consideration for the realization of Islamic governance. With regard to the 
deficiencies mentioned for good governance, there have been attempts to design 
alternative models.  Here,  two  prominent models are  discussed; firstly, the good 
enough  governance  model,  and  secondly,  the  desired  Islamic  governance  model 
 
Good Enough Governance 
The idea of good enough governance has unsecured the validity of good governance's 
action plan (Grindel, 2005). This model proposes that not only is it not necessary but also 
impossible to urgently obviate all the requirements of government. That is why any 
capacity building or institutionalization should be done through years ahead. The good 
enough governance means that the thought of modification of government should be 
followed by considering the socio-economic situation of individual countries. This kind of 
government modification should be selected under the light and radiation of historical 
factors, time duration, socio-economic conditions and depth of democracy in these 
counties. Model of good enough governance has drawn its attention to the minimum 
government conditions for political and economic development. So, this model is a base for 
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questioning long-term instructions for structural changes and innovations of public capacity 
building which presently are considered very important for development. In other words, 
although the model of good enough governance does not accept the instructed model of 
"Good Governance" but from a conceptual point of view the localized model of "Good 
Governance." 
 
Desired Islamic Governance 
As the last divine religion, Islam enjoys the capability of eliciting and adopting the 
desired governance model in accordance with Islamic principles and values. Islamic 
scholars in general, and Shiites in particular, describe and illustrate the model of Islamic 
utopia based on Islamic laws, the traditions and practices of Prophet Muhammad and Imam 
Ali, and the Doctrine of Mahdism. They believe that human emancipation and well-being is 
possible within the framework of such governance (scholars such as Allameh Majlesi, 
Mulla Sadra, and Imam Khomeini). It is necessary to note that in contrast to Plato, Islamic 
scholars regard the Infallible Imams and in their absence, the Faqih (Supreme Jurisprudent) 
at the top of the utopia and qualified for the leadership of the society. The concept of 
'Leadership of the Faqih' was first proposed by Abu al-Salah Halabi. 
 
Applicability of Good Governance in Iran 
Islam as the last divine religion has the potential capacity to use the good governance 
model compatible with Islamic values and principles. What could indeed guarantee the 
eloquence and prosperity of a society is only   the   Holy Quran’s interpretation of 
"transcend" which can be achieved under the auspices of theosophy, consciousness, justice 
and government based on Islamic rules. Although the idea of a governmental excellence in 
its general concept has often been discussed in Iran, but the lack of a tailored model of this 
philosophy has been a major impediment. 
A prominent feature of the present political system in Iran is the Islamic dimension of its 
government. According to Caiden (1988), public pressure and expectation of the masses for 
better services by lesser tax will play an important role in the achievements of the 
modification of administrative plans in developed countries. However, these kinds of 
demands from civil society in developing countries are not very effective for such 
modifications. Consequently, efforts to imitate and impose models experienced in the 
developed world would be rather disappointing for the accomplishment of good governance 
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in developing countries.As a result, to use the paradigm of good governance in the Islamic-
Iranian pattern, we need to design a local model which would encompass all the 
characteristics of good governance under the umbrella of Islamic values. Such a model 
would have the following attributes: 
Justice: according to Islamic principles the government should be built on justice and 
fairness. 
Divine Legalism: the second aspect of an Islamic government should be compliance of 
principles and rules established by Islam and based on the Holy Quran. 
Participation: Imam Khomeini believed that a good government for its formation and 
survival should be based on the opinion and the vote of the people. Good governors should 
serve the masses and uphold public expediency as their primary goal. 
Serving the Masses: One of the important responsibilities of a good government is to 
serve society and to strive to deliver the social and economic needs of the people. In this 
context, government is only an instrument of service, training and leading a nation towards 
justice and prosperity. 
Morality: according to Islam, government is a pact and convention of God with the 
people in which there is no place for the oppressive and corrupt. 
Submitting to Supervision: accepting and tolerating reprimand, censure and 
disapproval is another feature of a good government according to Islamic teachings. 
Governments divorced from public scrutiny and supervision, and in charge without 
responsibility, have roots in  autocracy  and  despotism.  Islam  underscores  the  status  
of  and  belief in public  consciousness  and  their  role  in  supervising  government  
performance. This approach, the religion maintains, helps in ensuring the security and 
well-being of the society. 
Accountability: In the good government model presented by the World Bank, which is a 
referee of western thought, accountability is elevated to a prominent and deserving 
position. Thus, one may ask whether in a political system based on Islamic values, 
accountability can be considered as a characteristic of good governance. Pishehfard (2004) 
believes that those who opine that accountability in an Islamic system is impossible 
prejudge in their understanding that in Islam governance, Faqih supervisory means a kind 
of tutorship. This prejudgment is misleading and wrong simply because accountability in 
high places is a basic tenet of Islamic political discourse. 
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Governmental Excellence 
Undoubtedly, traditional governance partly seeks a degree of accountability, lucidity, 
adherence to participation, rule of law and justice, but does not meet the people’s 
expectations. This type of governance simply fails to deliver when times are bad. In today’s 
world countries from the perspective of good governance (voice and accountability, 
political stability and non-violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and corruption control) are systematically under the public spotlight and their 
performance ratings are the subject of periodic reports by prominent international agencies. 
Although these activities are taken place towards excellence in governance, but it is 
obvious that accepting this kind of models may be face with ideological principles of some 
other countries like Islamic ones. Hence, from contingency perspective, developing a native 
model of governmental excellence is a strategic necessity. 
 
Aligning Public Aadministration With GG 
In order to establish a high degree of excellence in governance, it is necessary to align 
public administration with governance's requirements.  If we accept that good 
governance is a new paradigm in managing the affairs of the people, it becomes 
necessary to fathom how far the present situation in Iran is from the ideal by looking 
closer at its traditional bureaucracy. Iran is an ancient land in the Middle East which has 
seen more than its fair share of ups and downs. With its cultural/ethnic mix and diversity 
(Azeri, Baluch, Arab, Kurd, and Fars), it is regarded as a multi-cultural society. 
Dynasties that came to power over centuries established the ‘courtier bureaucracy’. With 
few exceptions, bureaucracies were almost always at the service of the royal court where 
kings were lords and people were peasants without basic rights. Bureaucracy in its new 
form and manifestation was born in Iran during the Qajar Dynasty.In the process of Iran's 
political and cultural relations with Europe, especially Britain and France, new concepts of 
bureaucracy gradually emerged, namely the “representative bureaucracy." Introduction of 
democratic principles and the victory of the Constitutional Revolution marked a 
fundamental shift from bureaucracy based on governance to bureaucracy based on 
democracy. However, principles and features of representative bureaucracy emerged 
gradually. 
The idea of what came to be known as ‘religious democracy” was first floated in Iran 
almost two decades after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Although the notion of good 
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governance has often been discussed in its general sense, the lack of an indigenous model 
has made its realization difficult, if not impossible. 
The singular trait of Iran's political system is its "Islamic" feature. Its indication lies in 
the creation of state institutions such as the ‘Velayat Faqih’ (rule of the supreme 
jurisprudent), the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament), the Council of Guardians, 
State National Security Council, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, and the elite 
Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps, and their predominant roles. 
A key issue is that the applicability of good governance depends partly on the quality of 
interaction between these powerful institutions and civil society. As Caiden (1988) points 
out, general pressures and people's expectations for better services with lower taxation, play 
a determining role in the success of plans for administrative reform in the developed 
countries, while demands by civil society in developing countries for administrative 
reforms are hardly met.Hence, attempts to impose models of the developed world on 
developing nations for the realization of good governance will be disappointing, to say the 
least. In applying the paradigm of good governance in an Iranian environment, we need to 
consider two important points; on the one hand, the determining role of social pressures in 
administrative reconstruction; and on the other hand, the possibility of implementing 
reforms based on good governance within the framework of prevailing institutions. 
Generally speaking, we could say that governments in Iran do not face pressures as 
witnessed in democratic societies. The essence and quality of relations between the 
government and people prevents the emergence of such pressures. The reason is that: 
firstly, the government has an Islamic disposition and does not allow demands contrary to 
Islamic principles. As a result, the governing bureaucracy operates as a guardian and a 
director not  as  a  responsible  bureaucracy, (Rahnavard, 2010).  Secondly, the masses are 
not organized to be able to push for demands. Non-government formations have yet not 
been institutionalized and so are not considered public interest speakers to be effective in 
government decisions. Hence, fundamental reforms in the public sector for materializing 
the features of good governance depend largely on powerful government managers in 
charge (ibid). 
As Hood (1995) states, there is no unique model for “good governance”, rather a range 
of models for good governance consistent with the existing climate in countries (political 
and cultural factors) could be imagined. In Iran, such a model should be devised and 
applied with focus on the “Islamic” feature of governance on one side, and the long-term 
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development plan of the country (20-Year Vision) and indigenous traits of Iranian society 
on the other. 
In Iran there is a national will that the path and direction of development should move 
ahead, and this key purpose is reflected in the 20- Year Vision. Indeed, challenging 
conditions, namely high unemployment, expanding urban sector, inefficient economy 
largely dependent on oil, disproportionate expansion of the public sector, systemic rise in 
current expenditures, high inflation, and population explosion (more than half the 
population was born in the past 30 years), have together imposed an extra burden on the 
rulers allowing them little time or space for meaningful reforms (Rahnavard, 2011). 
Thus, the possibility should not be disregarded that the paradigm of good governance 
could be a solution to Iran’s public administration dilemma by blending the relevant 
mechanisms of rehabilitation and improving living conditions. However, the primary 
question is to what extent the architects would be able and willing to devise and implement 
plans to move from the present bureaucracy to good governance through fundamental 
change in the political, administrative, and economic structures and within an acceptable 
timeframe. 
In this part of the study I have tried to clarify the existing public administrative model in 
Iran which was traditionally formed according to the three above mentioned aspects. This 
model shows that experts on public administration and public policy in Iran, out of the 
different characteristics of four famous public administration models (Transcendental 
Value Management (TVM)), Public Administration (PA), New Public Management (NPM), 
and Public Value Management (PVM), anticipate the following features appropriate for 
achieving the goals of the Iran Vision 2025 (Rahnavard, 2011). These points, however, may 
also be common between the four models of public administration: 
1- Acceptance of public management based on values and democratic theories (emphasized 
in TVM & PVM models). 
2- Acceptance of economic and political man as the rational sovereignty on management of 
human resources (emphasized in PVM). 
3- Define public interests based on the approach of national-religious demands (emphasized 
in TVM). 
4- Define key beneficiaries in the form of citizens (emphasized in PVM). 
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5- Define the role of general direction and mediation among non-government institutions 
for the government (emphasis in NPM & PVM). 
6- Implementing policy through comprehensive partnership and participation of the players 
(emphasis in PVM & TVM). 
7- Accountability based on 360 degree approach (emphasis in PVM). 
8- Administrative and legal legitimate authorities (emphasis in TVM). 
9- Horizontal and participatory structures (emphasis in TVM). 
10- Motivation based on entrepreneurship and service delivery (emphasis in PVM & NPM). 
11- Key role of managers: Leading and integrating service delivery networks (emphasis in 
TVM & PVM). 
12- Comprehensive inclination toward public administration service (emphasis in 
TVM&PVM). 
13- Key goals of the system: Achieving public values and enduring exaltation of the society 
(emphasis in TVM & PVM).  
As is concluded from the pre-mentioned characteristics, from the total thirteen 
characteristics of public value management, ten characteristics are seen in the integrated 
model, seven in the transcendental value management model, and two features of new 
public management have been reflected in the model. It should be bear in mind that there is 
no feature of traditional public administration (TPA) in the composing model. 
Therefore, with some indulgence, one can say that public value management model 
constitutes the main core of the integrated model (Transcend Value Management model). 
According to the exigency approach, there is no best model or approach; rather the 
optimum model appears and conceptualizes depending on the status quo. The public 
administration management model for implementing the government’s approach, including 
the 20-Year Vision or macro-policies, are not an exception to this rule. This model is 
effective and efficient only when it is designed and implemented in accordance with the 
needs of macro-policies at the government level and the status quo. 
Governments that are unable to foster their cognitive abilities and move on the 
excellence and exaltation path will face an obscure future that cannot make proper 
decisions and lead. Such governments will be reduced to dealing mainly with the day-to-
day problems of the society and cannot be successful in the global environment. 
The world today is in need of governments that have foresight and ponder about the 
proper procedures to meet the new needs of their people and have promoted the procedures 
of decision-making and implementation of decisions at different levels of management. 
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Government policies of the bygone era that still consider the masses as peasants and the 
government as lord, are simply irrelevant and incompatible with today’s environs. 
Governments across the globe need to garnish themselves with insignia of accountability, 
adherence to participation, rule of law, and ethical values to be able to recognize 
objectively the emerging demands of their people and deliver. 
As mentioned earlier, the 20-Year Vision has different targets. From these, it is essential 
to focus, for their realization, on government obligations to devise the desirable governance 
and make available the corresponding instruments. Based on the analysis of the key 
features of the Vision, government requirements for achieving the goals of the Vision are 
elaborated as follows: 
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Table 4-5: Government requirements for achieving the goals of the Iran Vision2025 
 
No. Characteristics of the Vision Government Requirements 
1 
Development in concord with cultural, 
geographical and historical exigencies and 
based on moral principles and Islamic, 
national and revolutionary values. Emphasis 
on religious democracy, social justice, 
legitimate freedoms, perseverance of 
generosity, human rights and social/ 
juridical security. 
- expansionism 
- adherence to participation 
- rule of law 
- adherence to security 
- inclined toward partnership 
- nationalism 
- fundamentalism 
- seeking justice 
- accountability &clarity 
- considering the voice of the people 
- upholding the people’s rights 
- focusing on citizens 
2 
Advancing knowledge, ability to produce 
science and technology, focus on bigger 
share of human resources and social capital 
in national production. 
- ability to advance knowledge 
- capable of producing science and 
technology. 
- based on intellectual human resources and 
social capital for national production. 
3 
Building a safe, independent and powerful 
nation with a defense system based on total 
deterrence and harmony between the people 
and government. 
- adherence to trust 
- adherence to independence 
- representativeness 
- dedication to service 
- adherence to security 
- inclined toward partnership 
4 
Access of all the people to healthcare, 
welfare, food security, social security, equal 
opportunities, fair distribution of income, 
healthy family, eliminating poverty, 
corruption and discrimination, and a safe 
environment. 
- welfare inclination &poverty 
- sustainable development 
- expansion of human resources 
- quality policymaking 
- parity and encompassing 
- fighting corruption 
- upholding meritocracy 
- inclined to establish family 
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Continued Table 4-5 
No. Characteristics of the Vision Government Requirements 
5 
 
Building a society that is active, responsible, 
altruist, religious and content, and uphold 
work ethics, discipline, cooperation and 
social compatibility, commitment to the 
Islamic Revolution, the ruling system and 
Iran’s progress, and is proud of being 
Iranian. 
 
- social responsibility 
- assurance 
- fostering self- confidence 
- adherence to participation 




Achieving the top rank in the economic, 
scientific & technological spheres in 
Southwest Asia (including Central Asia, the 
Caucasus, Middle East & the neighboring 
states) with emphasis on the movement of 
software and production of science, 
sustainable economic growth, relative 
increase in per capita income & full 
employment. 
 
- pioneering based on technology 
- creativity & innovation 
- sustainable development 
- inclination toward welfare 
- expansion of non - government sectors 
- promoting competitiveness 
7 
 
Inspiring the Islamic world by strengthening 
the model of religious democracy, viable 
development, moral society, and intellectual 
and social dynamism… and their 
effectiveness on Islamic and regional 
convergence based on Islamic teachings and 
the thoughts of Imam Khomeini. 
 
- adherence to morality 
- sustainable development 
- democracy (inclination to partnership, 
participation and people’s rights) 
- adherence to excellence 
- creativity & innovation 
- regional interaction 
8 
 
Promoting constructive and effective 
interaction/cooperation with the outside 
world based on the principles of dignity, 
wisdom & expediency. 
 
- global adherence to interaction 
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Applicable Recommendations 
Though the aforementioned features and the corresponding requirements imply 
constraints in the realization of good governance in Iran, however, they are not to the extent 
to render impossible the implementation of the new ideology of governance. Considering 
the nature of intra-government relations, and bearing in mind the important issue that Iran’s 
effective and viable presence on the global stage is subject to convergence with 
international institutions, the following recommendations are presented: 
1. Contrary to a single plan and goal that should be terminated at a specific time, good 
governance should be considered a long-term policy. 
2. As opposed to some response to a threat or a specific crisis, good governance should be 
accepted and upheld as an opportunity to reinvent governance. 
3.In determining what has to be changed premised on good governance, it is necessary that 
the relevant decisions be made with the involvement of the interested parties. Leadership 
of the transition from traditional governance to good governance should be the function 
of the representatives of interested groups. 
4. A mechanism should be created so that all the executive systems feel responsible for the 
realization of good governance, and the task not be delegated solely to the Managing 
and Planning Organization (MPO). 
5. Good governance should not be considered a course of action simply to evade the past 
(traditional governance), rather it should be intertwined with the 20-Year Vision. 
6. It should be ensured that all executive bodies are fully abreast of the goals of good 
governance and the policies to be pursued. Devising plans for improving the 
administrative system that are divergent must be avoided. 
7. Instead of wasting time and afterward pushing policies and plans for the betterment of 
society, the executive bodies must prepare for the realization of good governance via 
timely and appropriate strategic management. 
8. Instead of restricting good governance to an approach, a combination of widely used 
approaches should be made available in the context of the current situation of the 
country, and Islamic values should be taken into consideration as a regional model 
underpinning good governance. 
 
Conclusion 
All things considered, there is nothing new about good governance. Excellence in 
governance was proposed in the form of utopia in the ancient centuries. But in the new 
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format, it has been discussed and its key features have been revealed in the current century. 
It is worth mentioning that since good governance has become a prevailing abstract model 
in judging government performance, it is considered as a paradigm. Even though this 
management improvement model has partly been implemented in countries like Britain and 
The Netherlands, in some developing countries it is still considered “new”. Some 
commentators believe that good governance is a universal phenomenon moving and 
spreading from one country to another (Lam, 1996; Ridley, 1996). 
Against this attitude that the “good governance movement” is considered a new 
global paradigm, some authors believe that good governance is merely a transient 
management caprice (Abrahamson, 1991). Supporters of such an attitude believe that 
good governance will be a thing of the past when newer models emerge. Others argue 
that good governance will develop in order to be compatible with the requirements of 
managing the public administration (Kickert, 1997), as we have chosen an integrated model 
of this approach in Iran. 
As shown in Table 1, moving towards good governance is possible when there are 
enough national and international stimuli. If and when that happens, reconsidering the 
model of governance would indeed be necessary. Moving from the present governance 
architecture to good (ideal) architecture should be planned and implemented across the 
political, economic, judicial, and administrative ambiance in Iran in the context of the 20-
Year Vision with the help of an integrated public administration management model. 
 
To maintain the cohesion between this chapter and other parts of the research, chapter 
five aims to put to test the goals and objectives of a good governance's paradigm in the 
form of a sub-hypothesis consisted of several questions, in the framework of a 
questionnaire to be completed by a number of Iranian experts, involved in the Iranian 
planning and budgeting system, both at central (national) and regional (provincial) levels. 
To this end, the sub-hypothesis concerning the effects of decentralization on the 
country’s structural and management reform has been examined through 11 related 
questions, including the role of decentralization in such elements as: The optimal size of the 
government, battling corruption, politico-economic stability, public participation in the 
country’s executive affairs, government’s accountability, transparency in performance of 
public and state institutions and enhancement of state organizations’ efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
154   
Provided that the sub-hypothesis, as put forth in chapter five, is confirmed, chapter six 
will set out a number of proposals, aimed at proposing required amendments to current 
lawsand regulations in various scopes of Iranian Plan and Budget Code, as well as in 
financial and administrative regulations, related to Iran's planning and budgeting system. 
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Since this research is of a descriptive nature, and as was discussed in the methodology 
section of the first chapter, like most similar descriptive studies we resorted to interviews 
with, and presented questionnaires to, a group of informed people to collect data. To avoid 
any prejudgment and reliance on personal views and experiments on the concluding 
statement on the budgeting system in Iran, or proposing the creation of an effective 
budgeting order within the economic planning system in Iran, we got the opinion of experts 
with over 20 years of professional experience either in their own fields or with the state 
planning and budgeting system. In this part of the study, the experience and attitude of 
Iranian experts who have been actively involved in development budgeting at both the 
central (national and sectoral) and regional (provincial) levels has been examined. 
For this purpose, the group of experts with development planning and budgeting 
experience at the national and provincial levels has been identified. The samples consist of 
                                                 
1For this part of the research I'm beholden to my dear friend Dr. Tajgardoon, whom I appreciate for his kind 
collaboration and management.    
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two major subgroups. The first includes senior experts in national planning and budgeting 
who, as members of the central office of the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO), were 
actively involved  in the  preparation  of  national  development   plans   and 
budgets enacted in Iran over the past two decades. The second group consists of senior 
experts who have been either affiliated to the offices of governor generals or the provincial 
PBO bureaus and have been actively engaged in crafting provincial development plans and 
budgets required for implementing them. The questionnaires were filled out in face to face 
interview with the qualified candidates. 
At this stage of the research, on the basis of the main hypothesis of the research 
"sustainable (economic, political and social) development has not been achieved due to 
the lack of an effective central-regional development relationship" we completed 60 
questionnaires for provinces (total of 30 provinces) and 35 questionnaires for the national 
level (30 sectors). There are altogether 95 completed questionnaires each of which contains 
6 sub- hypotheses and 51 questions. Some took one full day to be completed and were 
returned to the researcher. Statistical samples selected for the study on the basis of Krejcie, 
Morgan and Cohen tables were given to 120 interviewees. To determine members of the 
statistical sample units, random sampling was used to reflect the list of PBO directors and 
managers after the 1979 Islamic Revolution who was available. The samples were selected 
by using random figures. 
The questionnaires contained 6 sub-hypothesis and each of them consisted of 4-12 
questions. The sub- hypothesis and related questions in the questionnaires were as follows: 
 
Questionnaire 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
Further to our meeting and negotiations, you are kindly requested to answer the 
following questions (please mark one of the five proposed alternative) with regard to the 
given sub- hypotheses and definitions of centralization and decentralization below. 
 
Definitions: 
Decentralization: The transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations and/or 
the private sector. 
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Centralization: The situation in which decision-making power is at the top of an 
organization and there is little delegation of authority. 
 
Sub- hypotheses: 
First Sub-hypothesis: There is a high tendency toward implementation of 
decentralization policy: 
1- In your opinion, to what extent the government tends to implement decentralized 
budgeting? 
2- In your opinion, to what extent the government and parliament tend to implement 
decentralized budgeting? 
3- In your opinion, to what extent provincial authorities are inclined to implement 
decentralized budgeting? 
4- In your opinion, to what degree are the national authorities willing to implement 
decentralized budgeting? 
5- In your opinion, to what extent the government and parliament together are willing to 
implement decentralized budgeting? 
6- In your opinion, to what extent is the central government willing to support regional 
decision-makers? 
7- In your opinion, to what extent has parliament enacted laws and regulations for 
proper implementation of decentralization policies? 
8- In your opinion, to what extent the government-public relationship in administration 
affairs has been defined in the laws and regulations? 
 
Second sub-hypothesis: Basic laws of the country should be reformed in favor of 
decentralization: 
9- In your opinion, to what extent can careful examination and charting of 
decentralization policy in budgeting help the government and the parliament move 
towards implementing the decentralization policies? 
10- In your opinion, to what extent is reforming the basic laws of the country necessary 
to better implement decentralization? 
11- In your opinion, to what extent has the lack of comprehensive and basic laws 
impeded implementation of decentralization? 
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12- In your opinion, to what extent could comprehensive legislation on 
decentralization be considered as a prerequisite to proper implementation of 
decentralization? 
 
Third Sub -hypothesis: Degree of decentralization among various phases of the country's 
budgeting is high: 
13- In your opinion, how far has existing decentralization been able to develop 
regional financial latitude? 
14- In your opinion, how far has the existing decentralization been able to improve the 
country's economic governance and monitoring? 
15- In your opinion, to what extent decentralization among various financial levels is 
institutionalized? 
16- In your opinion, to what extent laws and regulations governing decentralization 
have been defined in budget preparation? 
17- In your opinion, to what extent have laws for overseeing implementation of 
budgets in the regions on decentralized basis been defined? 
18- In your opinion, to what degree have the means of executing budget on 
decentralized basis in the region been defined? 
19- In your opinion, what is the extent of decentralization in preparing the budget 
within the government? 
20- In your opinion, what is the extent of decentralization in the process of budget 
approval? 
21- In your opinion, what is the scale of decentralization in executing the budget within 
the government? 
22- In your opinion, to what degree is the budget oversight decentralized? 
 
Forth Sub -hypothesis: Degree of coordination in various phases of budgeting is high: 
23- In your opinion, to what extent are laws and regulations in place for coordination 
between various national and provincial levels in the process of budgeting? 
24- In your opinion, what is the level of coordination required to enhance the means 
and latitude toward securing more financial resources? 
25- In your opinion, how far are volunteer organizations able and willing to secure the 
needs of the society in the regions? 
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26- In your opinion, to what extent have the modes of public participation in the 
administration of regional affairs been defined and specified? 
27- In your opinion, how far does coordination exist in the various phases of budgeting 
to implement a decentralization system? 
 
Fifth Sub- hypothesis: Positive effects of decentralization on structural reform and 
administration of the country is high: 
28- In your opinion, what would be the impact of decentralization on the optimum size 
of government? 
29- In your opinion, how would decentralization help curb bureaucratic corruption? 
30- In your opinion, to what extent decentralization may or may not affect political 
stability? 
31- In your opinion, to what extent decentralization may improve public-government 
relationship? 
32- In your opinion, how far can decentralization contribute to transparency of the 
information system (decision making)? 
33- In your opinion, to what extent would decentralization positively affect 
government responsiveness? 
34- In your opinion, to what extent can decentralization encourage the people’s 
participation in the better administration of the country? 
35- In your opinion, how could decentralization bring together service providers and 
receivers? 
36- In your opinion, to what extent decentralization can enhance public participation in 
the country’s executive affairs? 
37- In your opinion, to what extent can decentralization improve government 
effectiveness? 
38- In your opinion, to what degree can decentralization contribute to training qualified 
employees for regional management affairs? 
39- In your opinion, what would be the scale and scope of decentralization policy 
responsiveness to all government goals and programs? 
 
Sixth Sub-hypothesis: Positive impact of decentralization on better organizational 
management is high: 
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40- In your opinion, how effective is decentralization on better organization 
management? 
41- In your opinion, to what extent would decentralization help affect productivity in 
your organization? 
42- In your opinion, to what degree would decentralization affect efficiency in your 
organization? 
43- In your opinion, to what degree does decentralization affect the effectiveness of 
your organization? 
44- In your opinion, what would be the extent of the impact of decentralization on 
enhancing coordination in your organization? 
45- In your opinion, what would be the extent of the impact of decentralization on 
enhancing service delivery to the clients in your organization? 
46- In your opinion what would be the level of impact of decentralization on 
transparency of internal flow of information in your organization? 
47- In your opinion, to what degree can decentralization affect responsiveness of the 
officials in your organization? 
48- In your opinion, to what extent can decentralization help contribute to training and 
hiring qualified staff for your organization? 
49- In your opinion, to what extent would restricting the authority of the central 
government to advisory and oversight roles contribute to better management of your 
organization? 
50- In your opinion, to what extent can independence in accounting, budget, treasury 
and revenue earning help improve management in your organization? 
51- In your opinion, to what degree would higher delegation of authority to lower 
levels increase participation in implementing decentralization? 
 
Method of data analysis: 
In the first phase we prepared frequency distribution tables and graphs to describe 
statistical population from different points of view. By using the same method, each of the 
research and responses has been briefly described. In the presumptive section of the 
research, we used the single factor t test to examine the sub-hypotheses. Methods of the 
selected samples were determined by the respondents as (1) very low, (2) low, (3) average, 
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(4) high, and (4) very high. Due to the fact that the above mean score is 3, this figure was 
selected as the expected mean in the assumed target population. This test was performed at 
the 0.05 Alfa level. In this research, each sub-hypothesis is composed of a few questions. 
Due to the fact that each of the sub- hypotheses was a combination of questions, scores 
from 1 to 5 were assigned to the question options from very low to very high. The typical 
five-level Likert item was used in the form of the following table. In fact, the test aimed at 
the question of whether the responses by interviewees to our questions exceed the mean or 
less. 
Option Very low Low Average High Very high 
Spectrum 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Within the concept of Low, should the first sub-hypothesis be rejected, we may 
conclude that the respondents to those questions believed in more options, meaning that 
they were in favor. Therefore, the scale of the sub-hypothesis (the entire set of questions) 
has left the ordering scale and tuned into distance  scale, in  which  case  the  parametric 
test could be used to test the sub-hypothesis (the formula). On the basis of the above 
formula the calculated t has been compared with the t of the standard table with a degree of 
freedom of n-1 and the favored level of significance. If the calculated t was smaller than the 
t of the standard table with the favored degree of freedom, the sub-sub-hypothesis is then 
rejected. If it was bigger, the sub-hypothesis would be accepted. 
In the SPSS software, the calculated statistics is compared with the critical amount. 
Therefore, on the basis of the obtained level of significance out of these calculations, the 
sub-hypothesis could be adopted or rejected. In consideration of the single spectrum test, 
the critical amount stands on the right side of the curve. 
 
First Sub-hypothesis:There is a high tendency toward implementation of decentralization 
policy: 
By listing 8 questions it has been tried to test the first sub-hypothesis. The aggregate 
table of response to questions of first sub-hypothesis shows that the highest percentage of 
responses belongs to the average column with 33.91%. This means that on average, some 
34% of the respondents have chosen the mean as answer to questions of first sub-
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hypothesis. It seems that the general tendency among the respondents to questions of Issue 
1 has been 'mean' to 'low'. Only 24.41% of the respondents have chosen high and very high. 
The rest opted for low and very low as their response. This should mean that by choosing 
the mean-to-low option, the respondents believed that the tendency toward implementation 
of decentralized budgeting is not high.Furthermore, questions three and seven have been 
selected as the worst and best responses whose detailed information and analysis is as 
follows: 
Table 5-1: General Response to Questions in First Sub-hypothesis 
Question 















































1 10 10.5 27 28.4 37 38.9 19 20 2 2.1 95 
2 4 4.2 25 26.3 33 34.7 25 26.3 8 8.4 95 
3 2 2.1 6 6.3 6 6.3 38 40 43 45.3 95 
4 21 22.1 37 38.9 27 28.4 8 8.4 2 2.1 95 
5 8 8.4 31 32.6 42 44.2 12 12.6 2 2.1 95 
6 6 6.3 35 36.8 41 43.2 11 11.6 2 2.1 95 
7 13 13.7 39 41.1 38 40 5 5.3 0 0 95 
8 18 19.4 34 36.6 33 35.5 7 7.5 1 1.1 93 
Total 82 10.82 234 30.87 257 33.91 125 16.49 60 7.92 758 
 
Table 5-2: Responses to question 3, in your opinion, to what extent are provincial 
authorities inclined toward implementing decentralized budgeting? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 2 2.1 2.1 
Low 6 6.3 8.4 
Average 6 6.3 14.7 
High 38 40 54.7 
High Very 43 45.3 100 
Grand Total 95 100  
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As seen, the highest number of respondents has selected the very high component, 
whereas the least number represents the low component. The results illustrate that only 
14.7% of the respondents believed that the tendency among provincial authorities toward 
decentralized mode is average, low and very low. The rest believe in high tendency of 
provincial officials toward the policy of implementing decentralized budgeting. 
 
Table 5-3: Responses to question 7, in your opinion, to what extent has the Parliament 
passed legislation for implementing decentralization policies? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 13 13.7 13.7 
Low 39 41.1 54.7 
Average 38 40 94.7 
High 5 5.3 100 
High Very - -  
Grand Total 95 100  
 
The result shows that 94.7% of respondents believed that in very low, low and average 
level have laws and regulations for implementing decentralization been legislated. In other 
words, pertinent laws have not been passed by the legislature. More than 50% of the 
respondents have chosen the very low and low components. 
 
Conclusion of the first sub-hypothesis (There is a high tendency toward implementation 
of decentralization policy): 
 
Table 5-4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received for First Sub- hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation 
Standard deviation of the sample 
mean 
93 2.81 0.53 0.055 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
 -3.524 92 0 
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Taking into account the t as calculated on the basis of data provided in the above table 
whose value is -3,524, and the critical value on the right side of the curve, the t as 
calculated is much lower than the t of the standard table with the desirable degree of 
freedom. Therefore, this sub-hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Second Sub-hypothesis: Basic laws of the country should be reformed in favor of 
decentralization: 
As seen in table 5-5, responses to the questions of the second sub-hypothesis determine 
that the most frequently answers are in the High column. Some 46.84 percent have selected 
the answer High and 38.95 percent have selected Very high. None of the respondents chose 
the Very Low option. Only 5% favored the Low option. This should be interpreted that, by 
choosing High and Very High options, the respondents have supported the necessity of 
reforming the basic laws and conducting a comprehensive study of decentralization. 
Questions 10 and 11 are selected as the worst and best options. Detailed responses and 
their analysis related to these two questions are provided as a sample. 
 
 
Table 5-5: General Response to Questions in Issue II (Second Sub-hypothesis) 
Question 















































9 0 0 1 1.1 5 5.3 41 43.2 48 40.4 95 
10 0 0 1 1.1 5 5.3 38 40 51 53.7 95 
11 0 0 5 5.3 9 9.5 53 55.8 28 19.5 95 
12 0 0 12 12.6 16 16.8 46 48.4 21 22.1 95 
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Table 5-6: Responses to question 10, in your opinion, to what extent is reform of basic 
laws necessary to better implement decentralization policies? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 
Average 5 5.3 6.3 
High 38 40 46.3 
High Very 51 53.7 100 
Grand Total 95 100  
 
The outcomes indicate that as with the previous questions, some 93.7 percent of the 
respondents believed in a high and very high need for reforming the basic laws of the 
country to better implement decentralization policies. Only 6.3 percent of the respondents 
believed that there would be no need to reform the laws to achieve the same objective. 
 
 
Table 5-7: Responses to question 11, in your opinion, to what extent has the absence of 
basic laws impeded implementation of decentralization policies? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 
Average 5 5.3 6.3 
High 38 40 46.3 
High Very 51 53.7 100 
Grand Total 95 100  
 
The above results indicate that some 85.3 percent of the respondents believe in High and 
Very High options, meaning that decentralization in the country is impeded by the absence 
of comprehensive and basic laws. Only 14.7 percent who selected the Low and Average 
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Conclusion of the Second Sub-hypothesis: The basic laws of the country should be 
reformed in favor of decentralization: 
 
Table5- 8: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received for Second Sub -hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation 
Standard deviation of 
the sample mean 
95 4.20 0.52 0.053 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
22.636 94 0  
 
Taking into account the t as calculated on the basis of the data of the above table which 
is 22,636 and whose significant rate was zero, the above sub-hypothesis is acceptable. In a 
sense this sub-hypothesis is adopted with a high degree of certainty (almost 100 %). 
 
Third Sub-hypothesis:  Degree of decentralization among various phases of the country's 
budgeting is high: 
Questions 13 through 23 indicate opinion of the respondents on third sub-hypothesis. 
These questions discuss the degree of decentralization during the various phases of 
budgeting. The highest percent of responses related to the column Average with 39.19 
percent followed by the column Low. Responses illustrate the view that the respondents 
believe in low rate of decentralization in the budgeting system. 
As seen, only 15.56 percent of respondents are of the opinion that the extent of 
decentralization in budgeting is high. The rest believe that such extent is average, low and 
very low. Questions 13 and 15 have been selected as the best and worst alternatives. 
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Table 5-9: General Responses to the Questions of Third Sub-hypothesis 
Question 















































13 0 0 5 5.3 28 29.5 50 52.9 12 12.6 95 
14 7 7.4 48 51.1 28 29.8 10 10.6 1 1.1 94 
15 4 4.3 54 58.1 33 25.5 2 2.2 0 0 93 
16 6 6.3 38 40 47 49.5 4 4.2 0 0 95 
17 11 11.6 41 43.2 33 34.7 10 10.5 0 0 95 
18 11 11.6 44 46.3 37 38.9 3 3.2 0 0 95 
19 10 10.6 38 40.4 33 35.1 11 11.7 2 2.1 94 
20 13 14 33 35.5 36 38.7 7 7.5 4 4.3 93 
21 5 5.3 27 28.4 44 46.3 14 14.7 5 5.3 95 
22 8 8.4 24 25.3 51 53.7 12 12.6 0 0 95 
Total 75 7.94 352 37.29 370 39.19 123 13.03 24 2.54 944 
 
 
Table 5-10: Responses to question 13, in your opinion, to what extent has the existing 
decentralization policy been able to develop regional financial authority? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 5 5.3 5.3 
Average 28 29.5 34.7 
High 50 52.9 87.4 
High Very 12 12.6 100 
Grand Total 95 100  
 
The above table illustrates that some 87.4 percent of the respondents believed that 
decentralization has been able to further extent the regional financial authority, but only to 
an average, low and very low degree. Although the percent of respondents who have 
chosen the average option is only 52.6 percent, but the low percent of the respondents with 
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a high opinion (12.6 percent) indicates higher tendency toward low degree of 
decentralization. 
 
Table 5-11: Responses to question 15, in your opinion to what extent is decentralization 
among the various financial levels institutionalized? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 4 4.3 4.3 
Low 54 58.1 62.4 
Average 33 35.5 97.8 
High 2 2.2 100 
High Very 0 0 100 
Grand Total 93 100  
 
As per the previous question, some 97.8 percent of the respondents have selected the 
average, low and very low options in answering this question. Only 2.1 percent chose the 
high option. This is indicative of the fact that decentralization among various financial 
levels in the regions has not been institutionalized. 
 
Conclusion of the Third Sub-hypothesis: Degree of decentralization among various 
phases of the country's budgeting is high: 
 
Table 5-12: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received for Third Sub- hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation 
Standard deviation of 
the sample mean 
91 2.53 0.44 0.047 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
-10.092 90 0  
 
Taking tascalculatedon the basis of information in theabove table whosequantity is-
10,092,and as said in the sub-hypotheses test section, the critical amount is on the right side 
of  the curve, meaning that the t as calculated is less than the t of the standard table with a 
desirable degree of freedom, therefore, this sub-hypothesis is rejected. 
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Fourth Sub-hypothesis: Degree of coordination in various phases of budgetingis high: 
 
 
Table 5- 13: General Response to Questions in Fourth Sub-hypothesis 
Question 















































23 8 8.5 54 54.7 27 28.7 5 5.3 0 0 94 
24 11 11.7 55 58.5 25 26.6 3 3.2 0 0 94 
25 12 13 36 39.1 32 34.8 11 12 1 1.1 92 
26 30 31.9 46 48.9 16 17 2 2.1 0 0 94 
27 10 10.6 52 55.3 25 26.6 6 6.4 1 1.1 94 




Table 5-14: Responses to question 26, in your opinion, how far are the methods of public 
participation in administration of regional affairs defined and specified? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 30 31.9 31.9 
Low 46 48.9 80.8 
Average 16 17.1 97.9 
High 2 2.1 100 
High Very 0 0  
Grand Total 94 100  
 
Nearly 98% of the respondents have selected the average, low and very low options. The 
figure of 48.4 percent for the low option is indicative of disbelief on the part of respondents 
in the existence of specified definition of public participation in regional administration. 
Only 2.1 percent of the respondents have chosen the high option. 
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Table 5-15: Responses to question 27, in your opinion, what is the extent of coordination 
in various phases of budgeting to implement decentralization? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 10 10.6 10.6 
Low 52 55.3 66 
Average 25 26.6 92.6 
High 6 6.4 98.9 
High Very 1 1.1 100 
Grand Total 94 100  
 
In this question also almost 92.6 percent of the respondents have chosen the low and 
very low options. This should mean that 92.6 percent at the levels of average, low and very 
low believed in the existence of the necessary coordination in different phases of budgeting 
to implement the decentralized system.  
Conclusion of the Fourth Sub-hypothesis: Degree of coordination in various phases of 
budgeting is high: 
 
Table 5-16: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received forFourth Sub-hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation 
Standard deviation of 
the sample mean 
90 2.24 0.51 0.053 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
-14.216 89 0  
 
Taking into consideration the t as calculated on the basis of the data of the above table 
which is -14,216, and the critical amount on the basis of the significant rate of 99 percent 
and the desirable degree of freedom of (89), equals 2.6, therefore t as calculated is much 
smaller than the t in the standard table with the desired degree of freedom. For these 
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Fifth Sub-hypothesis: Positive effects of decentralization on structural reform and 
administration of the country is high: 
Questions 28 through 39 indicate the effects of decentralization on structural reform and 
better administration of the country. The highest option selected by the respondents is the 
high option. 50.75 percent of the respondents on average believe that effects of 
decentralization on structural reform and administration of the country are high. The very 
high is the next option chosen by the respondents. This is on the condition that less than 
one percent of respondents on average have chosen the very low option and only 3/5 
percent chose the low option. As such, respondents have expressed their opinion in a way 
that decentralization has a very positive impact on structural reform and better 
administration. 
 
Table 5-17: General Responses to Questions in Fifth Sub-hypothesis 
Question 















































28 3 3.2 4 4.2 11 11.6 49 51.6 28 29.5 95 
29 3 3.2 9 9.5 21 22.1 40 42.1 22 23.2 95 
30 0 0 10 10.8 18 19.4 45 48.4 20 21.5 93 
31 0 0 5 5.3 10 10.5 49 51.6 31 32.6 95 
32 0 0 3 3.2 14 14.9 45 47.9 32 34 94 
33 1 1.1 2 2.1 11 11.6 50 52.6 31 32.6 95 
34 1 1.1 2 2.1 8 8.4 48 50.5 36 37.9 95 
35 1 1.1 0 0 5 5.3 53 55.8 36 37.9 95 
36 2 2.1 0 0 12 12.6 52 54.7 29 30.5 95 
37 0 0 2 2.1 16 16.8 54 56.8 23 24.2 95 
38 0 0 1 1.1 13 13.7 46 48.4 35 36.8 95 
39 0 0 2 2.1 34 35.8 46 48.4 13 13.7 95 
Total 11 0.97 40 3.52 173 15.22 577 50.75 336 29.55 1137 
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Table 5-18: Responses to question 35, in your opinion, to what extent can 
decentralization bring service providers and receivers closer? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 10 10.6 10.6 
Low 52 55.3 66 
Average 25 26.6 92.6 
High 6 6.4 98.9 
High Very 1 1.1 100 
Grand Total 94 100  
 
The above statistics show that close to 93.7 percent believe in the high and very high 
options that decentralization can draw service providers and receivers closer together. Only 
6.3 percent of the respondents believe that decentralization does not have such a great 
impact. 
 
Table 5-19: Responses to question 39, in your opinion, to what extent can 
implementation of decentralization policy respond effectively to all government objectives 
and programs? 
 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 
Average 34 35.8 37.9 
High 46 48.4 86.3 
High Very 13 13.7 100 
Grand Total 95 100  
 
The above information shows that despite a decline in the percentage of respondents of 
high and very high options of the previous few questions, the final outcome of the table 
indicates that 62.1 percent of the respondents believe in the high and very high degree of 
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effectiveness of this policy toward achievement of all government goals and programs. The 
share of 35.8 percent opting for the average option is also considerable. 
Conclusion of the Fifth Sub-hypothesis: Positive effects of decentralization on structural 
reform and administration of the country is high: 
 
Table 5-20: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received for Fifth Sub- hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation Standard deviation of the sample mean 
89 4.12 0.49 0.052 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
21.633 88 0  
 
Taking into consideration that the t as calculated on the basis of data of the above table 
which is 21,633 and that its significant rate was zero, the above sub-hypothesis is 
acceptable. In other words, this sub-hypothesis is adopted with a high rate of certainty 
(nearly 100%). 
 
Sixth Sub-hypothesis: Positive impact of decentralization on better organizational 
management is high: 
Issue six deals with better management of the organization. Questions 40 thorough 51 
explain this issue. Similar to fifth sub-hypothesis, the highest percentage of responses 
reflects the high option followed by the very high option. 
Some 83% of the respondents on average have selected the high and very high option 
and less than 3% believe in the low and very low options. In a sense, all the respondents 
believed that decentralization has high and very high impact on better organization. 
Questions 49 and 51 have been selected as the worst and best responses whose details and 
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Table 5-21: General Response to Questions in Issue VI, (Sixth Sub-hypothesis) 
Question 















































40 1 1.1 0 0 9 9.6 61 64.9 23 24.5 94 
41 0 0 1 1.1 12 12.6 57 60 25 26.3 95 
42 0 0 1 1.1 8 8.4 57 60 29 30.5 95 
43 0 0 1 1.1 9 9.6 56 59.6 28 29.8 94 
44 0 0 1 1.1 21 22.1 44 46.3 29 30.5 95 
45 0 0 1 1.1 9 9.5 50 52.6 35 36.8 95 
46 1 1.1 2 2.1 20 21.11 38 40 34 35.8 95 
47 0 0 4 4.1 11 11.6 47 49.5 33 34.7 95 
48 0 0 2 2.1 23 24.2 41 43.2 29 30.5 95 
49 0 0 8 8.5 22 23.4 42 44.7 22 23.4 94 
50 0 0 3 3.2 16 17 50 53.2 25 26.6 94 
51 0 0 4 4.3 5 5.4 50 53.8 34 36.6 93 
Total 2 0.18 28 29.47 165 14.55 593 52.29 346 30.51 1134 
 
Table 5-22: Responses to question 49, in your opinion, to what extent would constraining 
the authority of the central government to advisory and oversight roles contribute to 
better management of your organization? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 8 8.5 8.5 
Average 22 23.4 31.9 
High 42 44.7 76.6 
High Very 22 33.4 100 
Grand Total 94 100  
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The outcomes show that 68.1 percent of the respondents believed that if the authority of 
the central government be limited to advisory and oversight roles it would highly or very 
highly contribute to better organization management. 31.9 percent of respondents evaluated 
this issue at an average and low rate. 
 
Table 5-23: Responses to question 51, in your opinion, to what extent would delegation 
of authority to lower levels increase participation in the implementation of a 
decentralization policy? 
Description Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low 0 0 0 
Low 4 4.3 4.3 
Average 5 5.4 9.7 
High 50 53.8 63.4 
High Very 34 36.6 100 
Grand Total 93 100  
 
Outcome of the above table shows that nearly 90.3 percent who selected the high and 
very high options believed that extra delegation of authority to lower levels increases 
participation in implementation of decentralization at a high and very high rate. Whereas 
9.8 percent maintained that the effect of delegation of authority on higher participation in 
implementing such a policy would be average and low. 
Conclusion of the Sixth Sub-hypothesis: Positive impact of decentralization on better 
organizational management is high. 
 
Table5-24: Mean and Standard Deviation of Data Received for Sixth Sub- hypothesis 
Number Mean Standard deviation 
Standard deviation of 
the sample mean 
92 4.05 0.54 0.056 
t Degree of Freedom Significant rate  
18.771 91 0  
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Taking into consideration the t as calculated on the basis of information given in the 
above table which is 18,771 and that the significant rate is zero, the above sub-hypothesis is 
accepted. In other words, this sub-hypothesis is acceptable with a high rate of certainty. 
 
Table 5-25: Summary of the Outcome of the Sub-hypotheses Tests 
Number Title of Sub-hypotheses Test Result 
1 




Basic laws of the country should be reformed in favor of 
decentralization 
Sub-hypothesis confirmed 
3 Extent of decentralization in various phases of budgeting Sub-hypothesis rejected 
4 Degree of coordination in various phases of budgeting Sub-hypothesis rejected 
5 












The results achieved from questionnaires demonstrate that the majorities of respondents 
believe to:  
1- Provincial authorities appreciate decentralized planning and budgeting policies. 
2- The necessary rules and regulation for real decentralization has not approved by 
parliament. 
3- Degree of decentralization in budgeting system of the country is low. 
4- If appropriate decentralization takes place, regional's financial latitude will be 
developed. 
5-  There is no sign of institutionalization of different financial level in provinces. 
6- There are many uncoordinated activates in different levels of budgeting system. 
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8- Implementation of decentralized budgeting system requires coordination in all 
budgetary process. 
9- Decentralization carry better effect on modification of structure and administrative 
of the country. 
10- Decentralization can proximate deliverers and receivers of services. 
11- Implementation of decentralized policies has the potential of responsiveness to 
goals and programs of government. 
12-  Decentralization will have significant effects on better management of 
government's institutions. 
13- Devolution of power to lower part of regional authorities leads to more participation 
in implementation of decentralized policies.   
 
Other Considerations: 
A survey of the qualification of respondents to questionnaires shows that 22% hold 
bachelor degree, 67% masters degree and 7% have PhDs. Executive experience of the 
respondents found that almost 11% have experience below 10 years, 8% between 10-15 
years, 30% between 15-20 years, 29% enjoy experience of 20-25 years, and 20% have 30 
years of professional experience. 
Classification of respondents according to their place of service, shows that 45% have 
work experience in the provinces, 30% in the central government, and 24% have worked 
for both, the provinces and the central government. 
Although, in the first part of this chapter, I have concluded the result of research sub-
hypothesis, but due to the expansive spectrum of questions in the questionnaire, 
familiarization with other respondents to the questions can help us in compiling a better 
analysis in the coming chapters. Thus, to facilitate the answers given to 51 questions in the 
questionnaire, I have summarized the response percentage for each question according to 
the value assigned to each option from very low to very high which are shown in Table 26. 
As shown in this table, 39% of the respondents have marked the options of very low and 
low to question 1 that is “to what extent the government tends to implement decentralized 
budgeting”. For question 2, tendency of the parliament toward implementing decentralized 
budgeting, the majority of respondents opted for average, which means those in charge of 
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budgeting, including the elected representatives of the people, are unconcerned and 
unenthusiastic about decentralized budgeting. 
In question 3, in which the extent of provincial authorities’ tendency to implement 
decentralized budgeting was asked, more than 85% of the respondents marked the options 
of high and very high. However, 61% selected the options of very low and low for question 
4 which asked about the tendency of national authorities willing to embrace decentralized 
budgeting. 
In question 5 that asked about the joint willingness of the government and parliament to 
implement decentralized budgeting, 41% of the respondents selected the options of very 
low and low, and 44% marked the "average" option. Regarding question 6 “the degree of 
consent of the central government to support regional decision-makers,” barley 13.7% of 
respondents chose the options of high and very high. In short, the majority of respondents 
believe the government is non- supportive in this regard. 
Response to question 7, which asked to what extent the parliament has passed legislation 
for effective implementation of decentralization policies, was only 5% high, and 55% low 
and very low. Question 8 had a similar fate as 64% of the respondents recognized the 
options of low and very low when asked about the degree of government-public 
relationship in the administration of the country’s affairs as defined by law. 
Question 9, which asked about the degree of careful examination and the charting of 
decentralization policy in budgeting, which helps the government and parliament in 
implementing decentralization policies, 93% of the respondents, marked the options high 
and very high. This means that the decentralized budget policies lack intellectual depth and 
are not based on expertise survey or research. 
In response to question 10, asking about the necessary reform to basic law to better 
implement decentralized policies; more than 93% opted for the high and very high options. 
Likewise, for question 11, “to what extent lack of comprehensive and basic laws impede 
decentralization”, 85% chose the options of high and very high. 
Almost 70% of the respondents ticked the high and very high options to question 12, which 
emphasizes the prerequisite of comprehensive and binding laws on decentralization for 
meaningful implementation of decentralization. 
On question 13, “how far the existing decentralization has been able to develop regional 
financial authorization”, 12.6% chose the high option, 53% opted for average option, and 
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35% settled for the low and very low options. Response to the question on how far has the 
existing decentralization policy been able to improve the country’s auditing and monitoring 
system is negative, as more than 58% of the respondents chose the options of low and very 
low while only 11.7% ticked high and very high. This means that these policies lack appeal 
and are weak and ineffective. 
On question 15, “is decentralization among various financial levels institutionalized” the 
majority of respondents (62.4%) said low and very low. Answers to question 16, “to what 
extent are laws and regulations governing decentralization defined in budget preparation”, 
were 4.2% high, 49% low and very low, and close to 50% marked the average option. This 
means according to their views, basically there is no compelling view of this key issue in 
Iran’s budgeting laws. 
About 58% of the respondents to question 17, “to what extent are laws and regulations 
defined for overseeing the implementation of budgets in the regions on a decentralized 
basis,” ticked the low and very low options and only 4% believed in the high option. The 
34.7 percentage voted to option 3(the average) cannot change the analysis that decisions 
taken for laws and regulations needed for a decentralized budgeting system are weak and 
ineffective. 
Respondents to questions 18-22 which were designed to ascertain the degree of 
decentralization at different levels of budget preparation chose options similar to questions 
16 and 17, and majority of them marked the low and very low options. 
Regarding question 23, in which I asked about laws and regulations for coordination 
between national and provincial levels in the process of budgeting, 66% of the respondents 
chose the low and very low side. 
In question 24 “to what extent does coordination exist to enhance the means and 
latitudes towards securing more financial resources”, 70% marked low and very low. 
Respondents to questions 25, 26 and 27 which refer to role of volunteer organizations in 
securing the needs of society, modes of public participation in administration of regional 
affairs, and coordination needed for various phases of budgeting, a majority of the 
respondents by selecting the low and very low options, made known their dissatisfaction 
with the centralized budgeting system. 
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Responses to questions 28-39, which were asked for the Fifth Sub-sub-hypothesis of this 
research, namely the effect of decentralization on modification of government structure and  
better  administrative  affairs,  show  that 81.2% of the  respondents  believed  in  the 
high and very high options regarding the effect of decentralization on optimum size of 
government (question 28), and 65.2% marked the high and very high options on the effect 
of decentralization on curbing bureaucratic corruption (question 29). 
Similarly, 69.9% of respondents marked the options high and very high for question 30, 
which asked whether or not decentralization can lead to more political stability. 
More than 84% of the respondents to question 31 ticked high and very high which indicates 
the effect of decentralization in improving public-government relationship. More than 82% 
of the respondents attested to the effect of decentralization on transparency of the 
information system, by choosing the high and very high options (question 32). 
Regarding the very important question 33, “effect of decentralization on government 
responsiveness”, 85% of the respondents supported the high and very high options. For 
question 34 which asks about the effect of decentralization on boosting the people’s 
participation in better administration of the country, 88% selected the high and very high 
options. 
As the percentage in Table 26 shows, the majority of respondents to questions 35, 36, 
37, 38 and 39 chose the high and very high options. They acknowledged decentralization as 
a way of bringing people closer, encouraging greater public participation, improving 
government effectiveness, hiring qualified people in the regions, and its responsiveness to 
all government goals and programs. 
In the Sixth Sub-hypothesis regarding the effect of decentralization on better 
organizational management, 12 questions were asked. The quality of responses underscores 
the compulsion of permanently doing away with the present centralized budgeting 
bureaucracy and moving toward a functioning decentralized system. 
For instance, in question 40 about 89% of the respondents chose the options of high and 
very high for the effect of decentralization on better organization management. In question 
41 regarding the effect of decentralization on productivity, 89% selected the high and very 
high options. 
For questions 42- 48 which inquires the effect of decentralization on efficiency, better 
service delivery, transparency of internal flow of information in organizations, 
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responsiveness of officials of organizations, and training and hiring qualified staff in the 
regions, similar percentages can be seen in the table. In some instances, close to 90% of the 
respondents selected the high and very high possibility. 
More than 68% of the respondents marked high and very high for question 49 regarding 
the effect of restricting the authority of the central government to advisory and oversight 
roles on improving governance. 
Our question about the effect of independency in accounting, budget treasury and 
revenues on better management, resulted in 79.8% of respondents selecting high and very 
high options. In other words, almost 80% of planning and budgeting experts we questioned 
for this research believe the provinces should be allowed more freedom and independence 
in the financial affairs of their regions, and should be responsible to the central government 
only for the results of their actions and decisions or the lack of it. 
The last question of this questionnaire was about the effect of delegating higher 
authority to lower levels on better participation in implementing decentralization policies. 
To this query 90% selected the high and very high options. 
Details of the percentage and accumulated percentage of each question can be reviewed 


















The sixth and final chapter of this research presents the conclusion and suggests 
appropriate policies for methods for improving budget allocations, and also recommends a 
mechanism for a fair distribution of funds to help alleviate poverty and enhance 
development indices in Iran. 
As mentioned in the second and third chapters of the research, the pattern of change in 
the planning and budgeting system in Iran and intensive centralization of the planning 
process have, inter alia, resulted in imbalanced and uneven development. Moreover, a 
significant disparity in development indicators in various regions across the country is 
obvious. Results from field studies, including interviews and questionnaires filled by 
experts and leading scholars involved in planning and budgeting in Iran, the conclusions of 
which were closely reviewed in chapter five, underpin the crucial need for rewriting the 
planning and budgeting system in tandem with a decentralized framework. To this end the 





-  The government and parliament in Iran noticeably are averse to the much-needed 
decentralized approach in budgeting despite the fact that both institutions often 
emphasize the belief in and disposition to decentralization. 
- It is essential that laws be reformed to promote decentralization and achieve its declared 
objectives. 
-  The degree of decentralization in the various phases of budgeting is simply unimpressive. 
In short, decentralization in the process of preparing, compiling, ratifying, implementing 
and supervising budgets is miniscule. 
-  Decentralization can and will lead to reforming the administrative and executive structure 
and render them more effective and efficient. 
 
The sheer aversion of senior officials notwithstanding, which is largely because of 
vested interests, experts across the board stress the fundamental need for: reforming the 
governing laws and regulations, meaningful coordination in the budgeting process, and 
increasing the level of decentralization in the different phases of budgeting. The strong 
belief in and support for such measures among experts, in particular those closely involved 
in the planning and budgeting process, further demonstrates the necessity of introducing a 
new administrative order for the intricate task of balanced budgeting. 
 
Guidelines for Revising rules Relevant to the Planning and Budgeting System 
The following pages explain the rules and regulations of managing administrative affairs 
of the country, mainly those related to planning, budgeting, centralization and 
decentralization. A review of the articles of the Iranian Constitution dealing with the 
budgeting process shows that the preparing and compiling phase is a single-tier undertaking 
with some narrow space for decentralization. 
The ratification phase of the budget is completely centralized wherein the legislature 
enjoys immense power. The implementation phase, however, is decentralized to a certain 
degree but yet not what is desired (according to our conclusion based on the completed 
questionnaires). Due to the inflexible centralized executive system, although the regional 
(provincial) authority is recognized by law, the state has been unable and/or unwilling to 




The supervision phase, like in most other countries, has a considerable decentralized 
component. Tables 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3 outline important features related to the budgeting 
process as enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. 
 
Table 6-1: Articles in the Constitution Regarding the Budgeting Process 
Subject Article Content 
Compilation of the budget 
by the government 6 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran affairs of the country 
should be managed based on public vote (democratic 
administration). 
Ratification of the budget by 
parliament. 52 
The executive branch (government) prepares the budget 






Government collects all the revenues and deposits it with 
the state treasury. All payments are made in the 
framework of ratified outlays based on law (centralized 
financial income). 
Authority of the executive 
power of the president 60 
Activities of the Government through the president and 
the cabinet. 
Role of public institutions in 
supervision 102 
High Provincial Councils can present projects to the 
parliament (within its jurisdiction). 
Responsibility of the head of 
the executive branch 122 
The president, within the confines of his jurisdiction, is 
responsible to the people, the supreme leader and the 
parliament (accountability). 
Responsibility for plan and 
budget 126 
The president is responsible for planning, budgeting, 
administrative and recruitment affairs 
(responsiveness),and can revolute these responsibilities to 
others. 
Accountability of ministers 137 Every minister is responsible for his/her particular duties before the president and parliament (accountability). 
 
 
Table 6- 2: Articles of the Audit Law Relevant to Budgeting 




11 All government revenues are centralized and should be deposited with the treasury. 
Financial and operational 
supervision 90 
Overall financial supervision is the function of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance and operational 







Table 6- 3: Articles of the General Audit Law 
Subject Article Content 
Financial supervision 1 
Establishment of the General Audit Organization to 
oversee financial operations, inspect and audit the 
expended funds and incomes, and prepare the budget 
report. 
Activities of the legislative 
branch in supervision 90 
The General Audit Organization operates under the 
auspices of the parliament 
 
To help get a better grasp and understanding of the present status of the budgeting 
process, I have illustrated it in picture 6-1 in terms of centralization and its degree in the 
main executive and financial dimensions. The Constitution, the Audit Law, Plan and 
Budget Law, and Five-Year Development Plan Laws are the governing laws on which the 
budgeting process is indeed founded. 
Thus, from the constitutional point of view and the executive and financial dimensions, 
despite having enough capacity (to transfer authority to lower and junior levels), the 
country is saddled with an administration system that is rigorous, inflexible and overtly 
centralized. If and when there are some small exceptions to this ‘rule’ they are few and far 
between. 
This dire situation is conspicuous in the last Five-Year Economic Development Plan. As 
the diagram shows, in General Audit Law, the degree of decentralization is high, and 
despite the possibility of delegating some affairs, the issue has not received the attention it 
deserves. To be able to move away from the bloated centralized system in the key 
executive and financial sectors, particularly with respect to the budgeting process, it is 
crucial to present a workable model that espouses the capabilities and potentials enshrined 
in the Constitution. 
Picture 6-2 shows the situation in terms of centralization and its degree in the governing 
laws. It is amply clear that no effort has been made over decades to amend the Constitution 
to be able to produce and present the desired model. This lack of will and enthusiasm 
should be considered from two perspectives: 
First, the process of amending the Constitution is arduous, not to mention that it is almost 
impossible. Second, by revising some parts of the Constitution, there is the possibility of 
their substitution with dissimilar choices with the corresponding outcome being far from 
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what is needed and desired. Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that the Constitution 
will remain unchangeable and that its unexploited capacities can and should be drawn upon 
to revise laws in the search for effective decentralization with emphasis on budget outlays. 
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Picture 6-1: Budgeting process from the vantage point of centralization and its degree (Present Status) 
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Suggested Amendments to the Law and its Impact on the Budgeting Process 
This part of the research, based on my experience in the planning and budgeting process 
in Iran as well as result derived from completed questionnaires, proposes changes in laws 
relevant to the budgeting process that could help reconstruct a decentralized central-
provincial government relationship. 
As recognized in compiling of the questionnaires and hypothesis test, plan and budget 
experts and directors are of the opinion that there is simply no coordination in and among 
the different phases of budgeting. Therefore, effort has been made to consolidate and 
combine the suggestions to help enhance the much-needed coordination. Also, to evaluate 
each proposed change, I have tried to assess the changes based upon the four main 
characteristics of decentralization, namely: economic and technical efficiency (increase), 
administrative corruption (decrease), avoiding further expansion of the government, and 
lastly, enhancing political stability. These are the four main criteria for assessing the 
proposed changes to the law to reach the desired level of decentralization in executive and 
financial affairs. 
In this method, a set of activities is transferred from the central government and 
affiliated organizations to the provincial authorities and local power will then increase and 
become responsible. This move, among other things, will encourage motivation to boost 
revenues in the provinces and improve accountability in government bodies. 
 
Prerequisites for the Implementation of the Proposals 
Prior to explaining the model and its effects, it is essential to briefly outline the 
prerequisites for the success of the proposed model. These can be summed up as follows: 
 
1- Revising the relevant laws. 
2- Delegating sizeable tasks of the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) to 
executive bodies. 
3- Agreements between the MPO and executive bodies within the framework of action 
plans. 
4-Only the Provincial Planning and Development Council submits the provincial plan of 
action and headquarters makes no changes to the budget related to provincial executive 
organizations. 
5- Provincial earnings in the entirety (minus oil) should be deposited with the provincial 
treasury and the central government should assist the provinces only from oil export 
revenues. 
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Proposed Amendments to Laws and Regulations 
The first governing law is the Plan and Budget Law that was passed by the parliament in 
1972. Changes are proposed in the executive and financial aspects of this 40-year-old piece 
of legislation. 
 
Table 6- 4: Proposed Changes to the Plan and Budget Law (Executive Dimension) 
Phase Change Impact 
Providing and com
piling 




Issue: Submitting the proposed 
budget of executive bodies to the 




Regarding this article it must be 
noted that local executive bodies 
submit their budget proposals to the 
provincial organization and after 
that the PBO receives all the 
proposals for survey. 
 
Article 14: 
Issue: Approval of the proposed 
budget of executive bodies by 
ministers or the highest authority 
therein. 
Change: 
The budgets of all provincial 
executive bodies should be 
approved by the Provincial 
Planning Council (PPC). 
A: 
- Productivity will 
increase 
- Financial incentive will 
increase 








- Proximity of those 
receiving and delivering 
the service will increase 
- Precise and transparent 
information system will 
increase 







Delegating authority to 
junior levels will increase 
Government  




- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- People’s participation 
will increase 
- Giving authority to the 
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Semi-centralized to decentralized 
 
Article 24: 
Issue: Defintion of financial 
resources, resource, 
 
centralization and its approval. 
 
Article 9: 
Issue: Approval of general 
executive plans by parliament. 
 
Change: 
Endorsement of the general 
executive plans of local executive 
bodies should be assigned to the 
PPC. 
Article 19: 
Issue: Notification of the budget 
of executive bodies by the prime 
minister (now president). 
Change: As mentioned in the 
proposed amendments, in which 
the provincial budget is compiled 
and approved independently, it is 
necessary to make corrections by 
clarifying that funding for the 
provinces’ executive bodies 
should be notified by the PBO’s 
provincial offices. 
Article 30: 
Issue: Establishment of the 
Allocation Committee. 
Change: 
 With regard to delegating 
financial authority to the 
provincial level, the income and 
expenditure of provinces should 
be adjusted. Therefore, the 
Allocation Committee should be 
redefined with a new mandate and 
exercise higher authority to be 
able to fulfill its responsibilities. 
 
A: 
-The financial incentives of 
the regions will increase 
- Decision-making time will 
decrease 








-Proximity of those receiving 
and delivering service will 
increase 
-Open and transparent 
information system will 
increase 
-Level of government 








Delegating authority to junior 
levels will increase 





- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- People’s participation will 
increase 










-Regions financial incentives 
will increase 
- Decision-making time will 
increase 
- Productivity will increase 
Economic  
andtechnical 




- Proximity of those receiving 
and delivering service will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 
information system will 
increase 
- Degree of government 







Delegating authority to junior 
levels will increase 
 





Continue Table 6-4 
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- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- People’s participation will 
increase 
- Giving authority 






Centralized to Semi-centralize 
 
Article 34: 
 Issue: Supervision of 
development projects and 
activities from the viewpoint of 
evaluation and adjustability of 
results with goals of budget. 
 
Change: 
 With respect to delegating 
selected authority to the 
provinces, there is need to 
enhance the supervisory role of 
the provincial PBOs in 
authorizing projects and 
development issues that by 
extension would improve 
accountability and transparency. 
A: 
- Productivity will increase 








- Open and Transparent  
information system will 
increase 
- Level of government 




 will decrease 
 
C: 
Power delegation to junior 
levels will increase 
Government 
 size  
 will increase 
D: 
Institutional and legal 





The suggested changes in the phase of controlling planning and budgeting law i.e. article 
34 lead to an increase in the productivity, and also devolution of more authority to lower 
levels which in turn results in an increase in the accountability of the authorities and 
establishment of institutional and legal frameworks. From the financial point of view, 
making the suggested changes in the aforementioned law and specially articles 18, 24, 30, 
35, and 36 (table 6-5) in the development, compilation, ratification, implementation and 
control phase, leads to an increase in economic and technical efficiency, and political 
stability and a decrease in administrative corruption. Lack of precision in thorough and 
proper implementation of the suggested legal changes and policies can result in the 
enlargement of the government. 
Continue Table 6-4  
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Table 6- 5: Proposed Changes to the Plan and Budget Law and its Impact on the 
Financial Dimension 









Issue: Preparing the budget 
bill in observance of Article 




It should be recognized that 
the provincial PBO is 
responsible for scrutinizing 
and securing the proposed 
budgets of executive bodies 
before submission to the 
Planning Council and 
upholding Article 26 of the 
General Audit Law. 
A: 
- Financial incentive of 
the provinces will 
increase 
- Decision-making time 
will decrease 









- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 
information system will 
increase 
- Proximity of those 
receiving and delivering 
service will increase 
Administrative 
Corruption will decrease 
C: 
- Power delegation to 




Size will increase 
While lacking supervision 
 
D: 
- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- Giving authority to the 












Issue: Determining financial 
resources, resource 
A: 
- Financial incentives of 
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Phase Change Impact 




Since the objective is to 
move away from 
centralization to relative 
semi-centralization, it is 
necessary to add the term 
‘provincial treasury’ to this 
article to facilitate funding. 
B: 
- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 
information system will 
increase 
- Proximity of the 
deliverers and receivers of 
service will increase 
 
Administrative 
Corruption will decrease 
 
C: 
- Power delegation to 





Size will increase 
D: 
- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- Giving authority to the 
















It is necessary to mention 
and emphasize the office of 
the Provincial Budget 
Allocation Committee in 
the law. 
 
It is expected that by recognizing subtle changes in some 
laws and regulations, coordination and collaboration would 
improve in and among the different phases of budgeting. 
Supervision 




Issue: To oblige executive 
bodies to send all the 
 
A: 
- Decision-making time 
will decrease 
- Productivitywill increase 
 
Technical  
efficiency will increase 
Continue Table 6-5 
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Phase Change Impact 
required information to the 
provincial PBO offices. 
 
Change: 
 With respect to delegating 
tasks to the provinces, it is 
essential to specify that 
local and national executive 
bodies in the framework of 
their obligations are 
responsible for providing all 
the information the 





- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 






Issue: Obligation of the 
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance to submit to the 
PBO information related to 
payments. 
Change: 
 It should be binding on the 
treasury in the provinces to  
send all such  information 
to the provincial PBOs. 
C: 
- Power delegation to 
junior levels will increase 
- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase. 
 
D: 
- Power delegation to the 














In table 6-6 the recommended changes in the enforcement phase of the national audit 
law and the consequences thereto can be seen. The changes in articles 33 and 39 of this 
law, which presumes the excellent control of financial measures of the country, aim at an 
increase in the authority and tasks of the provincial treasury which in turn results in a faster 
decision-making process, further increase in productivity, higher motivation to equip the 
financial resources in provinces, better accountability and a more transparent information 







Continue Table 6-5 
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Table 6- 6: Proposed Changes to the  Public Audit Law and its Impact on the 
Implementation Dimension 








Issue: responsibility of the treasury in 




It is necessary that provincial revenues 
be accumulated and centralized in the 
provincial treasury. 
A: 
-Financial incentives of 
the provinces will 
increase 
- Decision- making time 
will decrease 









- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 
information system will 
increase 
 






Issue: Depositing national revenues 
with the national treasury. 
Change: 
Permissions should be granted to have 
provincial revenues deposited into 
provincial treasury accounts. 
C: 
- Power delegation to 
junior levels will increase 
 
Government 




- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
- Participation of the 




 will increase 
 
Supervision 
Centralized  to    semi-centralized 
 
Issue: Setting up the Supreme Audit 
Organization in the provinces. 
 
Change: 
In respect of empowering the 
 provinces it would be essential to 
establish provincial audit bodies 
having the power and authority to  
demand, on a regular basis, reports 
from the treasury and executive 
A: 
- Decision making-time 
will decrease 








- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 




 will decrease 
C: 
- Power delegation to 
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Phase Change Impact 
bodies,  
and also establish advisory councils in 
the provinces. 
D: 
- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
Political 
Stability 
 will increase 
 
From the executive point of view, the suggestion provided for articles 11, 14, 12, 68, and 
101 of the audit law (table 6-7) underlie the establishment of provincial treasury accounts, 
description of exclusive revenues formation of consultative boards which can lead to a 
faster decision-making process, more productivity, better accountability and more public 
participation in the process of planning and budgeting of the regions which constitutes a 
key factor in a decentralized planning system.  
 
Table 6-7: Proposed Changes to Audit Law and its Impact on the Financial Dimension: 
 









Issue: centralization of 
government revenues and 




permission should be granted to 
the provincial treasury to open 
its own accounts in order to 
have government revenues 
deposited into the accounts. 
 
Issue: defining allocated 




Granting permission to allow the 
so-called allocated revenues to 
each province. At the same time 
revenue allocated costs should 
be incorporated into law. 
A: 
- Financial incentives of the 
provinces will increase 
-Decision- making time will 
decrease 







- Proximity of deliverers and 
receivers of service will 
increase 
- Level of government 
accountability will increase 
- Open and transparent 







-Delegating authority to 
junior levels will increase 
Government 
Size will  
İncrease While 
 lacking supervision 
 
Continue Table 6-6 
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Issue: Inclusion of budgets of 
ministries and executive bodies 
in the budget law. 
Change: 
 It is necessary to stipulate the 
budget of each province 




- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 
Political 
Stability 
 will increase 
Supervision 
Centralized to   decentralized 
 
Article 12: 
 National Audit Law 
Issue: Establishing an advisory 
board in the audit organization 
to help address violations. 
 
Change: 
Given the need to bridge the gap 
between effective supervision 
and prompt investigation of 
violations, creating advisory 
boards at the provincial levels is 
vital. 
Article 101: 
Issue: Obliging the national 
treasury to send invoices of 
monthly revenue and 
expenditure to the supreme audit 
organization. 
 
Change: The provincial treasury 
should be obliged to report 
monthly revenues and 




- Decision-making time will 
decrease 
- productivity will increase 
Technical 
Efficiency 
 will increase 
B: 
- Level of government 
accountability will increase 
- Open and transparent 







- Delegating authority to 









- Institutional and legal 





With regard to the third law closely scrutinized in this study, some reformative 
suggestions are provided from the enforcement and financial point of view under an ideal 
model named Regional-Central Government Relationship. This law is related to the 
development and regulation of mid-term development plans. Tables 6-8 and 6-9 entail the 
suggested reforms in the existing articles and also development of new articles from the 
executive and financial point of view. 
 
Continue Table 6-7 
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Table 6- 8: Proposed Changes to Development Plan Law and its Impact  
on the Executive Dimension 




Semi-centralized process will 
remain. 
Inthis phase it is possible to create the grounds for 
improving efficiency through minor changes and 
monitoring the structure of the semi-centralized 
status. 
Adoption 
Centralized to   semi-centralized 
 
Issue: Approval of the provincial 
budget. 
Article 71:reconfirmed by Article 83 
of the Fourth Five-Year 
Development Plan, outlines the 
manner of establishing the Council 
for Provincial Planning and defining 
its tasks. Based on paragraphs "m", 
"h", "z", the Council studies, 
confirms and allocates funds 
.It is necessary to add that the 
Council for Provincial Planning and 
Development approves the current 
and the development budgets 
according to the budget ceiling so 
that it would later be under no 
circumstances amended or changed 
by the Management and Planning 




- Decision- making time 
will decrease 





 will increase 
 
B: 
- Open and transparent 









- Delegating authority to 
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-Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 








Moving from decentralization to 
decentralized status 
During the Third and Fourth 
Development Plans a concerted efforts 
were made to decentralize the budget. 
However, due to inconsistency between 
this phase and other phases, and also 
inconsistency with other laws, it appears 
that that effort did not produce the 
desired 
results. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the 
following be integrated into the laws 
guiding the five-year national 
development plans: 
 - Local bodies take charge of the 
provinces' executive affairs. 
- Full authority over revenues/ resources 
generated by the provincial treasury be 
given to the Provincial Allocation 
Committee 
 - Only one development agreement shall 
be signed between the province and the 
center and the head of the Council for 
Proprovincial Planning and Development 
will be accountable to the cabinet for 
provincial activities. 
-The governor as head of the Council for 
Provincial Planning and Development 
will benefit from added executive and 
managerial authority. Regarding the 
scope of tasks, it functions beyond the 
authority of the Ministry of Interior but 
under the auspices of the president. 
 - Governors of the provinces are 
introduced to the government on the 
recommendation of ministries of interior 
and planning together. 
 - Executive bodies will undertake only 
one operational program agreement. 
 - The provincial treasury would no 
longer be restricted to a narrow defined 
status and have the benefit of a higher 
legal identity according to the 
amendment. 
-The provincial and city councils will 






 - Financial incentives of 
provinces will increase 
 - Decision- making time will 
decrease 




 and economic 
efficiency will increase 
B: 
Proximity of deliverers and 
receivers of service will 
increase 
 - Level of government 










 - Delegating authority to 









- Institutional and legal 




 will increase 
 
Continue Table 6-8 
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supervision 
Relatively     centralized tosemi 
centralized 
- Establishment of advisory boards in 
the audit organizations of 
theprovinces to help facilitate  
-Expansion of supervision by city 
and provincial councils. 
-The audit report for total revenues 
and expenditure shall be submitted 
by the provincial MPOs. 
-The heads of executive bodies shall 
be accountable to the heads of 
provincial planning councils for t 
he operational program, and 
ministers will not be accountable to 
the parliament based on their scope 
of authority. 
A: 
- Decision-making time 
will decrease 







- Level of government 
accountability will 
increase 
- Open and transparent 




 will decrease 
C: 
- Delegating authority to 
junior levels will increase 
Government 
Size will  
increase 
D: 
- Institutional and legal 







Table 6- 9: Proposed Changes to Development Plan Law and its Impact  
on the Financial Dimension 
Phase Change Impact 
Phase Change Impact 
Providing and com
piling 
Semi-centralized process will 
remain. 
With the implementation of some functional 
changes better conditions can be created for the 
execution of decentralization policies. 
Continue Table 6-8 
 
202   
  
Phase Change Impact 
Adoption 
Centralized to         semi-
centralized 
Issue: Provincial revenues 
- The total provincial revenues 
(minus oil) will be transferred to 
the treasury and figures forecast 
by the Council for Provincial 
Planning and Development shall 
be enacted. 
- Enactment of the total 
provincial revenue (notified by 
the center) is the function of the 
Council for Provincial Planning 
and Development. 
- The provincial treasury 
provides the budget amount if 
and only if it is a large figure 
enacted by the Council for 
Provincial Planning and 
A: 






 and economic 
efficiency will increase 
B: 







- Power deligation to 
junior levels will 
increase 
Government 





- The framework of authority for 
delineating activities at levels 
lower than the province should 
be expanded. 
D: 
- Institutional and legal 
framework will increase 





















Decentralized policies that are being relatively 




Continue Table 6-9 
 
















Phase Change Impact 
supervision 
Relatively decentralized  to 
semi- centralized 
In this phase of budgeting due to 
the transfer of extra activities to 
the provinces, supervisory 
bodies should be expanded to 




- Decision- making time 
will decrease 
 












- Executive bodies in charge of 
budgeting and governors are 
solely responsible for the 
outlays. 
- The relevant laws should be 
modified so that the treasury 
provides regular financial 
reports, the audit organization 
does likewise regularly, and the 
MPO makes available, on a 
systemic basis, its supervisory 
reports to the Council for 




- Power delegation  to 






 İncrease  While 
 








- Institutional and legal 




Continue Table 6-9 
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Institutional Reforms 
The last part of this research suggests several institutional reforms that will help move 
the current inefficient planning and budgeting system toward a more perfect one. Though, 
this has always been a kind of ambiguity whether the power given to central organizations 
allows them to experiment proposed reforms in favor of decentralization and devolution of 
power to local and regional authorities, these reforms are proposed to deal with the problem 
of sophisticated centralized planning and budgeting system in Iran. 
These institutional reforms can create incentives for individuals and societies and thereby 
promote the objectives of good governance which could be summarized in more social 
welfare and prosperity of the people. One of the basic principles of these institutional 
reforms was to ensure that the interests of those who make political and social decisions are 
aligned with those affected by them.    
Although Iran's Constitution offers a clear roadmap for changing the laws and institutions 
by which we live, due to its multiple barriers to change, including separate levels of and 
branches of government and a difficult amendment process to enhance the democracy, it 
has been tried to involve only those rules and regulation that the modification process is 
foregone. Any obstacle on organizing a successful reform movement and amendment of the 
proposed laws and regulation reinforces the status quo bias in centralized planning policies 
of the country.  
1 )Organizational reforms for better use of oil wealth  
As it was presented in previous chapters, due to the weak socio-economic performance 
on the one hand and unbalanced distribution of total government budget in different 
provinces of the country on the other hand, this question was formed as why Iran's 
economic growth rate is so low compared with countries like South Korea and Malaysia?  
This question is more significant specially when basic economic theory tells us that 
countries with more capital and natural resource wealth (such as oil & gas income in case 
of Iran), should grow more quickly. 
Although in words of Richard Auty (1988), the oil wealth has been described as an 
economic curse and Ross. Michael, (2013) believed that resources wealth in general and 
petroleum in particular, is an economic blight, there are many evidences that show by end 
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of 1989 and during 1990-2006 the oil producing countries grew about 40 percent faster 
than the rest of the world. This clarifies that petroleum has not been an economic curse; 
otherwise the countries with greater per capita income like Saudi-Arabia should be among 
the world's poorest countries (ibid). 
The Islamic Republic is also benefitting from oil and gas windfalls which are a kind of 
capital and should have accelerated the path of economic growth of the country. 
Nevertheless this country currently lags far behind other countries in the region according 
to most socio-economic indices, there is no doubt that unless the causes of such poor 
performance are clearly modified and effectively dealt with, the next development plans 
will have no better outcome than the others. Findings acquired in this study show that Iran's 
disappointing economic growth rate in recent years is the consequence of lack of powerful 
democratic institutions, lack of rules and regulation for a perfect decentralization on 
planning and budgeting and also inappropriate performance of government in financial, 
administrative and political affairs. At the same time, the income generated from sub soil 
asset has made the government less accountable, less or not responsiveness and also less 
inclined to promote the general welfare of the society. Toachieve fast-paced and sustainable 
economic growth; creation of employment opportunities; evaluation of productivity of 
labor force, improving political stability and increasing technical efficiency which are the 
result of a decentralized, transparent and responsive government, we need a careful new 
look at our  institutional reforms. 
During the past 30 years many multilateral institutions and organizations have been 
created to address socio-economic and cultural development of the country. Even though 
many of these responses are complementary; there are also areas of overlap, duplication of 
efforts and even conflict which are needed to be resolved. 
However, while opening up new prospects for economic growth and poverty alleviation 
which are the main objectives of this research as a whole, challenges must obviously be 
met with rigorous action, notably structural and institutional reforms, to allow the regions 
to take full advantage of the benefits of law's amendments in favor of decentralization by 
redefinition  of the role and functions of the state, central authorities, regional authorities, 
the private sector, and regional organizations for better management of government budget 
and financial resources.  An accountable and responsive systematic approach is essential to 
provide a stable environment for sustainable economic growth. To this end better 
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integration of the important dimensions of sustainable development policies (legal, 
economic and social), privatization, empowerment of democratic institution to play their 
effective roles in decision making, financial management and monitoring should be 
highlighted to promote institutional reforms.  
 
2) Need for a systematic approach 
A systematic approach is urgently needed to identify and effectively use the synergies 
that exist among many institutions and actors involved in Iran's planning and budgeting 
system. The inter-linkages approach offers a coordinated way to do this. A focus on inter-
linkages may reduce the burden placed on national authorities, promote the efficient use of 
regional and national resources and ensure that proposed amendments on financial and 
executive dimensions of laws and regulations regarding Iran's planning and budgeting 
system are mutually supportive. 
Efforts should be done to introduce formal institutions of the country to be a seminal 
contribution to how we think about institutional reforms and changes such as amendments 
of fiscal rules or anti-corruption regulations. This needs to bring together a diverse group of 
practitioners and academics to discuss what it its significance is for reform practice today.  
 
3) Policy and legislative review 
The legal system is nowadays, one of the fundamental elements of institutional 
infrastructure to the extent that inadequacies in the legal system constraints the 
effectiveness of democratic institutions. The reforms should mature to the point where 
regional administrations are well established, financial flows are structured to fit regional 
realities and local authorities start to lead service provision. There should be better ways of 
monitoring performance of regional and local administrators and create incentives for these 
authorities to pursue high levels of performance. 
Despite the growing volume of academic papers on the lack of coherency in the 
application of the laws and regulation, only limited efforts have been undertaken to 
systematically address these issues. 
It is necessary to organize an expert meeting to consult on options for achieving 
proposed reforms in tables 4-6 to 4-10. Experts must be invited to comment on pragmatic 
options and share their own proposals or concerns to these amendments. This consultation 
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should take place in connection with the Plan and Budget Law, Audit Law, Development 
plan Law and their impacts on the executive and financial dimensions.   
It should be the purpose of the consultation to obtain the views of leading experts on 
specific proposals given in chapter 6 of the research for affecting institutional reform with 
respect to evaluation of technical efficiency, political stability, transparency in the 
performance of the government and also minimizing administrative corruption which are in 
fact the result of decentralization in planning and budgeting approach of the country in 
national and regional level. 
These reforms defiantly help the provinces to change the underlying processes and 
power dynamics that determine how resources are actually allocated and help them to 
receive appropriate budget according to their potentials and requirements. 
 
4) Empowerment of Urban and Rural Councils  
According to the law,  Urban and Rural Councils which are eligible to elect the mayors and 
approve the municipality's budgets and responsible peoples for implementing the projects, 
should start looking for ways to address these important responsibilities. They currently 
have eschewed their latitudeson identifying priorities of regions, monitoring and controlling 
poor performance and management of national and regional administrators as poorly fitted 
to their context and looked instead to traditional centralized model of planning and 
budgeting.  
It should be noted that according to this law (The Law of Urban and Rural Councils 
Election) Tehran Urban Council which consisted of 15 members has enough power to 
compete with parliament in providing, compiling, notification, implementation, supervision 
and control on all aspects of Tehran's planning and budgeting system as well as nominating 
and electing the mayor who usually and traditionally nominates himself to take the position 
of the President. 
The Tehran urban and rural council is becoming more organized and collaborate more 
effectively with responsible organizations. Cooperation with ministries, government 
institutions and dialog with legislation is a good example of how this phenomenon works at 
national levels. Efforts should be made for same cooperation and dialog with provincial's 
authorities at regional levels.  In many provinces these councils play a dual role. First, as a 
mouthpiece for democracy, it is the chief challenger of the power of the state, limiting 
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deviations from good governance and acting as a regulator in the political arena and a 
credible negotiator between the people and public powers. Second, despite its overall 
efficiency, the council as a nongovernmental entity serves as a watchdog to guard against 
any environmental, social, political and economical abuse by increasing public awareness. 
  
5) Privatization and promoting the role of private sector 
In the context of economic development, the private sector is the main engine for growth. 
Accordingly, its operations must be free of heavy-handed and cumbersome regulatory or 
bureaucratic procedures that could slow its expansion. To take full advantage of Iran's 
Constitution, article 44 should be completely and perfectly implemented.  The private 
sector also needs high-quality human resources and managerial capabilities. The sector 
itself must assume some responsibility for the education and training of the workforce, 
enabling workers to take advantage of the potential offered by new information and 
communication technologies and to benefit from the relocation of industrial businesses and 
services.  
To flourish, however, the private sector also needs to be supported by a sound banking 
and financial sector within a liberalized institutional context. In particular, credit policy 
must be managed flexibly and be resolutely oriented toward fighting inflation. Exchange 
and interest rates must also be as realistic as possible, reflecting internal cyclical variations 
while staying connected to international market conditions. 
6) Financial management systems 
The success of a credible monetary policy depends crucially on a central bank that is 
wholly independent of political pressure. In addition, because of their significant role in the 
collection of savings and the financing of economic activity, banks' operations need to be 
supported by a secure regulatory framework that meets following criteria:  
a) Freedom of action that excludes any intervention by political powers in the 
distribution of credit;  
b) Development of and compliance with prudential standards comparable to those used 
internationally; and  
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c) Establishment of a banking oversight committee specifically responsible for 
monitoring strict compliance with approved banking management methods.  
All these reforms have extremely high financial and social costs that far exceed the  
continent's current resources. It is hoped, therefore, that the government may be able to 
count on international cooperation to support its economic development efforts. Particular 
attention must be paid to managing the foreign direct investment on infrastructure projects 
that aim at poverty reduction.  
 
7) Monitoring and evaluating system 
What is meant here by monitoring and evaluating system for development programs and 
plans is to provide guidance on all stages of the design and implementation of a monitoring 
and evaluation system and presents the main options with respect to the scope, issues and 
organization. Although often mentioned together, monitoring and evaluation are, in fact, 
two distinct activities, related but not identical. What they have in common is that they seek 
to capture information about what we are doing and how we are doing it.  
Monitoring:  This type of evaluation is performed while a project or a program is being 
implemented and involves tracking our progress by systematically gathering and analyzing 
information about what we are doing and whom we are reaching with the aim of improving 
the project design and functioning while in action. It can serve as a kind of early warning 
system that lets us know  if activities are being carried out as originally planned. And, if 
not, we can take measures to correct problems and adjust activities or the work plan as 
needed to be more effective. Monitoring provides the basic information and building blocks 
for evaluation. 
Evaluation is a more in-depth assessment of the performance and activities than 
monitoring. An evaluation studies the outcome of a project (changes in income, housing 
quality, benefits distribution, cost-effectiveness, etc.) with the aim of informing the design 
of future projects. Evaluation enables us to assess the progress, quality and impact of our 
work against our program strategy, our targets and our work plan.  Evaluation reveals 
whether we did what we planned to do and, if not why not? It also answers questions about 
accountability—did we complete what was promised in our proposal—and helps inform 
management decisions. It answers the questions: what was accomplished, what was the 
cost, is it worth doing again, how might it be done better in the future? In addition, 
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evaluation results increase knowledge for both our budgeting organization and stakeholders 
interested in our planning and budgeting performance.  
 
Conclusion 
Much has been said and written about the need and benefit of decentralization ever since 
it was introduced to the developing world in the 1980s. As governments started 
experimenting with and submitting to the values of decentralization, they encountered a tall 
order, including legal constraints, pore of vested interests, challenges of accountability, and 
the need for sharing power, authority and wealth with the masses. What has been the 
outcome of these colossal challenges related to planning, budgeting, transparency and 
accountability in the developed nations is not the focus of this research. Though we stand to 
gain if the powerhouses in Tehran and their supporters learn from the valuable experience 
of the developing world and realize that in today’s world the concentration of wealth and 
economic/political power in the hands of a selected few is simply not sustainable. 
This thesis and its author seek to do their fair share in contributing to the 
instruments essential to improve the quality of life and economic wellbeing of the 
majority of Iranians, enhance government accountability and responsiveness, curb the 
state’s unwanted and unhelpful interference in the economy and delegate power to the 
people. It can be fairly stated that Iran is not entirely a newcomer to the demands of 
decentralization  and  delegation  of  power. Though  we  may  have  been  a bit late in 
embracing these lofty values due to the Islamic Revolution (1979) and the chaos of the 
Iraq-imposed war (1980-88), but prominent economists, uncorrupted politicians and 
respected analysts have over the years underlined the dire need to share economic and 
political power. Most barely make a secret of the fact that the state and its huge political-
security apparatus can afford to ignore the voice of wisdom at its own peril. 
This research recognizes that despite the colossal constraints and challenges, it is 
possible and necessary to shake the pillars of  economic centralization and  move toward 
a decent, balanced, equitable, transparent and accountable state of affairs. To move strongly 
effectively on this herculean task it is crucial that lawmakers, policymakers and decision 
makers realize the gravity of the situation and hear the voice of socio-economic reason and 
logic. 
 
211   
Needless to say, the first step in the right direction is decentralizing the cumbersome 
budgeting process in which all orders and dictates flow out of Tehran to the 30 plus 
provinces. Experts in no small numbers strongly believe in and stress the need for: 
reforming the governing regulations, meaningful coordination in the budgeting process, and 
increasing the level of decentralization in the different phases of budgeting. 
With clarity of purpose it can and must be said that the venue to start from is the five-year 
development plans that encompass the economic, social and cultural needs and priorities of 
our people at five year intervals. In Iranian socio-political parlance ‘plan’ primarily means 
access to funds as without responsible funding and spending authority plans of whatever 
stripe would fall on the wayside. 
It is often claimed that the maneuverability of officials is restricted because of the laws, 
rules and regulations that guide the budgeting process. That may be partly true, but those in 
high places also need to realize that rules are not written in stone. To get better results from 
the usually limited funds that are available, we need to take a closer look at and learn from 
the mistakes of the former communist and centralized economies that ignored the 
legitimate demands of their peoples and were consigned to history as failures. 
This research has argued that Iran’s extended and omnipresent economic dilemma is the 
logical outcome of inflexible, unresponsive and centralized power. Were it not the case, the 
Iranian economy with its multi-billion-dollar annual earnings (according to published 
reports over the past seven years the government generated close to $700 billion only from 
oil exports) would have been on a better footing and offered the working class a decent 
standard of living. 
So, in the context of the five-year plans and the ‘20-Year Vision’, it is imperative that 
planners and policymakers insist on reforming regulations that for all practical purposes 
have become a part of the problem not the solution. To this end, this study has proposed 
changes to the laws guiding development plans, the work of the high audit organizations 
and finally the inefficient plan/budget system. 
Parallel to the proposals, I also have considered the impact of these changes on the 
financial, executive and implementation dimensions of national governance. In all three 
spheres it has been demonstrated that the changes built on the bulwark of meaningful 
decentralization and delegation of authority to the provinces would augur well for key 
sectors. The positive impact will include, but will not be restricted to, productivity, 
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delegation power to lower levels, economic and technological efficiency, and participation 
of the people in the politico-economic process. 
Similarly, the changes will help improve government accountability, open up the 
information system, create financial motivation in the provincial governments (keen on 
balancing their earnings and expenditures), develop the institutional and legal capacity, and 
last but not the least curb rampant administrative corruption. 
One key aspect of the proposed changes calls for budgetary and financial restructuring. In 
short, it calls for gradually breaking away from past centralized practices and delegating 
power to the provincial mangers and holding them and the relevant councils and 
ombudsmen accountable for their actions or the lack of it. 
Truth be said, budgeting and the provision of funds is a powerful political, social and 
economic weapon in today’s modern but certainly complex world. It plays a prominent role 
not only in the allocation and distribution of scare resources but also in the growth and 
development of economies and by extension the citizens of a country. By the same token it 
also determines the power base, social status and economic health of societies and 
individuals. 
The much needed economic reform in the Islamic Republic will not be meaningful 
unless the decades-old budgetary system is also rewritten and the bloated bureaucracy 
restructured in conformity with the socio-economic needs and goals of the people. 
Now it is up to those holding the levers of power in Iran to rise to the occasion and 
embark on the long delayed program of meaningful economic reforms starting with 
organized decentralization, changing obsolete and cumbersome regulations, embracing 














Table 1-4: Gross domestic production and per capita production of selected countries (1985-2005) 
Developed countries 
Gross domestic production growth (%) Per capita production (current prices) US $ 
1985 1995 2000 2005 2010 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010 
France 1.71 2.12 3.91 1.9 1.7 9600 25180 24452 34950 39170 
Germany 2.33 1.89 3.21 0.78 3.7 9530 28630 25510 34980 39852 
Japan 5.8 1.96 2.86 1.93 4.4 10850 40350 34620 38940 43063 
USA 4.1 2.54 3.69 3.08 3 3 27910 **** 43510 46702 
United Kingdom 3.54 2.94 3.8 1.84 2.1 8070 19430 25480 38320 36186 
Developing countries  
India 2.23 7.57 4.03 9.35 9.6 300 380.1 740 740 1375 
Indonesia 3.48 8.4 4.92 5.69 6.2 530 1010 590 1250 2952 
South Korea 6.8 9.17 8.49 4.2 6.3 2330 10770 9800 15930 20540 
Pakistan 7.6 4.96 4.26 7.67 4.1 370 490 490 720 1019 
Singapore -1.44 8.15 10.06 7.3 14.8 6870 23260 22970 2629 41987 
Malaysia -1.12 9.83 8.86 5.33 7.2 1940 4030 3450 5200 8373 
Under developed Countries  
Senegal 3.28 5.36 3.2 5.63 4.1 410 540 490 740 1034 
Sri Lanka May-00 5.5 6 6.24 8 370 700 880 1200 2400 
Namibia 0/55 4.11 3.4 4.71 6.6 1120 2200 1880 2650 4876 
Oil exporting countries  
Venezuela 0.2 4 3.69 10.32 -1.5 3460 2930 4 4950 13658 
Saudi Arabia -4.32 0.2 4.86 5.55 4.6 9560 7850 8.8 12700 16424 
United Arab Emirate -6.6 7.95 4.98 8.2 1.4 19900 19260 19270 0 39625 
Iran 2.07 2.66 5.14 4.62 1.8* 3380 1270 1670 2570 4526* 
Source: World development Indicators, World Bank 











Table 1-5: Investment growth rate of I.R.I during different periods 
Period Private sector Investment Public Sector Investment Total Investment 
1961-2001 5.34 7.29 5.69 
1971-2001 5.25 4.10 3.88 
1981-2001 3.93 1.45 2.75 
1988-2001 5.25 4.89 7.60 
2001-2006 3.74 6 4.32 






Table 1-6: Gross capital formation (% GDP) for selected countries (1985-2010) 
Years 
Country 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010 
France 19.22 18.56 20.47 20.33 19 
Germany 21.57 22.22 21.78 17.08 17 
Japan 28.72 28.43 25.44 23.57 20 
United state 20.28 18.15 20.49 19.51 15 
United Kingdom 18.54 17.39 17.98 17.47 15 
India 23.47 26.59 24.16 34.82 35 
Indonesia 27.96 31.93 22.25 25.08 32 
Korea, Rep. 29.97 37.67 31.00 30.06 29 
Pakistan 18.32 18.55 17.23 19.08 15 
Singapore 42.71 34.48 33.30 19.93 22 
Malaysia 24.84 43.64 26.87 19.99 21 
Senegal 17.19 13.62 20.46 29.68 29 
Sri Lanka 23.82 25.73 28.04 26.14 28 
Namibia 10.53 21.70 19.55 27.69 26 
Venezuela, RB 19.15 18.11 24.17 23.00 21 
Saudi Arabia 21.45 19.79 18.71 18.24 23 
United Arab Emirates 25.14 29.69 23.17 20.38 25 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 21.11 29.20 32.98 32.69 * 
Source: World Department Indicators, World Bank  







Table 1-7: Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (million US$) for selected countries 
(1985-2010) 
 
Country 1981 1991 2000 2005 2010 
France 2595.5 23736.3 42379.5 84996.5 71831 
Germany 821.5 11985.5 210085.4 41064.7 56644 
Japan 637.7 39.3 8227.2 3213.6  
United state 20010.0 57800.0 321274.0 112638.0 243151 
United Kingdom 5476.5 21731.5 122156.8 177405.1 154120 
India 106.1 2143.6 3584.2 6676.5 20336 
Indonesia 310.0 4346.0 -4550.4 8336.3 4914 
Korea, Rep. 233.5 1775.8 9283.4 6308.5 3586 
Pakistan 131.4 722.6 308.0 2201.0 4237 
Singapore 1046.7 11535.3 16484.5 13930.3 29348 
Malaysia 694.7 4178.2 3787.6 3966.0 6076 
Senegal -15.8 31.7 62.9 44.6 220 
Sri Lanka 26.2 56.0 172.9 272.4 479 
Namibia .. 153.0 118.9 166.1 30888 
Venezuela, RB 68.0 985.0 4701.0 2602.0 -508 
Saudi Arabia 491.4 -1874.7 -1881.1 463.7 18317 
United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. 12806 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -38.2 17.0 39.0 917.9 1647 







Table 1-8: Development investment flow in different provinces during 1989-2004 (constant price 1997) in billion Rials 









Country Total 1,726,480 269,304 80,195 70,619 1,247,772 58,589 
Markazi 31,616 6,969 1,647 1,152 21,202 646 
Gilan 45,353 5,724 2,980 1,635 34,841 173 
Mazandaran 56,629 6,772 2,607 2,447 43,709 1,095 
East Azarbaijan 61,289 13,903 3,458 3,426 40,272 229 
West Azarbaijan 32,032 5,737 2,913 1,538 21,788 56 
Kermanshah 24,833 3,611 4,315 935 15,364 608 
Khuzestan 134,297 53,489 9,563 15,414 49,947 5,884 
Fars 68,009 13,135 4,447 4,002 44,291 2,134 
Kerman 45,400 7,790 3,414 1,913 28,471 3,812 
Khorasan 96,518 13,316 6,237 5,288 69,622 2,016 
Isfahan 95,040 12,163 3,036 3,663 74,649 1,529 
Hormozgan 43,414 17,075 3,206 2,866 12,898 7,370 
Sistan and Baluchistan 24,116 7,463 3,927 1,415 11,311 1 
Kurdistan 16,904 2,716 2,772 854 10,518 44 
Hamadan 23,841 3,270 1,746 997 17,666 162 
Lorestan 20,923 3,372 2,451 1,080 14,809 211 
Ilam 12,106 2,912 2,315 342 6,145 392 
Zanjan 19,642 2,342 1,555 908 14,725 412 
ChaharMahaal and Bakhtiari 15,478 2,498 1,554 1,218 10,107 101 
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad 10,837 3,272 1,626 706 5,038 195 
Semnan 17,935 1,551 1,120 772 14,435 57 
Yazd 41,056 6,386 1,218 1,261 30,568 1,623 
Bushehr 85,463 36,693 2,224 2,632 18,305 25,609 
Tehran 640,811 29,663 4,119 12,850 590,373 3,805 
Ardabil 16,3351 2,644 1,986 453 11,205 62 
Qom 11,122 1,725 708 439 8,107 143 
Qazvin 14,288 2,205 1,241 411 10,253 178 
Golestan 20,875 1,907 1,813 0 17,112 44 






Table 1-9: I.R.I's Human Development Index by provinces (1999) 
Province Life Expediency Index Literacy Index Income Index 
Tehran  0.758 0.841 0.928 
Qom  0.71 0.748 0.928 
Isfahan  0.755 0.789 0.824 
Fars  0.708 0.747 0.9 
Yazd  0.725 0.778 0.831 
Gilan 0.755 0.742 0.781 
Semnan 0.72 0.794 0.739 
Markazi 0.695 0.735 0.82 
Kermanshah  0.667 0.7 0.875 
Khuzestan  0.698 0.703 0.836 
Kerman  0.773 0.741 0.803 
Mazandaran 0.707 0.74 0.725 
East Azarbaijan 0.692 0.693 0.772 
Bushehr 0.693 0.723 0.693 
Ardabil  0.678 0.664 0.772 
Khorasan 0.655 0.741 0.697 
Hormozgan 0.682 0.658 0.738 
ChaharMahaal and Bakhtiari 0.682 0.7 0.665 
Lorestan 0.66 0.697 0.684 
Ilam 0.65 0.724 0.651 
West Azarbaijan 0.662 0.623 0.666 
Zanjan 0.68 0.676 0.592 
Hamadan  0.675 0.698 0.538 
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad 0.64 0.702 0.527 
Kurdistan  0.61 0.607 0.641 
Sistan and Baluchestan 0.602 0.525 0.507 
 






Table 1-10: Provincial Ranking of H.D.I in Iran ( 2006) 
 
Source: First Human Development index I.R.I, World Bank 1999 
Province Human Development Index (HDI) Life Expectancy Literacy Income 
Tehran  1 1 1 1 
Qom  2 6 5 2 
Isfahan  3 2 3 7 
Fars  4 7 6 3 
Yazd  5 4 4 6 
Gilan 6 3 7 10 
Semnan 7 5 2 13 
Markazi 8 10 11 8 
Kermanshah  9 19 16 4 
Khuzestan  10 9 14 5 
Kerman  11 18 8 9 
Mazandaran 12 8 10 15 
East Azarbaijan 13 12 20 11 
Bushehr 14 11 13 17 
Ardabil  15 16 22 12 
Khorasan 16 22 9 16 
Hormozgan 17 13 23 14 
ChaharMahaal and Bakhtiari 18 14 17 20 
Lorestan 19 21 19 18 
Ilam 20 23 12 21 
West Azarbaijan 21 2 24 19 
Zanjan 22 15 21 23 
Hamadan  23 17 18 24 
Kohgiluyeh and BoyerAhmad 24 24 15 25 
Kurdistan  25 25 25 22 





Table 1-11: Effect of transferred cash flow on H.D.I by provinces in I.R.I (2006) 
Province Cash flow Transferred Million Rials H.D.I Life Expectancy Index Literacy Index Income Index 
Markazi 270.759 0.71 0.71 0.80 0.61 
Gilan 516.626 0.73 0.75 0.80 0.64 
Mazandaran 539.848 0.73 0.72 0.80 0.63 
East Azarbaijan 360.101 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.59 
West Azarbaijan 456.205 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.58 
Kermanshah 697.595 0.68 0.69 0.78 0.56 
Khuzestan 395.309 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.62 
Fars 498.966 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.63 
Kerman 611.086 0.69 0.70 0.80 0.59 
Khorasan 481.408 0.70 0.68 0.81 0.60 
Isfahan 179.412 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.65 
Hormozgan 525.273 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.59 
Sistan and Baluchistan 557.930 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.51 
Kurdistan 663.693 0.63 0.65 0.68 0.55 
Hamadan 556.478 0.68 0.70 0.78 0.57 
Lorestan 670.843 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.57 
Ilam 1.199.129 0.69 0.68 0.78 0.62 
Zanjan 557.235 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.59 
ChaharMahal and Bakhtiari 840.315 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.60 
Kohgiluyeh Boyer Ahmad 1.072.365 0.67 0.67 0.77 0.56 
Semnan 776.951 0.72 0.73 0.84 0.60 
Yazd 552.208 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.60 
Boushehr 758.460 0.72 0.71 0.82 0.64 
Tehran 94.027 0.78 0.75 0.90 0.71 
Ardabil 635.227 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.55 
Qom 446.889 0.71 0.73 0.82 0.58 
Qazvin 82.071 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.66 
Golestan 583.098 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.61 
Average 428.394 --- --- --- --- 
Correlation coefficient with Per 
Capita transferred flow 
------ -0.42 -0.53 -0.29 0.46 










Table 1-12: Iran ranking for selected indices in Southwest Asia 
Rank 








5 7 8 13 0.759 HDI 
5 7 8 14 70.2 Life Expectancy 
5 6 9 16 82.4 Literacy rate 
5 7 7 9 7.68 GDP 
1 1 1 8 17.5 Inflation 
1 2 2 4 11.6 Unemployment 
3 1 3 3 26.2 Active Population 
4 6 10 17 58.2 Rate of Participation 
3 2 2 3 177.3 Gross National Income 
6 6 10 18 4.4 
Gross Domestic Production 
Growth 














Table 1-13: Gross DomesƟc ProducƟon for selected countries (1985-2010)  
2010  2000  1995  1985  
Years
Country 
2549.0 1326.3 1572.0 543.4 France 
3258.9 1886.4 2522.8 708.9 Germany 
5488.4 4731.1 5333.9 1384.5 Japan 
14447.1 9898.8 7338.4 4184.8 United state 
2251.9 1477.2 1157.1 464.2 United Kingdom 
1684.3 474.7 366.6 236.6 India 
708.5 165.0 202.1 87.3 Indonesia 
1014.8 533.4 517.1 96.6 Korea, Rep. 
176.8 73.9 60.6 31.1 Pakistan 
213.1 95.9 80.7 19.0 Singapore 
237.7 93.8 88.8 31.7 Malaysia 
12.8 4.7 4.9 2.9 Senegal 
49.5 16.3 13.0 5.9 Sri Lanka 
11.1 3.9 3.5 1.3 Namibia 
393.8 117.1 74.9 57.9 Venezuela, RB 
450.7 188.4 142.4 103.9 Saudi Arabia 
297.6 104.3 65.7 40.6 United Arab Emirates 
331.0 101.3 90.9 170.6 Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Source: World Department Indicators, World Bank 






Table 1-14: Population and population growth rate by different Provinces (1896-2006) 
Province 1996 2006 2011 1986-1996 1996-2006 
East Azarbaijan 3225540 3602456 3724620 0.78 0.81 
West Azarbaijan 2496320 2873459 3080576 2.39 1.42 
Ardabil 1168011 1228155 1248488 1.20 0.48 
Isfahan 39223255 4559256 4879312 1.76 1.51 
Ilam 487886 545787 557599 2.47 1.13 
Boushehr 743675 886267 1032949 1.96 1.77 
Tehran 10343965 11345375 12183391 2.48 2.63 
ChaharMahal and Bakhtiari 761168 857910 895263 1.89 1.20 
Khorasan 6047661 7041071 7524663 0.43 1.74 
Khuzestan 3746772 4274979 4531720 1.45 1.71 
Zanjan 900890 964601 1015734 2.24 1.03 
Semnan 501447 589742 631218 3.40 1.33 
Sistan and Baluchistan 1722579 2405742 2534327 1.41 0.69 
Fars 3817036 4336878 4596658 1.86 1.64 
Qazvin 968257 1143200 1201565 3.71 3.40 
Qom 853044 1046737 1151672 1.80 1.28 
Kurdistan 1346383 1440156 1439645 1.86 1.67 
Kerman 2004328 2652413 2938988 3.29 2.01 
Kermanshah 1778596 1879385 1945227 2.24 0.66 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad 544356 634299 658629 2.13 2.84 
Golestan 1426288 1617087 1777014 1.97 0.55 
Gilan 2241896 2404861 2480874 2.83 1.54 
Lorestan 1584434 1716527 1754243 2.22 1.26 
Mazandaran 2602008 2922432 3073943 0.75 0.70 
Markazi 1228812 1351257 1413959 1.49 0.80 
Hormozgan 1062155 1403674 1578183 1.36 1.16 
Hamadan 1677957 1703267 1758268 1.28 0.94 
Yazd 990818 750769 990818 3.37 2.83 






Table 1-15: Some main characteristics of Iran's socio- economic structure  
  
Characteristics Issue No. 
Fixed and inflexible with administrative pricing for key economic activities. Market structure 1 
National (inefficient) monopolistic, protectionist and much influenced by political 
atmosphere. 
Space and extent of competition 
2 
Administrative bureaucracy Production organization structure 3 
Traditional, trade, and based upon natural resources Structure of economic production 4 
Oil, raw material and physical capital Sources of economic values 5 
Less than capacity, low quality and local market oriented Production characteristics 6 
Physical capital, labor force, oil and energy Key growth motivations 7 
Government subsidies and cheap production factor Sources of comparative competition 8 
Very low R & D importance 9 
Weak, centralized and individual Firms relationship 10 
Fixed and with less changes Consumer priorities 11 
Internal oriented Communications 12 
Past oriented and emphasizing traditional models Change adoption 13 
Particular job skills Skills 14 
Career skills and educational degree Training needs 15 
Administrative and uncoordinated Work place relationship 16 









Imposed regularities, unsuitable control and imperfect distribution system Relationship with businesses 18 
Fixed and without any risk Nature of law and regulation 19 
Aimless subsidies system Public service 20 
Bureaucratic Role of managers 21 
Life time Mode of employment 22 
Maximum interference and minimum role of market 
Role of government and degree of 
intervention 
23 
Unaccountable and bureaucratic Kind of accountability 24 
Source: Forth 5- Year Development Plan of I.R. Iran, 2004. 





Table2-11: Most important economic indices during first development plan (1989-1994) 






























































































































52/7  16/8  50/0   50/1  4/8  00/4  5/8  10/12  8/6  10/14  2/9  90/5  9/7  
Gross domestic production 
growth (percentage) 
1 




45/15   60/14   33/14   88/16   01/16   99/17   04/12   
Oil and Gas Exports (billion 
$) 
3 
35/2  56/3  82/4  82/4  75/3  31/6  00/3  24/4  65/2  14/3  31/1  38/2  04/1  73/1  Non Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
04/20  80/18  62/12   29/19   27/23  84/19  90/25  19/20  33/18  59/19  45/13  61/15  Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
59/18   53/15   33/16   44/18   62/18   26/22   31/17   Oil Price (US$) 6 




88/18  38/14  20/35   90/22  9/8  40/24  4/11  70/20  3/14  00/9  8/16  40/17  5/20  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
2/1468   0/2667   0/1803   0/1498   0/1420   0/1413   1207  Exchange rate (Dollar / Rail) 9 




398/0   399/0   397/0   387/0   399/0   396/0   409/0   Gini Coefficient 11 
    Source: Central Bank of Iran, Iran Statistical Center, (1989-1994) 









Table2-12: Comparison of general budget of the country with the first development plan (1989-1993) 






























































































3/4061  0/3180  4/3773  0/2592  0/2765  0/2097  1695 0/1688  9/1187  0/1150  Tax incomes 1 
3/14683  0/1344  3/5141  4/1345  4/3549  3/1142  1/3375  3/1011  1/1515  0/900  Oil & Gas incomes 2 
2/1614  1/1918  9/1044  0/1658  9/688  4/1482  4/568  5/1309  4/478  0/1100  Other incomes 3 
8/2035  1/6442  6/9959  4/5595  3/7003  7/4721  5/5638  8/4008  4/3181  0/3150  Total incomes 4 
5/13783  2/4704  6/7783  1/4482  0/5584  7/4226  8/4284  5/3923  2/3385  0/3430  Current Expenditure 5 
0/7018  4/1830  8/3192  4/1854  9/2537  9/1828  3/1766  3/1657  5/931  0/1018  Constrictive Expenditure 6 
5/20801  6/6534  4/10976  5/6336  9/8121  6/6065  1/6051  8/5580  7/4316  0/4448  Total Expenditure 7 









Table2-13: Comparison of goals and performance of the most important economic indices during 
the second development plan (1995-1999) 













































































































26/3  9/3  60/1  9/3  90/2  9/3  80/2  9/3  10/6  9/3  90/2  9/3  
Gross domestic production 
growth (percentage) 
1 




37/15  * 09/17  95/10  93/9  * 47/15  * 27/19  * 11/15  * 
Oil and Gas Exports 
(billion $) 
3 
27/3  30/3  94/3  90/3  18/3  * 91/2  87/2  11/3  21/3  25/3  25/3  Non-Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
92/13  * 43/13  99/16  29/14  * 12/14  * 99/14  * 77/12  * Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
11/17  * 47/17  * 28/12  * 68/18  * 29/20  * 86/16  * Oil Price (US$) 6 




62/25  34/14  10/20  1/22  10/18  4/12  30/17  4/12  20/23  4/12  40/49  4/12  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
8/5679  00/1570  00/8632  00/1570  00/6460  00/1570  00/4785  00/1570  00/4444  00/1570  00/4078  00/1570  
Exchange rate (Dollar / 
Rail) 
9 




3997/0  * 4009/0  * 3965/0  * 4029/0  * 3910/0  * 4074/0  * Gini Coefficient 11 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Iran Statistical Center, (1995-1999) 









Table2-14: Comparison of general budget of the country with second development plan (1995-1999) 





























































































94571 60650 8/64358  52763 4/65073  46558 9/57342  0/41121  6/41850  0/36219  Total incomes 1 
25831 17908 6/18686  14577 5/17344  11866 2/12560  0/9659  0/7313  0/7862  Tax incomes 2 
24170 26325 0/22168  25267 0/26018  24037 7/32745  0/22907  2/26666  0/21508  Oil & Gas incomes 3 
24570 16417 3/23504  12919 9/21710  10655 0/12037  0/8555  3/7871  0/6849  Other incomes 4 
7/95210  60825 8/71474  52938 8/654437  46733 4/54963  0/41296  9/41330  0/36394  Total Expenditure 5 
2/68009  31635 4/53818  28423 7/44966  26118 2/37571  0/24385  1/28448  6/22595  Current Expenditure 6 
5/27201  29190 4/17655  24515 1/20471  20615 4/17392  0/16911  8/12882  4/13798  Constrictive Expenditure 7 









Table2-15: Most important economic indices duringthird development plan (2000-2004) 












































































































5/5  6 4/6  8/6  8/7  7/6  1/8  5/6  30/3  5/5  00/5  5/4  
Gross domestic production 
growth (percentage) 
1 




05/26  07/18  32/36  55/22  36/27  09/23  97/22  80/22  34/19  86/10  28/24  08/11  
Oil and Gas Exports 
(billion $) 
3 
63/5  16/6  54/7  72/7  64/6  97/6  27/5  37/5  56/4  93/5  18/4  82/4  Non-Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
60/24  82/24  20/38  74/30  56/29  25/24  04/22  78/23  13/18  04/23  08/15  33/22  Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
27/84   05/36   10/28   36/24   12/23   60/27   Oil Price (US$) 6 




12/14  92/15  20/15  13 60/15  00/14  80/15  30/15  40/11  40/17  60/12  9/19  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
8258  00/8748   00/8325   00/8019   00/8009   00/8190   
Exchange rate (Dollar / 
Rail) 
9 




4063/0  43/0  3996/0  43/0  4156/0  43/0  4191/0  43/0  3985/0  43/0  3991/0  43/0  Gini Coefficient 11 











Table2-16: Comparison of general budget of the country with the third development plan (2000-2004) 



























































































327318 2/221544  263375 2/183821  9/213147  1/152541  128244 8/128539  107029 6/110048  Total incomes 1 
84421 8/72718  65099 1/60130  50587 6/49386  38797 3/40060  32842 2/32204  Tax incomes 2 
204560 21/99461  169944 98/84821  153817 57/70993  74957 9/62298  59449 48/56880  Oil & Gas incomes 3 
38337 2/49364  28332 1/38869  9/8743  9/32160  14490 6/26180  14738 9/20963  Other incomes 4 
289438 2/223604  236023 1/185671  8/185509  154031 128282 8/129784  108316 6/110988  Total Expenditure 5 
231923 2/156481  178251 2/136083  3/148297  7/114907  104772 5/98455  85865 3/85082  Current Expenditure 6 
57515 67123 57772 9/49587  5/37212  3/39123  23510 3/31296  22451 3/25906  Constrictive Expenditure 7 










Table2-17: Most important economic indices during the fourth development plan (2005-2009) 












































































































82/5  0/8   0/8  50/4  0/8  7/6  0/8  6/6  0/8  9/6  0/8  
Gross domestic production 
growth (percentage) 
1 
8/4  2/12   2/12   2/12  00/6  2/12  30/3  2/12  10/5  2/12  Investment growth (percentage) 2 
06/70  99/23   26/25  20/82  05/25  76/81  77/23  46/62  27/23  82/53  64/22  Oil and Gas Exports (billion $) 3 
35/14  56/10   81/12  15/18  59/11  64/15  47/10  08/13  46/9  55/10  50/8  Non Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
15/51  4/37   38/42  80/55  69/39  58/56  23/37  26/51  93/34  97/40  77/32  Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
81/68     45/94   08/69   08/61   64/50   Oil Price (US$) 6 
37/29  20  20 92/15  20 70/27  20 40/39  20 29/34  20 Liquidity growth (Percentage) 7 
52/16  9/9   9/9  40/25  9/9  40/18  9/9  6/13  9/9  1/12  9/9  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
00/9281     00/9574   00/9285   00/9226   00/9042   Exchange rate (Dollar / Rail) 9 
95/10  4/8   4/8  45/10  4/8  58/10  4/8  25/11  4/8  52/11  4/8  Unemployment rate (percentage) 10 
4019/0  38/0   38/0   38/0  4045/0  38/0  4004/0  38/0  4010/0  38/0  Gini Coefficient 11 










Table2-18: Comparison between performance of general budget of the country 
and figures of the fourth development plan (2005-2009) 






























































































Not given 758645 814235 670808.2 629609 593110.6 574989 526836 470990  Total incomes 1 
Not given 4/262631  6/203040  7/218558  5/162578  9/182521  125487 7/150397  102706 4/117830  Tax incomes 2 
Not given 192242.3 436575.4 175954.5 336062.5 157517.5 374109 140734.5 316277 128494.2 Oil & Gas incomes 3 
Not given 5/62741  80910 8/52947  80075 9/43399  559 7/35563  37119 7/29158  Other incomes 4 
Not given 758645 789407 670808.2 612964 593110.6 567556 526836 468623 457491.4 Total Expenditure 5 

















Table 2-19: Iran's planning system transformations since 1937-2003 
Contain and structure of planning system Historical and administrative conditions Plan title Period 
Establishment of economic council and commission 
of planning  
Feeling stability in administrative system of 
kingdom regime  
Non classical planning  Before 1937 
Establishment of economic council, planning 
committee and invitation of foreign consultants  
Constructive activities depend to relevant 
income  
Arrangement of first plan in 
kingdom period  1933-48  
A sectorial planning acceptable for a century devoid 
of planning  
Effect of foreign experts and international 
income elements on plan  
First constructive plan  1948-55  
Sectorial planning based on financial resource and 
budget allocation  
Attention to sectorial- traditional planning 
depend on empirical point of view  
Second constructive plan  1955-62  
Sectorial planning depend on foreign financial 
resources  
Historical particular transformations needed for 
plan like land reforms  
Third constructive plan  1962-67  
Sectorial budget planning  
Providing arrangements of basic theoretical 
principals of planning  
Forth constructive plan  1967-73  
Budgeting instead of planning and theoretical 
attention to spatial planning  
Enjoyment of oil revenue instead of any other 
approach in planning  
Fifth constructive plan  1973-78  
Attention to planning aspiration while fallowing the 
annual budgeting trend  
Emergence of diversified thoughts for ideal 
development planning  
Revolutionary and cross-section 
plans  1983-89  
Sectorial budget planning based on intermediate study 
of development theories  
Lunched into tools and patterns of planning 
and involving spatial planning  
First socio-economic development 
planning (non-approved)  1984-1989  
Budget planning under title of development planning 
and yeasty look to spatial planning  
Effective attention to financial resources for 
plan and its impact on planning system  
First socio-economic development 
planning (approved)  1989-1993  
Sectorial budget planning based on national and 
international financial resources  
Effective attention to financial resources for 
plan and its impact on planning system  
Second development plan of IRI  1994-1998  
Sectorial regional budget planning  
A planning system with tendency to 
sustainable development  
Third development plan of IRI  1999-2 003  
Sectorial regional budget planning  
A planning system based on spatial planning 
and regional development.  
Forth development plan of IRI  2004-2008  






Table 3-3: Most important economic indices during first development plan (1989-1994) 
Average 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989  







































































































































45/15   60/14   33/14   88/16   01/16   99/17   04/12   
Oil and Gas Exports 
(billion $) 
3 
35/2  56/3  82/4  82/4  75/3  31/6  00/3  24/4  65/2  14/3  31/1  38/2  04/1  73/1  
Non Oil Exports (billion 
$) 
4 
04/20  80/18  62/12   29/19   27/23  84/19  90/25  19/20  33/18  59/19  45/13  61/15  
Imports (FOB) (billion 
$) 
5 
59/18   53/15   33/16   44/18   62/18   26/22   31/17   Oil Price (US$) 6 








2/1468   00/2667   00/1803   00/1498   00/1420   00/1413   00/1207   
Exchange rate (Dollar / 
Rail) 
9 




3980/0   3993/0   3976/0   3870/0   3996/0   3969/0   4092/0   Gini Coefficient 11 








Table 3-4:Most important economic indices during second development plan (1995-1999) 












































































































26/3  9/3  60/1  9/3  90/2  9/3  80/2  9/3  10/6  9/3  90/2  9/3  
Gross domestic production 
growth (percentage) 
1 




37/15   09/17  95/10  93/9   47/15   27/19   11/15   
Oil and Gas Exports 
(billion $) 
3 
27/3  30/3  94/3  90/3  18/3   91/2  87/2  11/3  21/3  25/3  25/3  Non Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
92/13   43/13  99/16  29/14   12/14   99/14   77/12   Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
11/17   47/17   28/12   68/18   29/20   86/16   Oil Price (US$) 6 




62/25  34/14  10/20  1/22  10/18  4/12  30/17  4/12  20/23  4/12  40/49  4/12  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
8/5679  00/1570  00/8632  00/1570  00/6460  00/1570  00/4785  00/1570  00/4444  00/1570  00/4078  00/1570  
Exchange rate (Dollar / 
Rail) 
9 




3997/0   4009/0   3965/0   4029/0   3910/0   4074/0   Gini Coefficient 11 










Table 3-5:Most important economic indices during third development plan (2000-2004) 













































































































5/5  6 4/6  8/6  8/7  7/6  1/8  5/6  30/3  5/5  00/5  5/4  Gross domestic production growth (percentage) 1 
62/9  18/7  00/7  9/7  80/10  8/7  00/12  3/7  20/14  9/6  10/4  00/6  Investment growth (percentage) 2 
05/26  07/18  32/36  55/22  36/27  09/23  97/22  80/22  34/19  86/10  28/24  08/11  Oil and Gas Exports (billion $) 3 
63/5  16/6  54/7  72/7  64/6  97/6  27/5  37/5  56/4  93/5  18/4  82/4  Non Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
60/24  82/24  20/38  74/30  56/29  25/24  04/22  78/23  13/18  04/23  08/15  33/22  Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
27/84   05/36   10/28   36/24   12/23   60/27   Oil Price (US$) 6 
14/23  36/16  25/30  1/13  12/26  2/14  09/30  7/15  84/28  00/18  28/29  8/20  Liquidity growth (Percentage) 7 
12/14  92/15  20/15  13 60/15  00/14  80/15  30/15  40/11  40/17  60/12  9/19  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
8258  00/8748   00/8325   00/8019   00/8009   00/8190   Exchange rate (Dollar / Rail) 9 
68/12  65/12  30/10  5/12  80/11   80/12  8/12  20/14   30/14   Unemployment rate (percentage) 10 
4063/0  43/0  3996/0  43/0  4156/0  43/0  4191/0  43/0  3985/0  43/0  3991/0  43/0  Gini Coefficient 11 








Table 3-6: Most important economic indices during fourth development plan (2005-2009) 










































































































82/5  0/8   0/8  50/4  0/8  7/6  0/8  6/6  0/8  9/6  0/8  
Gross domestic production growth 
(percentage) 
1 
8/4  2/12   2/12   2/12  00/6  2/12  30/3  2/12  10/5  2/12  Investment growth (percentage) 2 
06/70  99/23   26/25  20/82  05/25  76/81  77/23  46/62  27/23  82/53  64/22  Oil and Gas Exports (billion $) 3 
35/14  56/10   81/12  15/18  59/11  64/15  47/10  08/13  46/9  55/10  50/8  Non Oil Exports (billion $) 4 
15/51  4/37   38/42  80/55  69/39  58/56  23/37  26/51  93/34  97/40  77/32  Imports (FOB) (billion $) 5 
81/68     45/94   08/69   08/61   64/50   Oil Price (US$) 6 
37/29  20  20 92/15  20 70/27  20 40/39  20 29/34  20 Liquidity growth (Percentage) 7 
52/16  9/9   9/9  40/25  9/9  40/18  9/9  6/13  9/9  1/12  9/9  Inflation rate (Percentage) 8 
00/9281     00/9574   00/9285   00/9226   00/9042   Exchange rate (Dollar / Rail) 9 
95/10  4/8   4/8  45/10  4/8  58/10  4/8  25/11  4/8  52/11  4/8  Unemployment rate (percentage) 10 
4019/0  38/0   38/0   38/0  4045/0  38/0  4004/0  38/0  4010/0  38/0  Gini Coefficient 11 










Table 3-7: Comparison of general budget of the country with the first development plan (1989-1993) 



























































































3/4061  0/3180  4/3773  0/2592  0/2765  0/2097  1695 0/1688  9/1187  0/1150  Tax incomes 1 
3/14683  0/1344  3/5141  4/1345  4/3549  3/1142  1/3375  3/1011  1/1515  0/900  Oil & Gas incomes 2 
2/1614  1/1918  9/1044  0/1658  9/688  4/1482  4/568  5/1309  4/478  0/1100  Other incomes 3 
8/2035  1/6442  6/9959  4/5595  3/7003  7/4721  5/5638  8/4008  4/3181  0/3150  Total incomes 4 
5/13783  2/4704  6/7783  1/4482  0/5584  7/4226  8/4284  5/3923  2/3385  0/3430  Current Expenditure 5 
0/7018  4/1830  8/3192  4/1854  9/2537  9/1828  3/1766  3/1657  5/931  0/1018  Constrictive Expenditure  6 
5/20801  6/6534  4/10976  5/6336  9/8121  6/6065  1/6051  8/5580  7/4316  0/4448  Total Expenditure 7 












Table 3-8: Comparison of general budget of the country with second development plan (1995-1999) 


























































































94571 60650 8/64358  52763 4/65073  46558 9/57342  0/41121  6/41850  0/36219  Total Incomes 1 
25831 17908 6/18686  14577 5/17344  11866 2/12560  0/9659  0/7313  0/7862  Tax incomes 2 
24170 26325 0/22168  25267 0/26018  24037 7/32745  0/22907  2/26666  0/21508  Oil & Gas incomes 3 
24570 16417 3/23504  12919 9/21710  10655 0/12037  0/8555  3/7871  0/6849  Other incomes 4 
7/95210  60825 8/71474  52938 8/654437  46733 4/54963  0/41296  9/41330  0/36394  Total Expenditure 5 
2/68009  31635 4/53818  28423 7/44966  26118 2/37571  0/24385  1/28448  6/22595  Current Expenditure 6 
5/27201  29190 4/17655  24515 1/20471  20615 4/17392  0/16911  8/12882  4/13798  Constrictive Expenditure  7 












Table 3-9: Comparison of general budget of the country with the third development plan (2000-2004) 




























































































327318 2/221544  263375 2/183821  9/213147  1/152541  128244 8/128539  107029 6/110048  Total incomes 1 
84421 8/72718  65099 1/60130  50587 6/49386  38797 3/40060  32842 2/32204  Tax incomes 2 
204560 21/99461  169944 98/84821  153817 57/70993  74957 9/62298  59449 48/56880  Oil & Gas incomes 3 
38337 2/49364  28332 1/38869  9/8743  9/32160  14490 6/26180  14738 9/20963  Other incomes 4 
289438 2/223604  236023 1/185671  8/185509  154031 128282 8/129784  108316 6/110988  Total Expenditure 5 
231923 2/156481  178251 2/136083  3/148297  7/114907  104772 5/98455  85865 3/85082  Current Expenditure 6 
57515 67123 57772 9/49587  5/37212  3/39123  23510 3/31296  22451 3/25906  Constrictive Expenditure 7 













Table 3-10: Comparison of general budget of the country with the fourth development plan (2005-2009) 





























































































Not given 758645 814235 670808.2 629609 593110.6 574989 526836 470990 457491.2 Total incomes 1 
Not given 4/262631  6/203040  7/218558  5/162578  9/182521  125487 7/150397  102706 4/117830  Tax incomes 2 
Not given 192242.3 436575.4 175954.5 336062.5 157517.5 374109 140734.5 316277 128494.2 
Oil & Gas 
incomes 
3 
Not given 5/62741  80910 8/52947  80075 9/43399  559 7/35563  37119 7/29158  Other incomes 4 
Not given 758645 789407 670808.2 612964 593110.6 567556 526836 468623 457491.4 Total Expenditure 5 
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Degree Qualification of Respondents 
Description Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Bachelor 21 22.1 22.8 22.8 
Master 64 67.4 69.6 92.4 
PhD 7 7.4 706 100.0 
Total 92 96.8 100.0  
Missing 3 3.2   
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Regional Experience of Respondents 
Description Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Province  43 45.0 45.1 63.8 
Center 28 29.4 29.4 75.5 
Center-
Province 
23 24.2 24.5 100.0 
Total  94 98.9 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.1   
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Executive Experience of Respondents by Year 
Experience 
year Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
3 4 4.2 10.0 10.0 
4 3 3.2 7.5 17.5 
5 3 3.2 7.5 25.0 
6 2 2.1 5.0 30.0 
7 2 2.1 5.0 35.0 
8 2 2.1 5.0 40.0 
10 3 3.2 7.5 47.5 
11 2 2.1 5.0 52.5 
12 2 2.1 5.0 57.5 
13 1 1.1 2.5 60.0 
14 3 3.2 7.5 67.5 
15 4 4.2 10.0 77.5 
16 2 2.1 5.0 82.5 
17 1 1.1 2.5 85.0 
18 1 1.1 2.5 87.5 
20 5 5.3 12.5 100.0 
Total 40 42.1 100.0  
Missing System 55 57.9   










Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 10 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Low 27 28.4 28.4 38.9 
Average 37 38.9 38.9 77.9 
High 19 20.0 20.0 97.9 
Very high 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 2 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Low 25 26.3 26.3 30.5 
Average 33 34.7 34.7 65.3 
High 25 26.3 26.3 91.6 
Very high 8 8.4 8.4 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 3 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Low 6 6.3 6.3 8.4 
Average 6 6.3 6.3 14.7 
High 38 40.0 40.0 54.7 
Very high 43 45.3 45.3 100.0 
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Question 4 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 21 22.1 22.1 22.1 
Low 37 38.9 38.9 61.1 
Average 27 28.4 28.4 89.5 
High 8 8.4 8.4 97.9 
Very high 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 5 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 8 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Low 31 32.6 32.6 41.1 
Average 42 44.2 44.2 85.3 
High 12 12.6 12.6 97.9 
Very high 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 6 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 6 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Low 35 36.8 36.8 43.2 
Average 41 43.2 43.2 86.3 
High 11 11.6 11.6 97.9 
Very high 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
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Question 7 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 13 13.7 13.7 13.7 
Low 39 41.1 41.1 54.7 
Average 38 40.0 40.0 94.7 
High 5 5.3 5.3 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 8 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 18 18.9 19.4 19.4 
Low 34 35.8 36.6 55.9 
Average 33 34.7 35.5 91.4 
High 7 7.4 7.5 98.9 
Very high 1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 93 97.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 2 2.1   
Total 95 100.0   
 
Question9 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 5 5.3 5.3 6.3 
High 41 43.2 43.2 49.5 
Very high 48 50.5 50.5 100.0 
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Question 10 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 5 5.3 5.3 6.3 
High 38 40.0 40.0 46.3 
Very high 51 53.7 53.7 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 5 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Average 9 9.5 9.5 14.7 
High 53 55.8 55.8 70.5 
Very high 28 29.5 29.5 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 12 12.6 12.6 12.6 
Average 16 16.8 16.8 29.5 
High 46 48.4 48.4 77.9 
Very high 21 22.1 22.1 100.0 
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Question 13 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low  5 5.3 5.3 5.3 
low 28 29.5 29.5 34.7 
Average 50 52.6 52.6 87.4 
High 12 12.6 12.6 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 14 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 7 7.4 7.4 7.4 
Low 48 50.5 51.1 58.5 
Average 28 29.5 29.8 88.3 
High 10 10.5 10.6 98.9 
Very high 1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total  94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 15 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Very low 7 4.2 4.3 4.3 
Low  54 56.8 58.1 62.4 
Average 33 34.7 35.5 97.8 
High 2 2.1 2.2 100.0 
Total 93 97.9 100.0  
Missing Data 2 2.1   
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Question 16 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low  6 6.3 6.3 4.3 
low 38 40.0 40.0 46.3 
Average 47 49.5 49.5 95.8 
High 4 4.2 4.2 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 17 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 11 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Low 41 43.2 43.2 54.7 
Average 33 34.7 34.7 89.5 
High 10 10.5 10.5 100.0 
Total  95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 18 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 11 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Low  44 46.3 46.3 57.9 
Average 37 38.9 38.9 96.8 
High 3 3.2 3.2 100.0 
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Question 19 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Very low  10 10.5 10.6 10.6 
low 38 40.0 40.4 51.1 
Average 33 34.7 35.1 82.2 
High 11 11.6 11.7 97.9 
Very high 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.1   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 20 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 13 13.7 14.0 14.0 
Low 33 34.7 35.5 49.5 
Average 36 37.9 38.7 88.2 
High 7 7.4 7.5 95.7 
Very high 4 4.2 4.3 100.0 
Total  93 97.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 2 2.1   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 21 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 5 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Low  27 28.4 28.4 33.7 
Average 44 46.3 46.3 80.0 
High 14 14.7 14.7 84.7 
Very high 5 5.3 5.3 100.0 
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Question 22 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low  8 8.4 8.4 8.4 
low 24 25.3 25.3 33.7 
Average 51 53.7 53.7 87.4 
High 12 12.6 12.6 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 23 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 8 8.4 8.5 8.5 
Low 54 56.8 57.4 66.0 
Average 27 28.4 28.7 94.7 
High 5 5.3 5.3 100.0 
Total  94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 24 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 11 11.6 11.7 11.7 
Low  55 57.9 58.5 70.2 
Average 25 26.3 26.6 96.8 
High 3 3.2 3.2 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
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Question 25 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low  12 12.6 13.0 13.0 
low 36 37.9 39.1 52.2 
Average 32 33.7 34.8 87.0 
High 11 11.6 12.0 98.9 
Very high 1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 92 96.8 100.0  
Missing  Data 3 3.2   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 26 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 30 31.6 31.9 31.9 
Low 46 48.4 48.9 80.9 
Average 16 16.8 17.0 97.9 
High 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total  94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total  95 100.0   
 
Question 27 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very low 10 10.5 10.6 10.6 
Low  52 54.7 55.3 66.0 
Average 25 26.3 26.6 92.6 
High 6 6.3 6.4 98.9 
Very high  1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
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Question 28 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Low 4 4.2 4.2 7.4 
Average 11 11.6 11.6 18.9 
High 49 51.6 51.6 70.5 
Very high 28 29.5 29.5 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 29 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Low 9 9.5 9.5 12.6 
Average 21 22.1 22.1 34.7 
High 40 42.1 42.1 76.8 
Very high 22 23.2 23.2 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 10 10.5 10.8 10.8 
Average 18 18.9 19.4 30.1 
High 45 47.4 48.4 78.5 
Very high 20 21.1 21.5 100.0 
Total 93 97.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 2 2.1   
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Question 31 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 5 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Average 10 10.5 10.5 15.8 
High 49 51.6 51.6 67.4 
Very high 31 32.6 32.6 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 32 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Average 14 14.7 14.9 18.1 
High 45 47.4 47.9 66.0 
Very high 32 33.7 34.0 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total 95 100.0   
 
Question 33 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 3.2 
Average 11 11.6 11.6 14.7 
High 50 52.6 52.6 67.4 
Very high 31 32.6 32.6 100.0 
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Question 34 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 3.2 
Average 8 8.4 8.4 11.6 
High 48 50.5 50.5 62.1 
Very high 36 37.9 37.9 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 5 5.3 5.3 6.3 
High 53 55.8 55.8 62.1 
Very high 36 37.9 37.9 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very  Low 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Average 12 12.6 12.6 14.7 
High 52 54.7 54.7 69.5 
Very high 29 30.5 30.5 100.0 
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Question 37 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Average 16 16.8 16.8 18.9 
High 54 56.8 56.8 75.8 
Very high 23 24.2 24.2 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 13 13.7 13.7 14.7 
High 46 48.4 48.4 63.2 
Very high 35 36.8 36.8 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Average 34 35.8 35.8 37.9 
High 46 48.4 48.4 86.3 
Very high 13 13.7 13.7 100.0 
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Question 40 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 9 9.5 9.6 10.6 
High 61 64.2 64.9 75.5 
Very high 23 24.2 24.5 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 12 12.6 12.6 13.7 
High 57 60.0 60.0 73.7 
Very high 25 26.3 26.3 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 8 8.4 8.4 9.5 
High 57 60.0 60.0 69.5 
Very high 29 30.5 30.5 100.0 
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Question 43 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 9 9.5 9.6 10.6 
High 56 58.9 59.6 70.2 
Very high 28 29.5 29.8 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.1   




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 21 22.1 22.1 23.2 
High 44 46.3 46.3 69.5 
Very high 29 30.5 30.5 100.0 
Total 95 100.0 100.0  
 
Question 45 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Average 9 9.5 9.5 10.5 
High 50 52.6 52.6 63.2 
Very high 35 36.8 36.8 100.0 
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Question 46 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Very  Low 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 3.2 
Average 20 21.1 21.1 24.2 
High 38 40.0 40.0 64.2 
Very high 34 35.8 35.8 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Low 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Average 23 24.2 24.2 26.3 
High 41 43.2 43.2 69.5 
Very high 29 30.5 30.5 100.0 




Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 4 4.1 4.2 4.2 
Average 11 11.6 11.6 15.8 
High 47 49.5 49.5 65.3 
Very high 33 34.7 34.7 100.0 
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Question 49 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 8 8.4 8.5 8.5 
Average 22 23.2 23.4 31.9 
High 42 44.2 44.7 76.6 
Very high 22 23.2 23.4 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total 95 100.0   
 
Question 50 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Average 16 16.8 17.0 20.2 
High 50 52.6 53.2 73.4 
Very high 25 26.3 26.6 100.0 
Total 94 98.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 1 1.1   
Total 95 100.0   
 
Question 51 
Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Low 4 4.2 4.3 4.3 
Average 5 5.3 5.4 9.7 
High 50 52.6 53.8 63.4 
Very high 34 35.8 36.6 100.0 
Total 93 97.9 100.0  
Missing  Data 2 2.1   
Total 95 100.0   
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